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 1 
Introduction:  
Asia as an Idea in Modern Intellectual History 
 
 
Research purpose 
 
From its first inscription on an Assyrian stele, the term “Asia,” which 
signifies “the place of sunrise,” has had a history of over three millennia. As the 
so-called modern world gradually took shape from the 16th century, Asia has 
also acquired new meanings that are both complex and ambiguous. This 
dissertation focuses on the early 20th century, a time when interaction between 
the East and the West in many aspects reached a peak, and explores how 
Asia—as a major reference for Europe—has assumed a specific cultural identity 
in world historical narratives through both passive representation and active 
identification.  
The Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) played a remarkable 
role in the theorization of Asia. After winning the Nobel Prize in Literature in 
1913, he travelled around the world, criticizing modern Western civilization as 
being plagued by materialism and nationalism, and proposing Eastern 
civilization as spiritual remedy. While this process and the content of Tagore’s 
discourse have received much elaboration, by examining Tagore’s relationship 
with various distinct contexts, the dissertation aims at a systematic analysis of 
the conflicting views of “the East” or “Asia” in the early 20th century. Before 
specifying the methods, structure, and content of the dissertation, I will briefly 
define its scope. 
 
Research scope 
 
Though Tagore is the central figure of the dissertation, this is not a 
monograph of Tagore studies in the sense that it does not delve into biographical 
details, nor does it dissect Tagore’s literary works or his artistic, social, and 
philosophical thought. Focusing on Tagore’s civilizational discourse, this 
dissertation seeks to analyze Tagore’s formulation of such ideas as “Asia,” 
“modernity,” and “nationalism” when addressing a West-centric world order, 
and to examine how Tagore’s views contributed to the remaking of the above 
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notions. That Tagore can serve as a nexus for a wide-range intellectual network 
in the modern world is largely due to his earning the Nobel Prize in 1913, a 
drama I will analyze in detail as one of the mechanisms of Orientalism. 
Furthermore, the dissertation explores how Tagore has been evaluated in 
different countries, and how this process has contributed considerable 
complexity and nuances to the making of “Asia” in the early 20th century.  
Therefore, it seems appropriate to define this project as a study of 
“intellectual history” or, more precisely, “the history of ideas,” with “world 
history” being the ultimate conceptual category in which both Eastern and 
Western countries have attempted to gain discursive vantage, whether from the 
opposite or the same hemisphere. Nonetheless, I do not intend to trace these key 
ideas—Asia, modernity, nationalism, and world history—to their origins, nor 
will I exhaust their historical variations. What is attempted in this dissertation 
is the contextualization of these ideas in the early 20th century, a time when 
Tagore’s voice was among one of the prominent opinions. 
Accordingly, I have used many of Tagore’s own English writings, including 
those translated from Bengali by himself, as primary sources. My lack of 
proficiency in the Bengali language no doubt obstructs full appreciation of 
Tagore’s profundity. However, for the historical period in question, it can be 
claimed that Tagore’s English writings suffice for an in-depth discussion, as he 
was obliged to convey his cultural vision to the world through this lingua franca. 
The limited awareness of Tagore has been, as I will emphatically argue, also due 
to this language that was not native to Tagore. Here I will quote a paragraph 
from Ramachandra Guha’s introduction to the 2009 Penguin reprint of Tagore’s 
Nationalism to justify my own focus:  
 
This essay has, somewhat deliberately, ignored Tagore’s creative 
oeuvre—his poems, plays, novels and songs by which he is best known 
and which are most especially revered in his native Bengal. There, his 
views on the social and political questions of the day appear indirectly, 
by allusion. It is in his lesser-known essays and lectures that he writes 
more directly on such matters as nationalism and internationalism, 
and the conflict and cooperation of cultures. Admittedly, this 
methodological focus was also mandated by a linguistic deficiency. I do 
not know Bengali, so many of the nuances of Tagore’s fiction and 
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(especially) poetry would be lost in translation. But I console myself 
that it is in his non-fiction that we are more likely to find the Tagore 
who speaks to the world.1 
 
In the same vein, this dissertation attempts to explore “the Tagore who 
speaks to the world.” As will be revealed, nevertheless, in the contemporary 
world, those socio-politcally oriented essays and lectures of Tagore are by no 
means “lesser-known” as understood by Guha. On the contrary, while many 
Indians—particularly the Bengali circles—appreciate Tagore through his 
artistic expression, the poet reemerges in a global forum today primarily 
because of his civilizational vision and criticism. What historical process has 
contributed to this schism of Tagore’s images in different corners of the world? 
This is the question I will be trying to address in various analytical frameworks. 
 
Research methods 
 
Given the scope and characteristics of the dissertation as delineated above, 
to relate Tagore to the crystallization, or perhaps complication, of the idea of 
Asia, this dissertation adopts three interconnected approaches to sketch the 
East-West paradigm prevalent in the early 20th century, which was defined 
geographically, culturally, as well as ideologically.  
First, a documentary approach. Both primary and secondary materials 
are extensively referenced. The former, some of which are only available in 
India, are used for a nuanced study of Tagore’s civilizational discourse, 
whereas the latter are drawn upon to examine the diversity of evaluation of 
Tagore in different parts of the world. This diversity, to a great extent, is 
connected with the various ways of perceiving and imagining the East. 
Second, a historical approach. Based on textual analyses, the dissertation 
attempts to present the complex process of exchange of ideas between 
intellectuals worldwide, with Tagore as nexus. Apart from demonstrating the 
conflicting nature of some heated ideas, I will also modify some simplistic 
conclusions about Tagore’s thought found in previous research.  
Third, a theoretical approach. Viewed against a broader backdrop, Tagore’s 
                                                   
1 Ramachandra Guha, “Introduction: Travelling with Tagore,” in Rabindranath Tagore, 
Nationalism (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2009), p.xlix. My italics. 
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civilizational discourse is an antithesis to a West-centric philosophy of history 
and theories of modernity. Therefore, an examination of how Asia has been 
characterized by the West since the Enlightenment and how Asians have 
reacted to the often biased image is necessary. Such discussions will show that 
the crystallization of the East-West paradigm is a process of mutual recognition 
and imagination. 
 
Dissertation structure  
 
The dissertation is divided into four parts and contains eight chapters in 
total. The two chapters of Part I define the core issues of the project, examining 
the formulation of Tagore’s East-West paradigm and the mythologizing of his 
image in many parts of the world. The West, chiefly Britain, and India were 
naturally the main stages for Tagore’s cultural endeavors, a fact that has been 
thoroughly studied. Nevertheless, a synthetic perspective is attempted in this 
part to analyze the rise and fall of Tagore’s global reputation on broader 
historical and theoretical grounds.  
While Western factors often weigh more than Eastern ones in Tagore’s 
civilizational discourse owing to the imbalance in power structure at the time, 
the importance of the latter is not overlooked. The four chapters of Parts II and 
III delve into the intricate relationships between Tagore and the modern 
intellectual histories of China and Japan—the two countries dearest to him to 
form an Asian unity with India—which are more complicated and intellectually 
inspiring than demonstrated by previous research.  
The two chapters of Part IV bring the historical reconstruction into a larger 
context, comparing how the three main actors of Asia—namely, China, India, 
and Japan—have been depicted in modern world historical narratives, based on 
their respective historical backgrounds, geographical conditions, and relative 
relationships with the West. This part seeks to strengthen previous arguments 
by demonstrating how the idea of Asia was triggered by non-Asian standards. 
 
Dissertation content 
 
Part I of the dissertation, “Tagore and His East-West Paradigm,” is 
composed of Chapters 1 and 2: 
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Chapter 1 critically reviews the making of Tagore’s public image and 
concomitant studies of him. By exploring the ideological premises that have 
undergirded interpretations of the Indian poet for nearly a century, this chapter 
demonstrates that many of the regional, temporal, and thematic ramifications of 
the topic are, on a deeper theoretical level, closely related to different ways of 
conceiving and projecting the East, which constitute different types of 
Orientalism. 
Chapter 2 deals with the three overarching ideas of “spirituality,” “Asia,” 
and “modern world history,” and delves into three corresponding spaces of 
discourse: Western comments on Tagore around the time of his rise to fame, 
Tagore’s view of Eastern and Western civilizations, and world historical 
narratives prevalent in his time. By focusing on Tagore, this chapter aims to 
sketch a brief history of the formulation of the idea, or ideology, of Asia in the 
early 20th century. 
Part II of the dissertation, “Tagore and His Eastern Asia: Japan,” is 
composed of Chapters 3 and 4: 
Chapter 3 characterizes Tagore’s view of Japan as Nihonjinron (theory of 
Japaneseness), and compares it to the comments of such Western luminaries as 
John Dewey (1859-1952) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) to examine how Asia 
was differently valued by Eastern and Western thinkers respectively in the 
early 20th century. Such differences were determined by their intellectual 
backgrounds, political stances, and personal feelings for the future prospects of 
Asia. 
Chapter 4 examines the major trends of modern Japanese intellectual 
history through the refraction of Tagore. Tagore was admired in Japan as the 
first Nobel laureate from Asia, but his warning against Japan’s Westernization 
irritated many Japanese in 1916. After the defeat of WWII, however, Tagore’s 
message was earnestly reviewed in Japan, and he has become an inspiring 
figure in the current age of globalization. This chapter traces these vicissitudes 
through textual evidence. 
Part III of the dissertation, “Tagore and His Eastern Asia: China,” is 
composed of Chapters 5 and 6: 
Chapter 5 focuses on the Chinese experiences of John Dewey, Bertrand 
Russell, and Rabindranath Tagore during the May Fourth period. Owing to the 
peculiar cultural milieu at the time, these visitors were often involved in 
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domestic debates either directly or indirectly. The reactions of Chinese 
intellectuals to these visitors were usually more political than intellectual, 
foreshadowing the sharp turn taken afterwards in modern Chinese history. 
Moreover, the artificiality of the idea of Asia is observable through comparing 
the lectures of Dewey, Russell, and Tagore in Japan and in China. 
Chapter 6 reconstructs the relationship between Tagore and modern 
Chinese intellectual history. This attempt comes from an observation that 
current research on Tagore conducted by Chinese scholars is often too limited in 
perspective, with Tagore’s 1924 controversial visit to China occupying most of 
the attention. I have addressed this problem by comparing Tagore’s discourse 
with that of many contemporary Chinese and Westerners to unveil a wider 
intellectual frame. 
Part IV of the dissertation, “Asia in World Historical Narratives,” is 
composed of Chapters 7 and 8: 
Chapter 7 reflects on the axial age theory, one of the world historical 
narratives produced in the early 20th century. Although the theory is not exempt 
from West-centricity and attaches different values to China and Japan 
according to their degrees of modernization, its comparative frame can possibly 
be adapted to the idea of East Asia, which is gaining prominence in the study of 
world history and is expected to provide a non-Western geo-cultural paradigm. 
Chapter 8 surveys how the East features in the modern world historical 
genre. While China has not much in common with India, they were generally 
regarded as the two pillars of ancient Eastern civilization and thus as 
essentially different from the West and Japan. Critically, the knowledge-power 
structure of “world history” as a genre became all the more conspicuous when 
imperial Japan tried to challenge West-centricity in its own narratives. By 
comparing the views of Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Western thinkers, this 
chapter shows a critical episode in the remaking of “the East” in the modern 
world. 
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Part I 
Tagore and His East-West Paradigm 
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1. Tagore and Orientalism: 
Tagore Studies as a Focus for East-West Debate 
 
 
1 .1  Tagore from the Perspective of  Oriental ism 
 
This chapter reviews various traditions of research on Rabindranath 
Tagore. As the title suggests, the review is not a comprehensive bibliographical 
survey, but aims to examine the relationship between Tagore’s words, 
knowledge about him, and Orientalism as a way of thinking and representation.  
The current review is contextualized temporally: academic and cultural 
organizations around the world just celebrated the 150th anniversary of Tagore 
in 2011. Many symposia, recitation gatherings, and painting exhibitions were 
held to commemorate the poet’s multifaceted talents and to discuss the 
relevance of his thought to the age of globalization. Furthermore, 2013 is the 
centenary of Tagore’s receipt of the Nobel Prize in Literature, an event that 
surprised the world a century ago and made Tagore the most renowned 
Easterner at the time. This honor, however, was not without drawbacks. 
Outside of India, Tagore is mainly observed through the prism of “the East” or 
“Asia,” which to a great extent has reduced his versatility to a “spiritual,” 
“mystic,” and “anti-Western” monochrome, although exploration of Tagore’s 
works indicates that such epithets cannot be applied uncritically.  
Against this backdrop, I argue that Orientalism is a useful concept for 
examining how the evaluation of Tagore has fluctuated in the past hundred 
years. Orientalism, which signifies not only a discipline but a European practice 
of ideological connotations, is defined by Edward Said (1935-2003) as follows in 
his 1978 magnum opus:  
 
Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and 
epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of 
the time) “the Occident.”1 
 
In more political terms, Orientalism is “a Western style for dominating, 
                                                   
1 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p.2. 
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restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”2 Said drew on such ideas 
as Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1937) “hegemony” and Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) 
“discourse” to explain the Western effort to assume a cultural vantage over the 
non-Western world and sustain that superiority through textual exactitude and 
intellectual conviction. Since the process under discussion derives from a 
time-honored cultural endeavor that finds one of its ancient origins in 
Herodotus’ (484?-425? BCE) Histories, it would be methodologically improper to 
force an analogy between Orientalism as a large-scale project and Tagore as an 
individual case. Nevertheless, if we define Orientalism as essentially a way of 
thinking about the Orient based on its presumed differences with the Occident, 
Tagore certainly embodies a nexus of various practices that juxtapose East and 
West.  
One more caveat is necessary here. Although Said fully recognized the 
immensity of the Orient and that much of the expanse is more or less subject to 
European (and later American) scrutiny and representation, he restricted his 
discussion to the Islamic world, as its geographical proximity to Europe has long 
provoked the latter’s anxiety, enmity, and exotic imagination. India, in contrast, 
constitutes another kind of Orientalist project owing to an inherent political 
disorder that rendered it vulnerable to European rivalries and political control.3 
In Said’s subsequent exploration of the problem of image-making in the 
West-centric power structure, India, along with other non-Western regions, is 
given a more in-depth account. Said generalizes the issue as follows: “What are 
striking in these discourses are the rhetorical figures one keeps encountering in 
their descriptions of ‘the mysterious East,’ as well as the stereotypes about ‘the 
African [or Indian or Irish or Jamaican or Chinese] mind’.”4  Furthermore, 
Tagore’s criticism of nationalism has been cited as a brilliant example of 
“resistance culture.” 5  For Tagore, nationalism is not a convenient 
anti-colonialist tool, but rather is a product of Western capitalism and 
materialism that should be kept from. It is on this humanistic ground that 
                                                   
2 Ibid., p.3. 
3 Ibid., p.75. 
4 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p.xi. The words 
in brackets are Said’s. For a meticulous study of India and European Orientalist projects, see 
Raymond Schwab, Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking trs., The Oriental Renaissance: 
Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880 (New York: Columbia UP, 1984). Said 
does not say much about the relationship between India and Orientalism in his foreword to 
the English version, which might indicate that he had not yet been engaged in this topic at 
such an early date (prior to 1984). See pp.vii-xx. 
5 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, p.215.  
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Tagore differentiated a “spiritual East” from a “materialistic West.” Yet he was 
never sparing in admiration for the West’s indefatigable search for scientific and 
technological progress, as long as such advances remained in the service of 
humanity. 
Despite his attack on the Western system of nation-state, Tagore was also a 
nationalist in the broadest sense in that he strove for an independent India. But 
such independence was to be premised upon harmonization of the ancient 
Indian spirit with modern scientific facilities, a vision of which Isaiah Berlin’s 
(1909-1997) praise is worth quoting at some length: 
 
A not dissimilar problem seems to me, from what I have read in Tagore, 
to have faced India towards the end of last century [i.e. the 19th 
century]; and he never showed his wisdom more clearly than in 
choosing the difficult middle path, drifting neither to the Scylla of 
radical modernism, nor to the Charybdis of proud and gloomy 
traditionalism. (I know that some have thought Tagore to have yielded 
too much to the West. I confess that I did not find this so in those of his 
works that I could read in English. He seems to me to have kept to the 
centre.)6 
 
Berlin and Said are among those few leading intellectuals who are not 
Tagore experts but regard his thought as having universal value rather than 
merely embodying local concerns. Berlin admired the difficult path that Tagore 
chose, but the parenthesized note is somewhat simplistic. Actually, Tagore was 
considered no less a cultural conservative than an Occidentophile, depending on 
the standpoints of his critics. As both the global environment and domestic 
situations have changed through time, the reception of Tagore in different parts 
of the world also has undergone transformation. Many of these transformations, 
nonetheless, are epistemologically connected with Orientalism: while views on 
Tagore are deeply grounded in local experience and change with historical 
conditions, what remains unaltered seems to be a division between the two 
hemispheres, which are claimed to be the most problematic categories of the 
                                                   
6 Isaiah Berlin, “Rabindranath Tagore and the Consciousness of Nationality,” in The Sense 
of Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their History (London: Pimlico, 1996), p.260. 
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meta-geographical imagination.7 
Furthermore, although scholars like Berlin and Said do not reference 
geographical constraints when evaluating Tagore’s ideas, their sole focus on his 
nationalist critique also betrays the fundamental Orientalist treatment that 
Tagore has received. This bias, however, is historically attributable to Tagore 
himself. This chapter comprises a review of this history and the development of 
various conventions of Tagore studies that reveal how the East-West debate has, 
explicitly or implicitly, weighed on the world’s cognition of Tagore for a century.8 
 
1 .2  Tagore ’s  Global  Reputation and Concomitant Issues 
 
In the article “Restoring Rabindranath Tagore,” Mary Lago (1919-2001) 
claims that “[t]he most persistent myth, which began to adhere from the very 
beginning of his Western career and has done lingering harm, is that of Tagore 
as latter-day Wise Man from the East.”9 As this statement weaves together key 
terms that characterize Tagore’s international career—not only in the West but 
virtually everywhere outside India—it serves as a fine start for an analysis of 
the formulation of Tagore’s international image.  
Rabindranath Tagore was born to an aristocratic family in 1861 in Kolkata 
(known as Calcutta before 2001). Well connected to the colonial government and 
the British East India Company, Tagore’s family background exposed him to 
both traditional Indian classics and the modern Western disciplines of art, 
humanities, and sciences, and rooted his sensitivity in the tension between East 
and West. Given this intellectual cultivation, the awarding of the Nobel Prize in 
1913 to Tagore made him a ready spokesperson for the East. Travelling and 
                                                   
7 Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography 
(Berkeley: U of California P, 1997), p.x. 
8 Using Orientalism as a theoretical framework is not new to Tagore studies. For example, 
both Ana Jelnikar and Huang Wei-lin 黃威霖 adopt Orientalist criticisms extensively in 
their analyses. This paper focuses on the historical process of Tagore’s being “Orientalized,” 
dealing with theorization in the final section. For the two references, see Ana Jelnikar, “W. B. 
Yeats’s (Mis)Reading of Tagore: Interpreting an Alien Culture,” in Kathleen M. O’Connell 
and Joseph T. O’Connell eds., Rabindranath Tagore: Reclaiming a Cultural Icon (Kolkata: 
Visva-Bharati, 2009), pp.318-344; Huang Wei-lin, Wenmingchayi yu xiandaixing: Taigeer de 
zhengzhilixiang jiqi dui Zhongguowenming de qipan 文明差異與現代性―泰戈爾的政治理想及
其對中國文明的期盼  (Civilizational Differences and Modernity: Rabindranath Tagore’s 
Political Ideals and His Perspective on Chinese Civilization) (Taipei: Department of Political 
Science, National Taiwan University, 2011), especially Chapter 3, “Dongfang wenming yu fan 
Yazhou zhuyi” 東方文明與泛亞洲主義 (Eastern Civilization and Pan-Asianism).  
9 Mary Lago, “Restoring Rabindranath Tagore,” in Mary Lago and Ronald Warwick eds., 
Rabindranath Tagore: Perspectives in Time (London: Macmillan, 1989), p.5.  
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lecturing around the world subsequently became routine. With a sense of 
mission when speaking to the devastating results of WWI, Tagore eagerly 
preached the spiritual superiority of Eastern civilization, which in his eyes 
provided a remedy for a modern Western culture characterized by materialism 
and nationalism. 
Obviously, the cultural mission on which Tagore embarked hinged on a 
crucial episode, that is, the surprising 1913 Nobel Prize in Literature, which 
followed his sensational popularity in and beyond London from 1912 and was 
claimed as “one of the genuine romances of literary history.”10 According to a 
letter from Tagore to his niece dated May, 6, 1913, he began translating 
Gitanjali (song offerings) into English in March, 1912, when his trip to England 
was postponed by a sudden illness. He boarded the ship in May and continued 
the translation. When Tagore arrived in London and gave the manuscripts to his 
painter friend William Rothenstein (1872-1945), whom he had known in Kolkata 
years earlier, they were passed with great enthusiasm to W. B. Yeats 
(1865-1939). The Irish poet then wrote an introduction and edited the poems for 
publication in September;11  “from there on you know the story”12 —Tagore 
referred to the extraordinary welcome he received in the same letter. What is 
more, he became the first Nobel laureate from Asia half a year later. 
Introductory or scholarly publications on Tagore in languages other than 
Bengali appeared in abundance for several years after the event. 
On the English translation of Gitanjali, Tagore admitted that “[e]ven today 
I cannot grasp how I wrote it and how people have liked it so much.”13 As 
Tagore seems to have been unprepared for his phenomenal popularity in the 
West, Yeats’ effusive praise in his introduction to Gitanjali might lend some 
insight into the “romance”: 
 
We write long books where no page perhaps has any quality to make 
writing a pleasure, being confident in some general design, just as we 
fight and make money and fill our heads with politics—all dull things 
in the doing—while Mr. Tagore, like the Indian civilization itself, has 
                                                   
10 Ibid.  
11 Rabindranath Tagore’s letter to Indira Devi Chaudhurani, in Krishna Dutta and Andrew 
Robinson eds., Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 
pp.117-118. 
12 Ibid., p.118. 
13 Ibid., p.117. 
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been content to discover the soul and surrender himself to its 
spontaneity.14 
 
The stark contrast between Western and Indian civilizations finds 
expressions in “general design” versus “spontaneity,” and “fight and make 
money” versus “discover the soul.” Yeats’ appreciation for Tagore probably 
stemmed from his own affinity for mysticism, personal political orientation, and 
fatigue with modern civilization.15 Yet it was not uncommon for contemporary 
Western critics to take what they imagined as the Indian spirit to be antidotal to 
a Western civilization frayed with political and commercial competitions.  
Soon after Gitanjali, a series of lectures given at Harvard in February, 1913 
were published as Sadhana, which also circulated widely in the West, especially 
in America and England. The book bears a subtitle, The Realisation of Life, and 
contains Tagore’s own interpretation of the Upanishads and the teachings of 
Buddha that “have ever been things of the spirit, and therefore endowed with 
boundless vital growth.”16 Through these lectures, Tagore hoped that “western 
readers will have an opportunity of coming into touch with the ancient spirit of 
India as revealed in our sacred texts and manifested in the life of to-day,”17 a 
wish to reverse an observed tendency of mummifying the religious scriptures of 
India in Western academia. Nevertheless, the publication of Sadhana also 
brought unexpected repercussions: “Mystical poems are private balm for the 
restless soul, but prose exposition elicits rebuttal.”18 In other words, what was 
implied in Gitanjali was made into argumentative form, thus drawing 
disputation. Moreover, “Sadhana marked Tagore as the Man with a Message,”19 
which did Tagore “lingering harm” as he would never be appreciated qua poet 
ever again.  
                                                   
14 W. B. Yeats, “Introduction,” in Rabindranath Tagore, Gitanjali: Song Offerings (London: 
Macmillan, 1913), p.xx. For a critical reading of Yeats’ Orientalist message in his 
introduction to Gitanjali, see Ana Jelnikar’s article mentioned in note 8. 
15 Comparison between Tagore and Yeats constitutes the subject of many essays, each 
highlighting   different aspects. Apart from Ana Jelnikar’s article mentioned in note 8, see 
also Harold M. Hurwitz, “Yeats and Tagore,” in Comparative Literature, Vol. 16, No. 1 
(Winter, 1964), pp. 55-64; Louise Blakeney Williams, “Overcoming the ‘Contagion of Mimicry’: 
The Cosmopolitan Nationalism and Modernist History of Rabindranath Tagore and W. B. 
Yeats,” in The American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 1 (Feb., 2007), pp. 69-100.  
16 Rabindranath Tagore, Sadhana: Realisation of Life (New York: Macmillan, 1913), p.viii. 
17 Ibid., p.vii. 
18 Mary Lago, “Restoring Rabindranath Tagore,” in Mary Lago and Ronald Warwick eds., 
Rabindranath Tagore: Perspectives in Time, p.14. 
19 Ibid. 
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In brief, the accolades Tagore received in the West not only divided his life 
into two contrasting periods—from that of a locally (not even nationally) known 
poet to a world-famous thinker or preacher—but also presupposed an East-West 
dichotomy in the world’s perception of him. 20  It is to this simplistic 
understanding that Mary Lago addressed her article, "Restoring Rabindranath 
Tagore." But a reasonable question is: what can we restore to Tagore if his 
image has long been biased? Historically, since much of Tagore’s versatility, 
including social criticism and educational reform, found expression (and 
markets) after his achievement of worldwide acclaim—not to mention that 
Tagore half-willingly adapted himself to the niche that the West created for 
him—it would be difficult to construct a more polymorphous image of Tagore 
outside India without his primary identity as an Eastern messenger. Culturally, 
infatuation with Tagore’s exoticism proved momentary. As Lago pointed out, 
Western readers soon asked for something more than the romantic mysticism of 
Gitanjali, and it was in the competition for reviews and bookshelves that Tagore 
unknowingly lost the race and dragged further and further behind modern 
writers such as T. S. Eliot (1888-1965), Ezra Pound (1885-1972), James Joyce 
(1882-1941), and D. H. Lawrence (1885-1930).21 Indeed, as early as the 1920s, 
Edward Thompson (1886-1946), an early Western biographer of Tagore, had 
perceived a possible miscontextualization of Tagore in the contemporary 
cultural milieu: “I have remembered always that Tagore…as a writer was the 
contemporary of the later Tennyson and Browning and Robert Bridges. In 
fairness, he must be judged as the Victorian poets are judged, whose world has 
passed away.”22 
Of course, more complicated factors are accountable for Tagore’s fall from 
                                                   
20 In a newly published biography that sketches Tagore’s intellectual life rather than his 
experiences, the author still has to acknowledge the impact of the event on Tagore’s public 
image while playing down the importance of the Nobel Prize: “For the common man, the 
decade 1909-1919 was, of course, chiefly remarkable because of the celebrated event, the 
award of the Nobel Prize in 1913. At this time Tagore was just harvesting the fruits of his 
work earlier and getting them translated for a foreign readership. In terms of his intellectual 
life, it is doubtful if this episode was significant. However, these English translations, 
sometimes edited by his intellectual associates in England, were significant in representing 
Tagore as the ‘spiritual’ poet of the East.” Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Rabindranath Tagore: 
An Interpretation (New Delhi: Viking, 2011), p.13.  
21 Mary Lago, “Restoring Rabindranath Tagore,” in Mary Lago and Ronald Warwick eds., 
Rabindranath Tagore: Perspectives in Time, p.19. 
22 Edward Thompson, Rabindranath Tagore: Poet and Dramatist (S.l.: Pierides Press, 2008), 
p.vii. This book was first published in 1926, and revised and reissued in 1946. Thompson had 
another title prior to this, Rabindranath Tagore: His Life and Work, which was published in 
1921. 
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grace in the eyes of Western readers. As widely noted, Yeats’ wishful 
representation of Tagore as an otherworldly figure, Tagore’s own omission in his 
translation of the parts that he considered would be difficult for Westerners to 
understand, and the filtering out of his modernist works (most of them novels) 
by Western publishers all contributed to the monochromatic image of Tagore as 
a mystic. With the publication in 1917 of Nationalism, which criticizes 
West-originated nationalism from the angle of humanistic universalism, “he had 
become a political voice that seemed to be setting East against West. To many, 
he was a Christ-figure turned Jeremiah.”23  
Clearly, on both a cultural and political level, Tagore became characterized 
as a messenger from the East, an image that remains to the present day despite 
the vicissitudes of Tagore’s reputation. But what was the East and how was it 
defined in contradistinction with the West? Since Tagore established himself as 
the representative of the East by virtue of a reputation earned in the West, this 
dichotomy became more a premise than a hypothesis for his thought. His views 
also contradicted the perceptions of other Eastern cultures, notably Japan and 
China. Moreover, the West itself is a problematic notion. A considerable portion 
of Western discussions on Tagore are of English or American origins, and 
Tagore’s observation of the West was largely shaped by his intimacy with 
English culture through colonial rule. By exploring different responses to 
Tagore in various parts of the world, the following sections reveal how the 
East-West dichotomy has pervaded those discourses. Though far from being 
comprehensive, this examination clarifies how the idea of the East or Asia, 
presumably geographical and cultural, has been mainly devised for political 
ends, as Orientalism argues. 
 
1 .3  Orientalist  Approach to  Tagore:  India  and the West 
 
Orientalism might not be the optimal approach to Tagore in India, where 
Tagore’s fellow countrymen are more able and willing to view him in a real-life 
context. Nonetheless, analysis of some interrelated discussions on Tagore in 
India will make it clear that, in many cases, Westerners are the presumed 
readers of those studies that frequently address what is said about Tagore in the 
                                                   
23 Mary Lago, “Restoring Rabindranath Tagore,” in Mary Lago and Ronald Warwick eds., 
Rabindranath Tagore: Perspectives in Time, p.16. 
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West. Therefore, by looking at India and the West together, this section 
attempts to demonstrate how contrasting images of Tagore and a continuum of 
views on him coexist paradoxically. 
Ashis Nandy once said that “as you well know, all Bengali intellectuals are 
automatically Tagore scholars.” 24  Though facetious, Nandy’s remark is 
indicative of how local Bengalis are treating Tagore as an icon: familiarity with 
his works constitutes an essential part of cultural literacy in the 
Bengali-speaking region.25 Such fervor is also evident in an article from The 
Guardian:  
 
No other language group reveres a writer as 250 million 
Bengali-speakers do Tagore. Shakespeare and Dickens don’t come into 
the picture; the popularity of Burns in Scotland 100 years ago may be 
his nearest equivalent in Britain.26  
 
In sharp contrast to this zeal is the indifference to Tagore in the 
English-speaking world today, for which there is statistical evidence: neither 
the Oxford nor Penguin editions of dictionaries of quotations, for example, 
contain anything by Tagore. 27  This absence appears ironic compared with 
Yeats’ claim of Gitanjali that “as the generations pass, travellers will hum them 
on the highway and men rowing upon rivers.”28 Another reminder to reinforce 
the irony is that in 1936, Yeats still included seven of Tagore’s poems in The 
Oxford Book of Modern Verse, although he was no longer as enchanted with 
                                                   
24 Ashis Nandy, “Violence and Creativity in the Late Twentieth Century: Rabindranath 
Tagore and the Problem of Testimony,” in Patrick Colm Hogan and Lalita Pandit eds., 
Rabindranath Tagore: Universality and Tradition (Madison: Associated University Presses, 
2003), p.264. 
25 Cf. “For millions of Indians and Bangladeshis, Rabindranath Tagore is at present, as he 
was in his lifetime, a cultural icon.” See “Introduction,” in Kathleen M. O’Connell and Joseph 
T. O’Connell eds., Rabindranath Tagore: Reclaiming a Cultural Icon, p.11. Aware that “icon” 
does not always assume a positive meaning, the editors nonetheless refer readers to the 
cultural, religious, and political sophistication that the term can embody. This volume is 
based on a 2008 conference at the University of Toronto, which heralded a series of events 
celebrating Tagore’s 150th anniversary. See also University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol.77, 
No.4 (Fall, 2008). 
26 Ian Jack, “Rabindranath Tagore was a global phenomenon, so why is he neglected?” See: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/07/rabindranath-tagore-why-was-he-ne
glected. 
27 Ibid. By chance, the journalist remembers one line and one stanza, but he avows that “I 
owe this knowledge to (a) a tourist guide in Agra, and (b) to a biography. Reading Tagore 
himself had nothing to do with it.”  
28 W. B. Yeats, “Introduction,” in Rabindranath Tagore, Gitanjali: Song Offerings, p.xv. 
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Tagore at that time as he had been in the 1910s.29  
The journalist asks “why is he neglected?” on May, 7, 2011, that is, Tagore’s 
150th anniversary. Personally he had listened in Kolkata to some bureaucrats 
complain for hours about how impossible it is to approach Tagore from English 
translations, an anecdote that reflects an awareness among Bengalis of the 
cultural differences between themselves and outsiders. Revealing the opposing 
images of Tagore in India and in Britain, this report was partly motivated by 
Amartya Sen, who was giving a talk at the British Museum to remind his 
audiences of Tagore’s legacies on the eve of the poet’s birthday.  
Whether Amartya Sen claims the title of Tagore scholar is dubitable. 
Nevertheless, there are multiple bonds between the two Bengali luminaries: 
Sen’s grandfather shared an intellectual partnership with Tagore; he himself 
received secondary education at the institution established by Tagore; the 1998 
Nobel Prize in Economics also obliges Sen to make critical comments on his 
predecessor.30 In “Tagore and His India,” Sen, like every concerned scholar, 
notes the discrepancy in publicity about Tagore in his homeland and in the rest 
of the world today,31 and considers the de-mythologizing of Tagore his primary 
task. Conscious of Tagore’s complexity and inner contradictions, he seeks to 
demonstrate a Tagore of maximum elasticity without sacrificing fundamental 
principles. Inevitably, such recognition was easily eclipsed by convenient labels 
such as “spiritualist” or “anti-modernist,” and in more than one aspect Amartya 
Sen observes what Isaiah Berlin pointed out as “the difficult middle path” that 
Tagore chose.  
An ambitious attempt to portray Tagore as a Renaissance figure is a 1995 
biography, Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man. 32  Indeed, the 
                                                   
29 W. B. Yeats ed., The Oxford Book of Modern Verse: 1892-1935 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1936), pp.63-67. See Chapter 2 for a thorough discussion of this issue. 
30 Actually, it has become an honor to have Amartya Sen contribute an introduction or piece 
to to-be-published volumes on Tagore. This emotion is well expressed in a 2011 volume, 
Tagore and China. One of the editors, Tan Chung, recollects in his own introduction that 
“when Amartya promised to contribute to our volume, my friends, especially those in China, 
had been overwhelmed by the good news as if we had won a big prize.” See Tan Chung and 
Amiya Dev eds., Tagore and China (New Delhi: SAGE, 2011), p.xxvii. Another motive for 
requesting a contribution from Amartya Sen to this volume was that his grandfather, Kshiti 
Mohan Sen, was among the five members who accompanied Tagore on his 1924 China trip. 
31 Amartya Sen, “Tagore and His India,” in The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian 
History, Culture and Identity (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p.89. 
32 English biographies of Tagore are numerous from 1913 to 1995, but it is claimed that only 
two of them are generally regarded as significant. The first is by Edward Thompson, 
Rabindranath Tagore: Poet and Dramatist, first published in 1926, which is not immune 
from Euro-centrism. The second is by Tagore’s grandson-in-law Krishna Kripalani 
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corpus of Tagore’s verbal works, which comprises poems, plays, novels, lyrics, 
essays, lectures, and letters—all dealing with a wide range of topics—cannot 
fully represent his creativity, as he is also the composer of thousands of 
paintings and songs (including the national anthems of both India and 
Bangladesh), as well as a rural reformer and school founder. Interestingly, when 
it comes to the reception of Gitanjali in the West, the two authors claim: “Today, 
by contrast, his prose writings would more likely have secured him the prize 
than his translated poetry.”33 The Guardian article also expresses a similar 
view: “perhaps the time has come for us to forget Tagore was ever a poet [due to 
translation problems], and think of his more intelligible achievements. These 
are many.” 34  These many achievements start with Tagore’s being “a fine 
essayist” and end with his being “a critical nationalist,” which are precisely 
Tagore’s two most appealing qualities for contemporary reviewers. I would 
argue, however, that what is needed today is exactly the opposite of the 
suggestion, that is, a reexamination of why Tagore was NOT primarily 
identified as a poet throughout his international career. This is arguably a 
better way to “restore” Tagore. In this regard, the 1913 Presentation Speech by 
the Nobel Prize Committee is historically significant but has, strangely enough, 
long been ignored. The Committee awarded the prize to Tagore for the following 
reason: 
 
…because of his profoundly sensitive, fresh and beautiful verse, by 
which, with consummate skill, he has made his poetic thought, 
expressed in his own English words, a part of the literature of the 
West.35 
 
After praising the perfection with which Tagore combined faith and 
                                                                                                                                             
(1907-1992), Rabindranath Tagore: A Biography, first published in 1962, which is weakened 
by its tendency to deify Tagore and eulogize Indian nationalism. For the comment, see 
Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man 
(London and New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2009), p.15. The two treatments contrast 
not only in terms of perspective but also chronologically regarding the mutual definitions of 
Britain/Europe and India/Asia before and after WWII. For Thompson’s book, see note 22. 
Kripalani’s view of Tagore will be mentioned at the end of the chapter. 
33 Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man, 
p.185. 
34 See note 26. 
35 Horst Frenz ed., Nobel Lectures, Literature 1901-1967 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing 
Company, 1969), p.127. 
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thought in his figurative language, the Committee went on to recognize that 
“the poet’s motivation extends to the effort of reconciling two spheres of 
civilization widely separated, which above all is the characteristic mark of our 
present epoch and constitutes its most important task and problem.”36 Despite 
the keen awareness of this hemispheric discrepancy, however, the speech 
ignores the imperialist causes of the poor communication between the two 
spheres, firmly subsuming Tagore under Christian influence, whose 
proselytizing mission was thought to have inspired poetic expression in general, 
and to have revitalized vernacular language in particular outside the West.  
Since it was the first time for the Nobel Prize to be granted to an Asian, the 
Committee showed much appreciation for the border-crossing initiative. 
Nevertheless, while expecting a mutually benefiting interaction between East 
and West, the Speech in many respects assumes the superiority of the latter and 
adopts a typical Orientalist view, which characterizes the East as a treasure 
house of “good tidings,” “whose existence had long been conjectured.” 37 
Moreover, the question of with which tradition Tagore should be identified also 
incited debate. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975), an eminent philosopher 
who was later to become the Vice-President and then President of India, had 
already observed before 1918 that there were two views regarding Tagore’s 
philosophy. One held that Tagore’s theism was akin to, if not identical with, 
Christianity; the other held that Tagore was a great student of Buddha and a 
fine articulator of the Upanishads in the modern era.38 It is not necessary to 
wade into this religious dispute. Suffice it to say that, from the very outset, the 
historic naming of an Asian as poet laureate was emblematic of the 
problems—rather than the solution—inherent in the mutual recognition 
between East and West in the early 20th century.  
Indeed, documents show that Tagore had been deeply concerned with the 
East-West debate from his youth. Nonetheless, it was the Nobel Prize and the 
cultural milieu then that made the issue more and more central to his writings 
and lectures. If Tagore was not yet aware of the reason for his Western acclaim 
in 1913, when he eventually gave a speech in Stockholm in 1921 (he was unable 
to attend the awards ceremony eight years earlier), he was confident enough to 
                                                   
36 Ibid., p. 128. 
37 Ibid., p. 131. This issue is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
38 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore (London: Macmillan, 
1919), pp.2-6. 
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claim that he “represented the East” to receive the prize, 39  inevitably 
impressing his Western audiences as more of an Eastern messenger than a poet.  
Amartya Sen notes that “he is not much read now in the West, and already 
by 1937, Graham Greene was able to say: ‘As for Rabindranath Tagore, I cannot 
believe that anyone but Mr. Yeats can still take his poems very seriously.’”40 In 
fact, in a dedication to the volume celebrating Tagore’s 70th birthday in 1931, 
Yeats had indirectly shown indifference to Tagore’s later poems and praised his 
prose instead.41 We can assume that Yeats was also impressed by Tagore’s 
critiques on nationalism, as a large proportion of his English essays is on 
civilizational issues. In the preface of The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, 
Radhakrishnan also affirms that “the book would be lacking in wholeness 
without an account of Rabindranath’s views about Nationalism in the East and 
the West.”42  In any case, the change from Tagore the poet to Tagore the 
messenger or essayist is discernible. Long after Tagore fell into oblivion 
altogether in the West, when new voices emerged to draw fresh attention to 
Tagore in terms of his contemporary relevance, it was his cultural and political 
discourse that first became the focus of distinguished scholars such as Isaiah 
Berlin and Edward Said. 
Publications on Tagore in the West did not actually cease during the 
decades after his death, but it was not until the end of the 20th century that a 
new research paradigm took shape, which tends to place Tagore in an 
anti-colonialist or postcolonial context. Here Tagore constitutes a brilliant case, 
for he was both a beneficiary of British rule, culturally and materially, and a 
fierce critic of imperialism in the modern world. Ashis Nandy, for instance, 
penetrates Tagore’s cultural vision from three sets of contradictions that 
“[d]uring the last hundred and fifty years…Afro-Asian reformers and thinkers 
have tried to reconcile,” namely, “that between the East and the West; that 
between tradition and modernity; and that between the past and the present.”43 
                                                   
39 Rabindranath Tagore, “The Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The 
English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (New Delhi: Atlantic, 2007), Volume V: Essays, 
p.5. 
40 Amartya Sen, “Tagore and His India,” in The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian 
History, Culture and Identity, p.89. 
41 W. B. Yeats, untitled, in Ramananda Chatterjee ed., The Golden Book of Tagore: A 
Homage to Rabindranath Tagore from India and the World in Celebration of His Seventieth 
Birthday (Calcutta: The Golden Book Committee, 1931; Rammohun Library & Free Reading 
Room, 1990), p. 269. 
42 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, pp.viii-ix. 
43 Ashis Nandy, The Illegitimacy of Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of 
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The arguments are elaborately constructed although the author claims that he 
is not a Bengali turned Tagore scholar.44 
In an article entitled “Rabindranath Tagore and His Contemporary 
Relevance,” the authors delve into Tagore’s ideas of humanism, nationalism, 
and internationalism, which are considered deeply relevant to our age of 
globalization.45 One of the authors, Uma Das Gupta, specializes in Tagore’s 
thought on education and nationalism. She elucidates the close connection 
between the two fields as follows: 
 
[Tagore] hoped to institute an education for cultural understanding at 
two levels, between the country’s alienated urban and rural 
populations and between India and the West. He believed that would 
be the self-respecting way of countering the humiliation of colonial 
rule and overcoming the isolation enforced by colonization.46 
 
Das Gupta also clarifies Tagore’s different attitudes towards nationalism. 
In most cases, “Nationalism” with a capital “N” refers to a West-originated 
ideology that reduces people’s will to mere efficient political and commercial 
functions, while “nationalism” with a lowercase “n” in a non-modern-Western 
context provides cohesion to a community of great diversity like India.47  
Admittedly, Tagore’s thinking on culture, society, and politics is profound 
enough for continuous exploration, but there are two things noteworthy in 
relevant discussions. First, Tagore is hardly treated as a poet;48 second, even in 
                                                                                                                                             
Self (Delhi: Oxford UP, 1994), p.1. 
44 See note 24. 
45  Uma Das Gupta and Anandarup Ray, “Rabindranath Tagore and His Contemporary 
Relevance.” See: 
http://www.parabaas.com/rabindranath/articles/pContemporaryTagore.html.  
46  Uma Das Gupta ed., The Oxford India Tagore: Selected Writings on Education and 
Nationalism (New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2009), p. xxi. The same author dedicates a short 
biography to the relationship between Tagore’s educational ideals and his peculiar views on 
nationalism: “Disillusioned with nationalist politics, he turned to his own responses to the 
many troubled questions of the changing times. He was convinced that there could be no real 
political progress until social injustices were removed. He pointed repeatedly to the sectarian 
elements of Indian nationalism which kept our people divided. He hoped that the 
Santiniketan-Sriniketan education would create a new Indian personality to show the way 
out of the conflict of communities. He brought a different dimension to nationality by arguing 
for universal humanity.” Uma Das Gupta, Rabindranath Tagore: A Biography (New Delhi: 
Oxford UP, 2004), p.x. A late biography highlights similar points of Tagore’s life. Uma Das 
Gupta, Rabindranath Tagore: An Illustrated Life (New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2013). 
47  Uma Das Gupta ed., The Oxford India Tagore: Selected Writings on Education and 
Nationalism, p.xxiii. 
48 While the image of Tagore the poet is rather obscure in cultural and political issues, 
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this field issues are largely raised by Indians who are proficient in English,49 
and they are mainly addressing British readers for obvious historical reasons. 
Therefore, it can be said that while the simplistic understanding of Tagore’s 
thought is elided in the new academic environment, the research paradigm 
remains shaped by an Orientalist premise that addresses the problems of 
identity and representation.  
Nearly all mentions above of the West are equivalent to Britain. Tagore’s 
last public lecture, “Crisis in Civilisation,” is also an indictment against the 
Western, chiefly English, manipulation of world politics. 50  While this 
illegitimate equivalence of the West with Britain is historically understandable, 
it also reinforces the dominance of the English language over the international 
forum on Tagore. As a consequence, discussions on colonialism and nationalism 
will likely remain mainstream for some time to come.  
An interesting attribute of Tagore studies is their periodic or even 
spasmodic nature. Since Tagore’s death in 1941, renewed interest in Tagore is 
usually concomitant to commemorative events such as Tagore’s centenary in 
1961, his 125th anniversary in 1986 and, most recently, his 150th anniversary in 
2011. Publications on Tagore cluster in the years around those events and the 
medium is primarily, although not exclusively, English. Amid this English 
literature, nevertheless, a considerable portion examines the reception of Tagore 
in different areas, thus providing a convenient way to observe Tagore’s image in 
the non-British West. Responses are diverse indeed, given particular historical 
contexts in which different countries received the Indian luminary. For instance, 
                                                                                                                                             
Tagore the novelist has received critical evaluation for unveiling conflicts in Indian 
nationalist movements and social problems. Gora (1910) and The Home and the World (1916) 
are his two most discussed novels. 
49 For example, Amartya Mukhopadhyay, Politics, Society and Colonialism: An Alternative 
Understanding of Tagore’s Responses (New Delhi: Cambridge UP, 2010). On the back cover of 
the book a paragraph reads: “Even as his 150th birth anniversary draws near, Rabindranath 
Tagore remains quite underexplored. Nirad C. Chaudhuri predicted that the difficulty in 
translating Tagore’s work would ensure that in future his work will lie ‘like a buried city in 
the past.’ The problem of translating his work in any of the European or modern Indian 
languages and his position as a cult figure in India have contributed to this gap between 
adulation and understanding. Recent revival of interest in the West in Tagore’s work only 
partly redresses this imbalance. For, much of Tagore’s central claim to greatness lies in his 
social thought.” While largely dovetailing with this statement, this chapter serves to 
“redress” the “imbalance” from the opposite direction by reviewing how non-artistic issues 
have gained prevalence in mainstream Tagore studies. For a recent postcolonial reading of 
Tagore by a non-Indian author, see Michael Collins’ Empire, Nationalism and the 
Postcolonial World: Rabindranath Tagore’s writings on history, politics and society (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2011). 
50 Rabindranath Tagore, “Crisis in Civilisation,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings 
of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VII: Lectures, Addresses, pp.980-986. 
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we are told that post-WWI Germany was seeking a message from the Eastern 
“savior;” Bulgarians were strongly sympathetic to Tagore’s search for national 
dignity; West-oriented Hungarian intellectuals were quite aware of the 
Orientalist implications of Tagore’s Nobel Prize; etc.51 Significantly, from these 
periodic tributes it can be discerned that publication of Tagore’s works resurges 
towards the end of the 20th century in many countries, but that in not one of 
them has a new research paradigm crystallized as in the English-speaking 
world. For these countries, Tagore is a memory passed down from the 1910s and 
1920s and inevitably identified with a mystic East. However, despite the 
relative shortage of systematic Tagore studies in non-British European 
countries, Tagore’s visits to the European continent and his interaction with 
local intellectuals contributed to his overarching notion of the West, which is 
worth further examination for both biographical and historical reasons. 
 
1 .4  Orientalist  Approach to  Tagore:  Japan and China 
 
In a Tagore-centered context, the West is often identified with Britain, 
while India occupies a pivotal role in relevant depictions of the East. 
Nonetheless, for geographical and historical reasons, Tagore was passionate in 
calling for Japan and China to make a unified Asia. Unique perspectives on 
Tagore’s cultural vision have also formed in the two countries. 
Tagore became known in Japan and China through his acclaim in the West, 
which means they, like Western countries, approached Tagore mainly through 
his mystic lyricism in English translation. Tagore’s name first appeared in 
Japan because of the Nobel Prize;52  in China, the earliest introduction to 
Tagore was published even before announcement of the Prize.53 Nevertheless, 
since Tagore became an Eastern messenger from the beginning of his 
international career, when he headed for Japan and China in 1916 and 1924 
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respectively, what he tacitly assumed was this identity, although he always 
claimed himself to be a poet. 
Tagore’s experiences in Japan helped sharpen his views on the East-West 
dichotomy, which for him was also the old-new division: 
 
In that country the old world presents itself with some ideal of 
perfection…And side by side, in the same soil, stands the modern 
world, which is stupendously big and powerful, but inhospitable.54 
 
The duality of Japanese society was a topic that Tagore dwelled on in his 
1916 speeches delivered in Japan, and that later became one of the sections of 
Nationalism. Without much protest, Tagore referred to the negative image of 
Asia in modern Western eyes:  
 
We have been repeatedly told, with some justification, that Asia lives 
in the past…It was said of Asia that it could never move in the path of 
progress, its face was so inevitably turned backwards.55 
 
In the rather subdued atmosphere, “[o]ne morning the whole world looked 
up in surprise, when Japan broke through her walls of old habits in a night and 
came out triumphant.”56 However, Tagore refused to believe that Japan was 
able to modernize by imitating the West, and he made a critical distinction 
between modern as self-renewing and modern as alienating. While the former 
draws inspiration from tradition, the latter becomes subordinated to inhuman 
utility. Through this dialectic, the old and the new acquired meaning in terms of 
cultural resources rather than of technological advancement, which challenged 
the normative definition of modernity shaped by the view of linear progress. 
Therefore, Tagore appealed to the responsibility of Japan as pioneer in the East: 
“She must infuse the sap of a fuller humanity into the heart of modern 
civilization.”57 Of course, he did not forget that the West had its great tradition 
of humanity, but the profit-seeking nationalism largely crowded out the ideal, a 
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tendency that Tagore also observed growing in Japan:  
 
What is dangerous for Japan is, not the imitation of the outer features 
of the West, but the acceptance of the motive force of the Western 
nationalism as her own. Her social ideals are already showing signs of 
defeat at the hands of politics.58 
 
Tagore’s message was not well received in Japan, which in 1916 was 
enjoying a rise in international status and developing a militarist pan-Asianism 
that sought to annex China after having acquired Taiwan and Korea. Taking a 
longer view, there were two important interlocutors who marked the beginning 
and end of Tagore’s direct dialogue with the Japanese. The intervening forty 
years witnessed a change in Japan’s Asian sentiments and policies. 
Tagore’s friendship with Okakura Kakuzō 岡倉覚三  (1863-1913), the 
author of The Ideals of the East and who coined the slogan of “Asia is one,”59 
began when the latter stayed in India for the year from 1901 to 1902. Although 
no documentation of their correspondence or conversations is available, Tagore 
remembered his Japanese friend cordially in a 1929 speech in Tokyo: 
 
The voice of the East came from him to our young men. That was a 
significant fact, a memorable one in my own life. And he asked them to 
make it their mission in life to give some great expression of the 
human spirit worthy of the East.60 
 
Tagore invoked the memory of Okakura not for nostalgia’s sake, but to 
engage in another round of preaching against imperialist Japan, which was 
deviating further and further from Okakura’s ideal. Noguchi Yonejirō 野口米次
郎 (1875-1947) was one of the “converts” from idealism to militarism. Being a 
member of the welcoming committee for Tagore’s 1916 tour, 61  by 1938, 
Noguchi’s pan-Asianism had grown so aggressive that he tried to convince 
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Tagore of the necessity of the war against China:  
 
But if you take the present war in China for the criminal outcome of 
Japan’s surrender to the West, you are wrong, because, not being a 
slaughtering madness, it is, I believe, the inevitable means, terrible it 
is though, for establishing a new great world in the Asiatic 
continent…62 
 
Needless to say, their relationship soured, and thus ended Tagore’s 
four-decade effort to appeal to Japan for Asian unity.  
Slightly earlier than the correspondence with Noguchi, Tagore sent in 1937 
a message of consolation to the Chinese people, whose country had been invaded 
by the Japanese. Tagore claimed that, by submitting itself to Western “scientific 
effrontery,” Japan had lost its legitimacy to lead Asia into the modern era.63 In 
fact, as early as 1920 when Tagore had a conversation with Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 
(1895-1990) in New York, he had suggested that Chinese learn science quickly 
but be wary of the jingoism that was rising in Japan.64 Therefore, it was almost 
natural for Tagore to turn to China for a true unity of Asia, a journey he was to 
embark on a few years later, in 1924. 
On this tour, Tagore kept reminding his Chinese audiences of the difficulty 
his Indian ancestors endured in bringing the philosophy of love to their land. 
This bond was even stronger than the one with Japan, as the Japanese received 
Buddhism mainly through China and Korea, not from India directly. He also 
often praised China’s humanistic tradition: 
 
You are the most long-lived race, because you have had centuries of 
wisdom nourished by your faith in goodness, not in the merely strong. 
This has given you your great past.65 
                                                   
62 “Tagore and Noguchi,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, 
Volume VIII: Miscellaneous Writings, p.1135. 
63 Rabindranath Tagore, “To the People of China,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings 
of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VIII: Miscellaneous Writings, p.1132. 
64 Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, “Yu Indu Taiguer tanhua: dongxiwenming zhi bijiaoguan” 與印度泰
谷爾談話―東西文明之比較觀 (Conversation with Tagore from India: A Comparative View of 
Eastern and Western Civilizations) in Sansongtang quanji 三松堂全集 (Complete Works of 
the Sansong Chamber) (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Publishing House, 2001), Vol.11, pp.6-7. 
The conversation between Tagore and Feng is scrutinized in Chapter 6.  
65 Rabindranath Tagore, “Talks in China,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Volume IV: Essays, p.758. 
 28 
 
But the cruel fact remained that both India and China seemed to be 
overburdened with the past, to which Tagore had nothing to offer but spiritual 
consolation: 
 
Let the morning of this new age dawn in the East, from which the 
great streams of idealism have sprung in the past…Prove how, 
through the heroism of suffering and sacrifice—not weak 
submission—we can demonstrate our best wealth and strength.66 
 
Such a stance involved Tagore in a heated cultural dispute in 
early-twentieth-century China. There were three approaches being debated for 
China’s future: pro-Westernization, anti-Westernization, and various versions of 
eclecticism. While Tagore was largely ignorant of this situation, as an Asian 
celebrity he was easily idolized on the one hand and became a convenient target 
of criticism on the other. When some Chinese admirers celebrated Tagore’s 64th 
birthday in Beijing on May, 8, 1924, Liang Qichao 梁 啓 超  (1873-1929) 
presented him with a Chinese name, Zhu Zhendan 竺震旦 , which was a 
combination of the old appellations of India and China and most symbolic of the 
ancient East.67 The joy of this celebration, however, was not shared by many 
people. Politically, both leftists and rightists found Tagore’s “heroism of 
suffering and sacrifice” unacceptable. What they did not understand was that 
Tagore had once been an activist in the Indian independence movement. But 
this aspect found little place in his admirers’ eulogies and in his own grand 
narrative of East-West civilizations.68 Culturally, Tagore’s tendency to dress 
everything in idealism caused much dissatisfaction. For example, Chen Duxiu 
陳獨秀 (1879-1942) pointed out that there were two fundamental mistakes in 
Tagore’s argument: “First, he misunderstands the value of science and material 
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civilization; second, he leads Eastern countries the wrong way for liberation.”69 
In brief, what most concerned the Chinese people in the early 20th century was 
physical power and national independence. 
Complementary to the experiences in the West, where Tagore faced a 
Eurocentric version of Orientalism, Japan and China provided him with 
necessary instances to base his own version of Orientalism on spiritual 
superiority. Tagore’s controversial visits to Japan and China have been 
examined at length by Stephen Hay in his 1970 monograph, which astutely 
indicates how Tagore inherited and revamped the East-West paradigm that was 
de facto of Western origin.70 Critically, while Edward Said did not mention 
Tagore’s arguments in his Orientalism, the issue of the West’s biased 
representation of the East was raised in an international forum by Tagore more 
than half a century before Said’s groundbreaking work. 
Actually, Tagore did not possess genuine knowledge of either Japan or 
China; he simply adapted his notions of them to an overarching framework: 
 
Tagore and other Bengali religious leaders had answered this question 
[of East-West dichotomy] by stressing modernized traditions of Indian 
religious and philosophical thought, leaving the direction of political, 
economic, and military affairs to Westerners, many of whom readily 
acknowledged the superior spirituality of India’s sages and 
seers…Such a division of labor seemed to Tagore to work so well that 
he visualized the whole of Asia concentrating its energies on cultural 
and spiritual pursuits.71 
 
Nevertheless, as an engaged observer, Tagore differentiated his messages 
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to Japan and China, testifying to the structure of modern world history in which 
Japan and China lay on the opposite sides of “modernization.” More importantly, 
some thought-provoking issues that can be addressed from an Orientalist 
viewpoint derive from his interaction with the two Asian countries. 
Firstly, in most biographies of Tagore written by Indians or Westerners, his 
Eastern journeys constitute nothing more than passing episodes. This treatment 
is almost inevitable since Tagore emerged as an Eastern prophet through 
Western acclaim and imagination. The Japanese and Chinese episodes became 
possible owing to the laurels from the West, against which Tagore kept revising 
his cultural perspective throughout his life. Neither Japan nor China critically 
influenced Tagore’s worldview or mainstream studies on him.  
Secondly, that Tagore’s message was not taken seriously in his time in 
either Japan or China does not imply that those countries were not interested in 
a pan-Asian project. Just as Tagore fervently celebrated the Japanese victory 
over Russia in 1905, his being awarded of the Nobel Prize in 1913 also aroused a 
sense of pride in Japan and China. What alienated Tagore from Japanese and 
Chinese intellectuals was his idealist conception of Asia, which was against 
Japan’s offensive pan-Asianism on the one hand, and adverse to the doubly 
defensive version of China’s Asianism against both Japan and the West on the 
other.72 
Thirdly, the change of world politics gradually made Tagore’s previously 
unheeded message relevant to post-war Japan and China. Japan’s ruinous 
defeat in WWII reminded some scholars of Tagore’s fierce criticism of 
nationalism, which was revisited as early as 1961 in the commemorative volume 
celebrating Tagore’s 100th birth anniversary.73  Furthermore, as devastating 
defeat brought with it the conviction in the Japanese mind that peace must be 
maintained at any cost, Tagore in his role as a messenger of Eastern humanity 
has become a frequent subject. China, too, has its own convention of Tagore 
studies. While a great deal of discussion is on the controversial 1924 trip that 
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was deeply related to modern Chinese intellectual history,74 more and more 
scholars are reviewing the great impact Tagore had on the New Literature 
Movement of China in the 1910s and 1920s, as well as his contribution to 
revitalizing cultural interaction between China and India. With the rise of both 
countries on the world stage towards the end of the 20th century, there have 
been some attempts to reexamine Tagore’s proposition of an Eastern civilization 
in the context of globalization, which aims to counter the long-prevalent 
Western paradigm of modernity.75 Undeniably, Tagore’s multifaceted relevance 
to the contemporary world finds strong evidence in Japan and China, but 
concerns there are chiefly locally or regionally oriented, with the identity and 
implication of the East lingering in scholars’ minds.  
Last but not least, just as the West refers to a much wider domain than 
Britain, Tagore’s Asian experiences were by no means exhausted by Japan and 
China. Nine years earlier than Stephen Hay’s work, there was a 1961 volume 
discussing Tagore’s Asian ideal from the viewpoint of his visit to Thailand.76 
Tagore’s travelogues composed during the Southeast and West Asia trips also 
provide an alternative to reviewing his own East-West paradigm. Furthermore, 
although the poet never visited Taiwan or Korea, people in the two Japanese 
colonies found great inspiration from his anti-colonialist thought. For 
contemporary Tagore studies, his Eastern experiences have not yet been fully 
explored, and fewer critiques of him have been collected from Eastern than from 
Western sources. This asymmetry is, perhaps, more evidence of the so-called 
Euro-centrism that informs Orientalism. 
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1.5 Orientalism as an Omnipresent Factor  
 
This chapter delves into Tagore’s thinking, public image, and studies on 
him from the perspective of Orientalism, contextualizing him not as a cultural 
figure representing the East during his time, but as a case in modern 
intellectual history that witnessed different approaches to the East.  
As specified in the first section, what Orientalism entails is an 
epistemological distinction between the East and the West, with the latter 
usually assuming an active role. Following this broad definition, the second 
section delineates the process of Tagore’s becoming (represented as) an Eastern 
mystic, which laid the backdrop for most concomitant discussions on the Indian 
poet. While the third section contrasts the diametrically opposed attitudes 
towards Tagore in India and in the West today, the fourth section also 
presupposes a Western “other” against which early-twentieth-century Japan 
and China adjusted their respective views of the East or Asia. In this concluding 
section, I will expand on the complicated function of Orientalism on three 
interconnected levels, that is, the mythologizing of Tagore, the crystallization of 
problematics of Tagore studies, and the emergence of the East as an issue. 
The first level. In 1913, the West observed Tagore as a figure who “in 
conformity with the express wording of Alfred Nobel’s last will and testament, 
had during the current year, written the finest poems ‘of an idealistic 
tendency’.”77 By 1961, nevertheless, one scholar had already indicated that 
“[s]tudies of Tagore’s poetry have been less numerous and less valuable than 
studies of his mysticism, of his educational ideal and of his humanistic 
philosophy,”78 which testifies to the change from Tagore the poet to Tagore the 
messenger delineated above.  
According to Amartya Sen, central to Tagore’s educational ideals and 
humanistic philosophy was his strong belief in freedom and reasoning. It was 
out of aversion to forced discipline that Tagore dropped school in his early teens; 
such an experience inspired him to create an environment for pupils to enjoy 
open-air lessons—a method he claimed inherited the spirit of the ancient forest 
civilization of India—and to cultivate their genuine affinity to both Nature and 
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the human world.79 Furthermore, contrary to common impressions, Tagore was 
an enthusiastic defender of reasoning. What distinguished him from optimistic 
scientists was his awareness of and even appreciation for the limits of human 
reason, which were all too often mistaken as uncritical mysticism.80 Imaginably, 
in the most unfavorable situation, which was often the case, Tagore tended to 
infuriate both Indians and non-Indians at the same time. Viewed from one end, 
Isaiah Berlin was correct in pointing out “some have thought Tagore to have 
yielded too much to the West;” viewed from the other, Tagore could barely rid 
himself of the label of an ultra-conservative. In a 1924 lecture in Beijing, Tagore 
said that “[f]or your people I am obsolete, and therefore useless, and for mine, 
newfangled and therefore obnoxious. I do not know which is true.”81 
Politically speaking, insistence on freedom and reasoning also 
characterized Tagore’s pursuit of an independent India: he maintained that 
national liberation must be earned through dignity, intellect, and cooperation, 
rather than through begging for mercy or through violence, a stance that earned 
him the title of “dissenter among dissenters.”82 In contrast to this complexity 
was the lustrous guise of Eastern mysticism that was demanded by temporary 
Western sentiment. In this capacity Tagore once enjoyed unprecedented 
popularity. Although not as remarkable as his overnight rise, his reputation had 
clearly faded away on the global setting before his death in 1941. 
The second level. As Edward Thompson indicated in the 1920s, Tagore’s 
romanticism—much diluted in translation—was bound to succumb to a 
modernist mode. Tagore the poet never resumed his past glory; nonetheless, the 
continual flow of Tagore studies since his death, albeit sometimes sparse, has 
witnessed recurrent interest in his humanism and idealism. A brief survey of 
the publications on Tagore in recent decades shows that many of these works 
elaborate on “the multiform ways in which Tagore’s life and work relate to the 
challenges of today.”83  
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There are some chief categories among these studies of Tagore’s relevance. 
Firstly, Tagore is portrayed as a “myriad-minded man,” profound but full of 
contradictions. Such an image of Tagore invites studies from different 
viewpoints, mainly by Indian authors, accompanied by a growing global interest 
in Tagore. Secondly, complementary to Tagore the writer and thinker, his career 
as an educator and village reformer also attracts discussion. What is in question 
is less the result of these activities than the philosophy embodied therein, which 
Tagore claimed was passed down from ancient India. Thirdly, Tagore 
constitutes a focus in postcolonial discourse. The above three categories form a 
continuum of inquiries, with Indians often stressing Tagore’s versatility and 
practical actions and Westerners mainly observing him through a cultural veil 
or theoretical prism. While the Indians are the closest to Tagore’s multiple 
legacies, the long history of colonial rule obliges them to address the issue in 
terms of dialogue or even debate with Western countries, especially Britain. 
Paradoxically, as Tagore owed his status as national icon to the West, when 
Indians try to reclaim his profound relevance from general oblivion, they must 
also repeatedly grapple with the East-West bottleneck. Lastly, approaching the 
East-West paradigm from another angle, many Japanese and Chinese today 
show a renewed interest in Tagore’s appeal for preservation of cultural identity, 
which was made a century ago when East Asia as a whole had just embarked on 
the journey of modernization. 
The third level. Actually, the rise of Asia in our global village is a result of 
information technology, strategic deployment, and market mechanisms. 
Genuine consideration of cultural diversity does not seem to occupy a position 
high on the agenda. It was to break through this sloganized Asia that one author 
attempts to review the Asian ideals shared by Tagore and Okakura Kakuzō in 
the first years of the 20th century.84 As Okakura died in 1913, before Tagore’s 
Nobel Prize, their interaction was highly intellectual and spiritual, with only 
slight political interference. But a critical question is: how much did Tagore 
know about the Asia outside of India?  
For instance, East Asia, the part of Asia dearest to Tagore, contains China 
and Japan as its two main agents; Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan are also 
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indispensable to the making of its regional history. Gaining increasing 
prominence today, this region is assumed to have shared a common cultural 
inheritance, thereby forming an organic entity. While not denying the historical 
relationship, it is also evident that East Asia became a rather artificial slogan 
proposed by imperial Japan from the 1920s, with a view to tightening its control 
over neighboring areas to compete with Western powers. However, twists and 
turns of this history were largely unknown to Tagore, who was born in a 
colonized India and whose cultural vision entailed an elite Indian-style 
demarcation between spiritual and material affairs, leaving the right of the 
latter to the West. Given the different historical backgrounds of India, Japan, 
and China, it was only natural that Tagore’s overarching appeal to an Eastern 
spirituality could hardly win general sympathy. 
Despite his lack of specific knowledge of other Asian countries, Tagore was 
keenly aware of the problem of Asia as an idea. In the 1929 Tokyo speech he 
claimed that: 
 
When we talk about European civilization, we use a term which is real 
in its meaning, it is an undoubted fact. But when they glibly talk of the 
Oriental mind and culture, they do not realize that we have not yet 
been able to develop a universal mind, a great background of Oriental 
cultures. Our cultures are too scattered.85 
 
It is unclear why Tagore chose the title “On Oriental Cultures and Japan’s 
mission.” The word “oriental” appeared only sporadically in his English writings; 
the expressions Tagore preferred were “Asian” or “Eastern” as previously shown. 
In any case, it might be safe to conclude that “Asia,” “the East,” and “the Orient” 
were all synonymous to Tagore, and the choice between them was stylistic. But 
what is clear is the dichotomy between “we”—the Asians—and “they”—the 
Europeans. Although this distinction is traceable to Tagore’s early life, his 
sudden rise to fame helped crystallize his view in more irreconcilable terms. He 
clearly told Feng Youlan in 1920 that the difference between Eastern and 
Western civilizations is “a difference of kind, rather than of degree.”86  
                                                   
85 Rabindranath Tagore, “On Oriental Culture and Japan’s Mission,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., 
The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VII: Lectures & Addresses, p.826. 
86 Feng Youlan, “Yu Indu Taiguer tanhua: dongxiwenming zhi bijiaoguan,” in Sansongtang 
quanji, Vol.11, p.4.  
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As Krishna Kripalani in his famous biography of Tagore says: “To the 
Western world Tagore’s chief significance lies in the new dimension he gave to 
its understanding of the East…Now and again a western thinker or scholar 
drew attention to some old literary classic or religious teacher and tributes were 
generously offered to the ancient wisdom of the East. But the general attitude 
was one of superiority and the basic incentive of exploitation.”87 The extent to 
which Tagore “enlightened” Westerners concerning the East should not be 
exaggerated, but this 1962 biography poignantly reveals the essential 
Orientalist bias embedded in East-West exchanges prior to the early 20th 
century, if not after. All in all, Tagore in his international career contributed to 
making Asia a topic. In categorizing India, China, and Japan together as 
“eastern Asia,” and categorizing Persia and Arabia together as “western Asia,” 
what he had in mind for contrast was an integrated West, a West that qualified 
him to speak for the East.88  
It is striking to find how limited in terms of subjects and content Tagore’s 
Japan and China speeches were—two countries he wanted the most to 
incorporate into a unity of Asia. Tagore’s versatility is only visible through his 
conversations with Western thinkers such as Albert Einstein (1879-1955) and 
Romain Rolland (1866-1944). While these dialogues rambled from topic to topic 
including the arts, education, sciences, philosophy, and logic, Tagore’s message 
to Japan and China frequently repeated the motif of East-West dichotomy. 
Perhaps one can say that, at least for Tagore, Asia was created in the process of 
discourse, which was a strategy of self-Orientalism to counter Western 
hegemony in the early 20th century.89 
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2. Politics of Spirituality:  
Tagore’s Conception of Asia 
 
 
2 .1  Tagore the Spiritualist?  
 
Based on the first chapter that lays the groundwork for the overall 
dissertation—namely, the intertwining of Tagore’s international career with the 
cultural mechanism of Orientalism—this chapter focuses on a key concept that I 
will argue was crucial to this history, namely, spirituality. Roughly speaking, 
Tagore defined an overarching Asia under an umbrella of spirituality, but he 
went on to differentiate this spirituality to address the diversity of Asian 
cultures. This effort did very little to counter West-centric Orientalism. To be 
specific, it remained under the aegis of that mechanism, from which derived 
self-Orientalism. By referring to Tagore’s cultural vision and interpretations of 
him throughout his international career, this chapter aims to contextualize the 
Tagore phenomenon in a modern intellectual history that witnessed an 
enthusiastic but problematic mutual East-West identification process in the 
early 20th century.  
As the first Nobel laureate from Asia, Tagore once enjoyed an 
unprecedented global reputation. While Tagore still figures prominently in 
Indian cultural life decades after his death, memory of him seems to have 
vanished in many parts of the world except in a few literary and academic 
communities. Amartya Sen consciously attributes this curious phenomenon to 
deeper cultural and cognitive causes: 
 
The contrast between Tagore’s commanding presence in Bengali 
literature and culture, and his near-total eclipse in the rest of the 
world, is perhaps less interesting than the distinction between the 
view of Tagore as a deeply relevant and many-sided contemporary 
thinker in Bangladesh and India, and his image in the West as a 
repetitive and remote spiritualist.1 
 
                                                   
1 Amartya Sen, “Tagore and His India,” in The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian 
History, Culture and Identity, pp.89-90. 
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As a writer, painter, philosopher, political activist, social critic, and 
educational reformer, Tagore’s versatility needs no further confirmation. Yet 
recognition is another matter. Why and how did Tagore come to be viewed as a 
spiritualist who was “repetitive and remote”? This representation in the West 
will be examined in Section 2. Not surprisingly, awarding of the Nobel Prize to 
Tagore constitutes a crucial part of the phenomenon.  
Then, what does “spirituality” or “spiritualist” mean in the context of idea 
exchange between Tagore and his global readers and audience? Sen goes on to 
relate this designation to religious mysticism: 
 
Tagore certainly had strongly held religious beliefs (of an unusually 
nondenominational kind), but he was interested in a great many other 
things as well and had many different things to say about them…His 
admirers in the West, however, were tuned to the more otherworldly 
themes which had been emphasized by his first Western patrons.2 
 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that if otherworldly themes were appealing 
to Western ears, the case was more complicated in the East, which was equated 
to the eastern part of Asia by Tagore—especially India and China as two 
prominent living ancient civilizations, and Japan as a rising power on the world 
stage in the early 20th century. On the one hand, dominance of Western over 
Eastern countries compelled the latter to align themselves with more practical 
issues.  Yet different traditions and diverse criteria were also to be found in 
Eastern countries, even if in the “spiritual” sphere. While it is widely known 
that Tagore (and many others) often contrasted a spiritual East with a 
materialistic West, a view gaining momentum after WWI, much less attention 
has been paid to the fact that Tagore did try to define “spirituality” in a very 
broad sense or redefine it altogether. This will be articulated in Section 3. 
Arguably, creating clear-cut divisions between East and West, or 
spirituality and materialism, is itself ideology-ridden, but the concept of the 
East or Asia would not have been possible without this effort. In this sense, 
Tagore’s view, idiosyncratic as it might be, also unwittingly echoed the 
mainstream civilizational discourse that was of a Western origin but became 
popular in the East later. This is only natural as Tagore was raised in 
                                                   
2 Ibid., pp.97-98. 
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Westernized Bengal, and it was by dint of a Western laurel that he became 
identified as an Eastern prophet. Delving into this structure of knowledge 
production, Section 4 focuses on the grand narrative of East-West civilizations 
prevalent in the early 20th century. However spiritual Asia was characterized in 
those narratives, including Tagore’s, the problem of modernization constitutes 
an inevitable focus. There were different understandings of modernization and 
different programs to carry it out, but as will be argued, Asia was essentially 
imagined through both spatial and temporal dichotomies against a modern 
Western yardstick. 
 
2 .2  Eastern Mystic ism in the Modern Western Psyche 
 
Aware of Tagore’s image as “the great mystic from the East,” Amartya Sen 
claims that “[t]o a great extent this Tagore was the West’s own creation, part of 
its tradition of message-seeking from the East, particularly from India.”3 While 
a psychological exploration of this tradition is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
its manifestation in the early twentieth-century West can be found in the 
mythologizing of Tagore. A historical approach toward this issue, which delves 
into considerable discursive nuances, is attempted here. 
The well-known story goes as follows: in 1912 when Tagore was to embark 
on a journey to England, he started translating some of his metric poems from 
Bengali into English prose verse. The poems, in manuscript form, astounded 
literary circles in London, and William Butler Yeats soon edited them for 
publication and wrote a laudatory introduction. This volume, Gitanjali, won 
Tagore an immediate reputation and the Nobel Prize the following year.4 As the 
first significant Western essay on Tagore, Yeats’ introduction to Gitanjali is 
worth close reading. It is poetic, sentimental, and contrasts Tagore and Indian 
civilization with the West on many points.5 
Yeats said, “If our life was not a continual warfare, we would not have 
taste… Four-fifths of our energy is spent in the quarrel with bad taste, whether 
in our own minds or in the minds of others.”6 Taste is a keyword here. Tagore’s 
                                                   
3 Ibid., pp.93-94. 
4 See Chapter 1 for a detailed account. 
5 Yeats understood quite well that his introduction was impressionistic and hoped that a full 
index on Tagore could be appended to his piece, a remark quoted in Krishna Dutta and 
Andrew Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man, p.166. 
6 W. B. Yeats, “Introduction,” in Rabindranath Tagore, Gitanjali: Song Offerings, p.xii. 
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poetry was meant to be sung for generations rather than reduced to something 
to be consumed by ladies of leisure or busy students. Besides representing good 
taste, for Yeats, what Tagore embodied was a higher synthesis, a synthesis 
beyond a simplistic division between worldly appreciation of different tastes and 
the ascetic refusal of them that seems to have dominated the Western 
imagination in general: 
 
Since the Renaissance the writing of European saints…has ceased to 
hold our attention. We know that we must at last forsake the world…; 
but how can we, who have read so much poetry, seen so many 
paintings, listened to so much music, where the cry of the flesh and the 
cry of the soul seem one, forsake it harshly and rudely?7 
 
“Warfare,” “quarrel,” “forsake,” and so forth—Yeats’ characterizations 
seem to suggest that the West was focused on fighting in definite terms of 
gaining or losing. Good taste defended itself against bad; the other-worldly rose 
above the worldly. For Tagore, however, life and death, soul and flesh are not 
mutually exclusive, as a line quoted by Yeats indicates: “And because I have 
loved this life I know I shall love death as-well.”8 Moreover, God is not a vision 
to be gained from abjuration of the world, but an omnipresence that becomes 
clear especially when life is looked back upon. Yeats’ eulogy comes to its end 
with a discarding of divisions between life, nature, literature, and religion: 
 
An innocence, a simplicity that one does not find elsewhere in 
literature makes the birds and the leaves seem as near to him as they 
are near to children…Indeed, when he is speaking of children, so much 
a part of himself this quality seems, one is not certain that he is not 
also speaking of the saints…9 
 
However naïve Yeats’ portrayal may seem, it is noteworthy that the terms 
“mystic” or “spiritual” seldom feature in the introduction. Rather, spontaneity, 
innocence, and simplicity constitute “a world I have dreamed of all my life 
                                                   
7 Ibid., p.xvii. 
8 From verse 95 of Gitanjali. Ibid., p.xviii. 
9 Ibid., pp.xxi-xxii. 
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long.”10 It has long been criticized that Yeats over-interpreted many subtle 
images in Gitanjali to be God incarnate, thus giving Tagore’s poetry too definite 
a character. Nonetheless, Yeats’ own attitude was more pious than religious, 
and the same can be said of Ezra Pound’s (1885-1972) early enthusiasm for 
Tagore.  
In late 1912, Pound wrote a eulogistic review of some poems to be contained 
in Gitanjali: “The Greek shows us man as the sport of the gods; the sworn foe of 
fate and the natural forces. The Bengali brings to us…a quiet proclamation of 
the fellowship between man and the gods; between man and nature.”11 Like 
Yeats, Pound saw a West strained between antithetical forces, whereas the 
world is represented as harmonious in Tagore’s poetry. Such an appreciation of 
simplicity and immediacy, both metaphysically and aesthetically, was also 
found in André Gide’s (1869-1951) introduction to his French translation of 
Gitanjali: “What I admire about Gitanjali is that it needs no [extra-textual] 
preparation in order to read it. No doubt it is interesting to notice the 
connections between this book and ancient India, but it is more interesting to 
consider how it speaks to us.”12  
After spending several months in England, Tagore went to the United 
States at the end of 1912. He was invited to give lectures on Indian philosophy 
at Harvard University in February 1913. The lectures were soon published as 
Sadhana: The Realisation of Life. Expanding on the spirit of the Upanishads 
and the Buddha’s teachings, each chapter of this volume addresses a specific 
aspect of the essential human union with the universe. On the first page of the 
book, Tagore is introduced as the “Author of ‘Gitanjali’.” This collection of poems 
had formed around Tagore a mystic aura, which became a definite symbol with 
publication of the sermons.13 Critically, views on Tagore diverged soon after his 
religious speeches, and Pound again was among the first persons to herald this 
change. In March 1913, he still praised Gitanjali: “[i]f these poems have a 
flaw…it is that they are too pious. Yet I have nothing but pity for the reader who 
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is unable to see that their piety is the poetic piety of Dante, and that is very 
beautiful.”14 In a letter dated April 22 the same year, nevertheless, Pound’s 
view on Tagore turned satirical:  
 
So long as he sticks to poetry he can be defended on stylistic grounds 
against those who disagree with his content. And there’s no use his 
repeating the Vedas and other stuff that has been translated.15 
 
It is reasonable to assume that Pound’s antipathy to Tagore began with the 
Sadhana lectures, as Tagore’s English works prior to this volume are all 
collections of poems revised by Yeats. From the term, “poetic piety,” we know 
that Pound’s appreciation of the religiosity of Tagore’s poetry was aesthetic 
rather than theological. Besides, Gide exclaimed in his introduction to the 
French version of Gitanjali: “After the 214,778 verses of Mahabharata, the 
48,000 verses of Ramayana, what a relief! Ah!…thanks to Rabindranath 
Tagore…we don’t have to exchange length for quality...For virtually each of the 
103 poems in Gitanjali carries admirable weight.”16 From this statement, it is 
possible to assume that Gide would probably be disappointed with a Tagore who 
sermonizes in Sadhana, although no comments on this book from Gide are 
available.  
A strictly aesthetic evaluation of Tagore was not widely shared after all. As 
a formal body, the Nobel Prize Committee’s portrayal of Tagore proved closer to 
the image that was to become widespread. This portrayal was far more political 
as well. Praising the poetic sublimity of Tagore, the Presentation Speech by the 
Committee claims that Gitanjali “has belonged to English literature.” 
Notwithstanding its being a great compliment to a foreign author, it smacks of 
West-centricity, if not imperialism: “Tagore has been hailed from various 
quarters as a new and admirable master of that poetic art which has been a 
never-failing concomitant of the expansion of British civilization ever since the 
days of Queen Elizabeth.”17 The Committee went on to elevate the issue to 
civilizational and religious levels, attributing the revival of Eastern cultures 
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and literatures to the Christian proselytizing movement: 
 
The Christian mission has exercised its influence as a rejuvenating 
force in India, too, where in conjunction with religious revivals many 
of the vernaculars were early put to literary use, thereby acquiring 
status and stability.18  
 
While Tagore’s creative transformation of Indian traditions was not ignored, 
it was persistently subsumed under modern, hence Western, influence: 
 
Even though Tagore may have borrowed one or another note from the 
orchestral symphonies of his native predecessors, yet he treads upon 
firmer ground in this age that…spends its own energies in dispatching 
greetings and good wishes far over land and sea.19 
 
What is more, the Committee also tended to adopt more definite religious 
terms in characterizing Tagore’s “aesthetic theism”: 
 
This is mysticism…but not a mysticism that, relinquishing personality, 
seeks to become absorbed in an All that approaches a Nothingness, but 
one that, with all the talents and faculties of the soul trained to their 
highest pitch, eagerly sets forth to meet the living Father of the whole 
creation.20 
 
The various expressions convey the same theme: Tagore, if not 
West-minded, was influenced by the West, and especially by Christianity. In 
Yeats’ introduction to Gitanjali, a mystic air prevails but taste is held in high 
regard. Pound seemed to be more radical on the aesthetic issue. Fully 
acknowledging the spiritual sublimity of Tagore’s poetry, 21  when Tagore 
sermonized, Pound became outright critical. In a 1917 comment Pound satirizes 
Tagore’s receiving the Nobel Prize: “Tagore got the Nobel Prize because, after 
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the cleverest boom of our day, after the fiat of the omnipotent literati of 
distinction, he lapsed into religion and optimism and was boomed by the pious 
non-conformists.” 22  Obviously, right through 1917, Tagore’s image in most 
Western minds was invariably religious as promoted by the Committee. In a 
1918 monograph, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, an eminent philosopher who was 
later to become the second president of India, even was compelled to defend 
Tagore from many plausible claims that his religious thought was simply 
mimicry of Christianity.23  
In brief, while Yeats, Pound, and Gide evaluated Tagore from the poets’ 
point of view, cognition of mysticism seems to have dominated public opinion on 
Tagore. Edward Thompson painfully acknowledged that “of whom every possible 
opinion is entertained in Europe and America, from his apotheosis as the last 
and most wonderful teacher of the ages to his contemptuous dismissal as a 
charlatan.” 24  Not surprisingly, the spectrum presented by Thompson is a 
religious one.  
Of course, it would be an overstatement to say that the West’s interest in 
Tagore was exclusively religious and that Tagore was just a passive object of 
representation. As the Nobel Prize Committee noted, “the poet’s motivation 
extends to the effort of reconciling two spheres of civilization widely 
separated,”25 and it was in this domain that Tagore sought to define his own 
image and the identity of Asia as the provider of spiritual resources to both 
Eastern and Western civilizations. What complicated this history is the 
following fact: it was Western accolades that enabled Tagore to travel to many 
parts of the world and helped refine his grand historical and cultural narrative. 
In claiming a distinct identity and even overarching paradigm, Tagore 
frequently chose conceptual tools—such as “Asia,” “modernity,” and 
“civilization”—that all originated in a West-centric environment. Tagore 
consciously attempted to counter their original definitions in some cases, but 
largely remained subject to their ideological premises.  
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2 .3  Spirituality  Claimed and Redefined:  the East as  Conceived by 
Tagore 
 
As mentioned above, Pound’s interest in Tagore cooled rapidly. Despite his 
change in attitude, he was also an early protestor against the popular 
misunderstanding of Tagore in the West: 
 
Why the good people of this land are…incapable…of devising for his 
honour any better device than that of wrapping his life in cotton wool 
and parading about with the effigy of a sanctimonious moralist, 
remains and will remain for me an unsolvable mystery.26 
 
The complaint appeared in a review of The Gardener, Tagore’s second 
volume of English poems that is different in style and content from Gitanjali, 
which shows that Pound was not unaware of the diversified literary tastes of 
Tagore. However, as a biographer pointed out, “the first impressions are always 
more vivid and lasting and Tagore would henceforth [i.e. since the publication of 
Gitanjali] be regarded in the West as primarily a religious and philosophic 
poet.”27 The mythologizing of Tagore has elicited much discussion and it is 
agreed that the poet wittingly applied himself to the niche carved out for him by 
the West. Overemphasis on this view, however, would eclipse the other half of 
the truth that Tagore strove to define the East within the broader frame of 
spirituality rather than mere religiosity, a process that demands elucidation to 
restore complexity to a simplified Tagore. 
From the very beginning of his international career, Tagore was strongly 
sympathetic to the border-crossing initiative of the Nobel Prize Committee: “I 
beg to convey to the Swedish Academy my grateful appreciation of the breadth 
of understanding which has brought the distant near, and has made a stranger 
a brother.”28 If this message is too short for a clear indication of Tagore’s 
universalism, the 1921 Stockholm speech—Tagore’s belated formal response to 
the Swedish Academy—demonstrates a fuller spectrum of his concerns. 29 
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Tagore understood that his Gitanjali poems “had brought with them a deeper 
feeling of rest, serenity and feeling of the eternal, and that these were exactly 
the sentiments that were needed by the Western people with their overactive 
life.” He attributed this spiritual power to Eastern civilization and specified that 
he “represented the East” to receive the Prize, the award of which he spent to 
establish a university to bring Eastern and Western minds together. The 
university (known as Visva-Bharati), in Tagore’s vision, would revive the ideal 
of education of an ancient India that was never parsimonious in giving spiritual 
wealth to the whole world. This generosity, unfortunately, had shrunk in the 
face of Western material power, and Indians were forced into collective 
ignorance of their cultural inheritance by the British educational establishment. 
Nevertheless, since the time for the great meeting of civilizations had come, 
Tagore appealed to his Western audience to join in his effort of bringing the two 
hemispheres into mutually beneficial contact.30 
Like the Presentation Speech given eight years earlier by the Committee, 
Tagore’s response proceeds from poetic to spiritual to civilizational issues. But 
their differences are remarkable. While the Committee was eager and even 
anxious to place Tagore in an Oriental niche under the aegis of Western 
theology and politics, the poet challenged this structure by rhetorically asking 
“is not the East the mother of spiritual Humanity and does not the West…, 
when they get famished and hungry, turn their face to that serene mother, the 
East?31 Furthermore, the eulogy of “spiritual Humanity”—mainly identified 
with Indian tradition here—entails criticism of Western imperialism, albeit 
euphemistically. Tagore proclaimed that the “ideal of unity never rejects 
anything, any race, or any culture. It comprehends all…with sympathy and love. 
This is the spirit of India.” But the reality hurt him that in India a cry for 
rejection of the West was loud at the time. “I feel that it is a lesson which they 
have received from the West. Such is not our mission.”32 By attributing the 
disturbance in the Indian pursuit of spiritual unity to a discriminating West, it 
can be observed that Tagore’s East-West dialectics is politically-minded. 
Indeed, Tagore took pains to inject political protests into a 
                                                                                                                                             
substance of Tagore’s vision of man and India. All his writings can be seen as elaborate 
manifestations of this vision in diverse forms.” See Mohit K. Ray, “Preface,” in Mohit K. Ray 
ed., The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume V: Essays, p.xviii. 
30 Rabindranath Tagore, “The Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech,” in ibid., pp.5-9. 
31 Ibid., p.5. My italics. 
32 Ibid., p.8. 
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spiritually-oriented civilizational discourse. In a friendly but inquisitive letter 
to Tagore, the classical scholar Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), an admirer of 
Tagore, shows discomfort with the notion of an East-West division: “People talk 
loosely of the difference in character between…‘East’ and ‘West,’ violently 
denouncing the one and praising the other. Even when there is no actual 
prejudice at work, the comparisons, though sometimes suggestive, are never 
exact.”33 In his response, Tagore, while agreeing with Murray’s lofty ideal of 
human cooperation, addresses this division out of very practical considerations:  
 
Unfortunately for us, however, the one outstanding visible 
relationship of Europe with Asia today is that of exploitation; in other 
words, its origins are commercial and material…There is no people in 
the whole of Asia today which does not look upon Europe with fear and 
suspicion.34 
 
Of course, such a grand narrative—cultural as well as political—like 
Tagore’s can be naïve and logically inconsistent at times. From his reception of 
the Nobel Prize in 1913, Tagore seemed to feel a growing sense of responsibility 
to bridge East and West, and he became more and more obsessed with the 
dichotomy.  For one who hailed “unity” as the guiding principle of the universe, 
Tagore seems to have depended on too strict a division between Eastern and 
Western civilizations to preach the ultimate “oneness.” For instance, in 
explaining his communion with Nature since youth, Tagore asserted “I am 
almost certain that…seclusion itself has no place in the Western world.”35 It 
does not require much historical knowledge to repudiate this claim; the 
argument would not hold even if “the Western world” were qualified as the 
modern one.  
Despite the over-generalization of the East-West paradigm, Tagore’s timely 
message was well received in the West through the 1930s. He was hailed as a 
messenger from the East even more than as a poet. Here arises a historical 
paradox: although the West, in the zeitgeist of post-WWI, enthusiastically 
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accepted Tagore’s criticism, his preaching of spiritual tradition was refuted and 
derided in Japan and China, Eastern countries per se, at a historical juncture 
when Japan was seeking to compete with Western powers and many Chinese 
people were blaming their national impotence on blind traditionalism.36 As 
demonstrated in Chapter 1, Tagore poorly represented himself in the two 
countries by dwelling on the spiritual superiority of the East, a habit developed 
from his Western experiences. Tagore’s many talents and concerns were not only 
unnoticed by his audiences, but were also insufficiently expressed by the 
speaker. Nevertheless, in hindsight, Tagore’s endeavor to address both cultural 
and political issues while subsuming them under a comprehensive “spirituality” 
constitutes an intellectual feat in the redefinition of the East or Asia in the 
modern world. 
Tagore’s messages to Japan and China are conscious historical criticisms. 
As the cradle of all the major religions of the world, Asia was once great. ‘’Then 
fell the darkness of night upon all the lands of the East. The current of time 
seemed to stop at once, and Asia ceased to take any new food, feeding upon its 
own past.”37  Amid this dullness that rendered Asia vulnerable to Western 
domination, Japan’s sudden awakening surprised the whole world, but Tagore 
insisted that Japan thrived on its own merits that are definitely non-Western: 
 
Europe seems to have felt emphatically the conflict of things in the 
universe, which can only be brought under control by conquest...But 
Japan has felt, in her world, the touch of some presence…Her 
relationship with the world is the deeper relationship of heart.38 
 
Despite Japan’s instinctive sense of beauty as observed, or imagined, by 
Tagore, the growing affinity of this young nation for the West compelled the poet 
to admonish: “You must apply your Eastern mind, your spiritual strength, your 
love of simplicity, your recognition of social obligation, in order to cut out a new 
path for this great unwieldy car of progress…”39 Critically, a deeper exploration 
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of Tagore’s discourse shows that the “Eastern mind,” “spiritual strength,” “love 
of simplicity,” and “recognition of social obligation” are all choice terms that he 
pit against what he viewed as the relentless machine of Western nationalism 
and materialism.  
In contrast to Japan’s modern achievements, Tagore admired China for its 
long history:  
 
Your civilization has been nurtured in its social life upon faith in the 
soul. You are the most long-lived race, because you have had centuries 
of wisdom nourished by your faith in goodness, not in the merely 
strong.40  
 
On another occasion, Tagore characterized the Chinese people in a way not 
very different from his praise of the Japanese: “you can take your joy in a naked 
presentation of reality…not because it has any association with something 
outside itself, but simply because it is before you, attracting your attention.”41 
Nonetheless, in general, Tagore’s message to China was more lenient and less 
urgent, because of the strong cultural bond between India and China and of 
their shared disadvantages in the modern era, which compelled him to claim 
that: 
 
It is from the heart of the East that the utterance has sprung forth: 
“The meek shall inherit the earth.” For the meek never wastes energy 
in the display of insolence, but are firmly established in true 
prosperity through harmony with the All.42  
 
Apparently, even with practical issues, Tagore tended to apply such labels 
as “Eastern” and “spiritual,” with a view to an ultimate “harmony with the All.” 
Although this grandiose narrative was welcome in the early twentieth-century 
West, it did not really cater to an East that was then seeking to strengthen itself 
in material terms. However, it would not be fair to accuse Tagore of being so 
overawed by his own reputation in the West that he was blinded to the political 
                                                   
40 Rabindranath Tagore, “Talks in China,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Volume IV: Essays, p.758. 
41 Ibid., p.781. 
42 Ibid., p.752. 
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realities facing the East. The reason is a subtle one. While overarching terms 
like “Universal Nature,” “Eternal Spirit,” “man-in-the-universe” feature 
prominently in lectures such as Sadhana that appealed to the Western psyche,43 
Tagore rarely adopted the same language in Japan and China, where he did try 
to strike a more this-worldly or socially-oriented chord. This, arguably, 
evidences a strong historical and political consciousness in Tagore, in spite of a 
serious want of specifics. Indeed, in preaching universal harmony Tagore 
adhered to the East-West dichotomy to the point of being ideological. 
Nevertheless, he was aware of the nuances of the East and claimed a common 
Eastern culture by resorting to a “spirituality” that encompasses elements not 
exclusively Indian or otherworldly. Even before winning the Nobel Prize, in one 
of the lectures given in Chicago (prior to those at Harvard) Tagore showed keen 
awareness of a differentiated but unified East: 
 
The greatness and beauty of Oriental art, especially in Japan and 
China, consist in this, that there the artists have seen this soul of 
things and they believe in it…Because we have faith in this universal 
soul, we in the East know that Truth, Power, Beauty, lie in 
Simplicity…In India, the greater part of our literature is religious, 
because God with us is not a distant God…We feel His nearness to us 
in all the human relationship of love and affection…[i]n seasons of 
flowers and fruits, in the coming of the rain, in the fullness of the 
autumn...44”  
 
However ethereal Tagore’s tone sounds, he did not simply position himself 
within the convenient category of Oriental mysticism that the West had 
prepared for him, as many scholars have assumed. Nonetheless, the Western 
mechanism of representation was complex and far-reaching. It is true that 
Tagore tried earnestly to define Asia according to self-understanding, but such 
an effort was impossible, or unnecessary, without the West as a reference, which 
provided both the conceptual structure and lexicon for elaborating on the idea of 
a modern Asia. 
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2 .4  Asia in  Modern World History:  A Comparative Review 
 
As previously discussed, diverse reactions arose after the initial 
appreciation of Tagore in the West. Some remained fascinated for a while, like 
Yeats; some quickly grew tired and turned satirical, like Pound. Of the various 
views, the Presentation Speech by the Nobel Prize Committee deserves a deeper 
historical analysis, for it not only represented, or even authorized, mainstream 
opinion towards Tagore, but also sought to place the East in the hierarchy of 
civilizations as perceived by the early twentieth-century West.  
As “a bearer of good tidings,” Tagore received extraordinary praise from the 
Committee: 
 
[H]e places before us the culture that in the vast, peaceful, and 
enshrining forests of India attains its perfection, a culture that seeks 
primarily the quiet peace of the soul in ever-increasing harmony with 
the life of nature herself.45  
 
This harmony is immediately qualified: “It is a poetical, not a historical, 
picture that Tagore here reveals to us to confirm his promise that a peace awaits 
us.”46  Doubtless, it was such a poetic, peaceful, ahistoric atmosphere that 
appealed to the Western imagination of the East, “whose existence had long 
been conjectured.”47 This conjecture, nevertheless, was not arbitrary on the part 
of the Committee. As a formal organization, it was obliged to justify Tagore’s 
comparability with great Western thinkers and writers, a qualification that was 
questioned by some contemporary Western critics upon the announcement of the 
Prize.48  
 
He is, however, as far removed as anyone in our midst from all that we 
are accustomed to hear dispensed and purveyed in the marketplaces 
as Oriental philosophy, from painful dreams about the transmigration 
of souls and the impersonal karma, from the pantheistic, and in reality 
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46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Krishna Kripalani gives a brief account of those events in Tagore: A Life, p.129. 
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abstract, belief that is usually regarded as peculiarly characteristic of 
the higher civilization in India.49  
 
The “good tidings” that Tagore brought from the East were differentiated 
from clichés of “Oriental philosophy,” and the latter was identified with “the 
transmigration of souls,” “the impersonal karma,” and “the pantheistic 
belief”—in brief, all elements considered to be heretic by Western theology. By 
detaching Tagore from problematic religious ideas and stressing his eagerness 
to “meet the living Father of the whole creation,” the Presentation Speech well 
embodies the relationship between Orientalism and religion: “the mystical,” 
argues Richard King, “a category that is often conceived to be preeminently 
‘otherworldly,’ private and apolitical is in fact implicated in a network of power 
relations in the contexts in which it has been employed.”50 
Furthermore, there is a significant connection to be observed in the Speech, 
that is, the East is equated with India, and India is equated with religion. Given 
the fact that Tagore was Indian and happened to be the first non-Westerner to 
win a Nobel Prize, it is natural to equate India with the East. As to the latter 
equation, it is almost trivial to dispute the richness of the religious culture of 
India, although the interpretation of the Speech is partial and manipulative. 
Nonetheless, an inevitable corollary from the two equations would be that the 
East is chiefly religious. Tagore, as a critical junction in the link, popularized 
and at the same time was restricted by this image. This corollary finds other 
textual evidence. For instance, the great Indian thinker and politician 
Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) in Glimpses of World History, a collection of 
letters sent to his daughter from jail from 1931, writes: 
 
We are apt to be taken in a little by the glitter of Europe and forget the 
past. Let us remember that it is Asia that has produced great leaders 
of thought who have influenced the world perhaps more than anyone 
or anything elsewhere—the great founders of the principal religions.51  
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It is truism that all major religions of the world came from that huge 
expanse called Asia, but Nehru’s words are typical of the Asian discourse 
prevalent in the early 20th century: Asia is defined as an antithesis to Europe in 
terms of its profound religious resources. A more conspicuous example is the 
1939 volume entitled Eastern Religions & Western Thought, a collection of 
philosophical treatises and lectures of Radhakrishnan.52 There seems to be a 
functional difference between the Eastern and Western minds, although in the 
1918 monograph on Tagore’s philosophy he was already claiming that “[t]he 
popularity of the writings of Sir Rabindranath Tagore shows that there is 
neither East nor West in the realm of spirit, and that his work meets a general 
want and satisfies a universal demand.” 53  Arguably, as both Nehru and 
Radhakrishnan were merely a generation younger than Tagore, both were 
well-versed in English and modern Western learning, and both became 
prominent on the Indian political stage, they were, like Tagore, involved in the 
same network of knowledge production that created the entrenched dichotomy 
between East and West. This network derived from the West’s tradition of 
seeking a meaningful message from the East, “which—as Hegel put it—had 
‘existed for millennia in the imagination of the Europeans.’ Friedrich Schlegel, 
Schelling, Herder, and Schopenhauer were only a few of the thinkers who 
followed the same pattern.”54  
This convention of demarcating East and West, more ideologically than 
geographically, is encapsulated by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers 
(1883-1969):  
 
[T]he Western world and Islam, Europe and Asia, which was in turn 
split up into the Near, Middle and Far East, are the successive shapes 
taken by the antithesis, in which cultures and peoples simultaneously 
attract and repel one another. This antithesis has at all times been an 
element in the make-up of Europe, whereas the Orient merely took it 
over from Europe and understood it in a European sense.55  
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According to Jaspers, it was this propensity of creating antithesis and then 
searching for creative unity that distinguished Western history from those of 
others. Although appearing as a philosophical statement, there is no 
fundamental difference between Jaspers’ observation and those of Yeats’ and 
Tagore’s in that the West gained its historical momentum from conflicting forces. 
As a forced “Other” of the West and inferior in terms of technological and 
military power in the modern era, the East saw many of its intellectuals defend 
their own cultures on spiritual grounds, a stance their Western counterparts 
generally agreed upon. In the case of Tagore, he received the Nobel laurel and 
identified himself unhesitatingly with the East, from whose bosom he believed 
he could bring a message of healing to the West. Yet a thorny problem remained. 
Besides a series of qualifiers—such as spiritual, peaceful, and 
introspective—that acquired their meanings in opposition to what were thought 
to be symptomatic of modern Western society—such as its being materialistic, 
combative, and overactive—the East lacks the coherence of consciousness and 
history that the West does possess:  
 
My friends, you all know what a great force it is in Europe that these 
Western peoples have such a thing as the continental concert of minds. 
It is a very real power, this cultural cooperation and bond of 
intellectual fellowship. It is a very great fact in human history.56 
 
Tagore was painfully aware of the vagueness of the idea of the East, and 
had priorities in forming an Oriental mind and culture. As shown above, the top 
two candidates on his list to form a union with India were Japan and China. 
However, there was an essential difference between his attitudes towards Japan 
and China, which also corresponded to intellectual trends in the early 20th 
century.  
Tagore’s friendship with Japanese intellectuals started with Okakura 
Kakuzō, the art scholar and writer who visited Kolkata from 1901 to 1902. 
Okakura’s Indian experiences led to the publication of The Ideals of the East in 
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London in 1903, which in turn inspired Tagore’s ideal of Asia. As a book on 
Asian art, its tone is idealistic and nostalgic: 
 
The simple life of Asia need fear no shaming from that sharp contrast 
with Europe in which steam and electricity have placed it to-day…Asia 
knows, it is true, nothing of the fierce joys of a time-devouring 
locomotion, but she has still the far deeper travel-culture of the 
pilgrimage and the wandering monk.57 
 
However, the core message of Okakura was a nationalistic one: 
 
The history of Japanese art becomes thus the history of Asiatic 
ideals—the beach where each successive wave of Eastern thought has 
left its sand-ripple as it beat against the national consciousness.58 
 
In the typical contrast between Asia and Europe, spiritual simplicity and 
technological sophistication, Okakura shared the optimism prevalent in early 
twentieth-century Japan owing to its thorough modernization and a 
newly-gained vantage in Asia. In short, Japan’s assumption of an Asian role in 
contradistinction with Europe was based on its successful imitation of the latter. 
Whether Tagore discerned the nationalistic bent in Okakura’s discourse or not, 
Japan’s modernization, or more precisely, Westernization, became a usual 
target of criticism in many of his speeches. In 1916, Tagore showed anxiety 
about an overly Westernized Japan;59 in a 1929 lecture in Tokyo, he tried to 
temper Japan’s growing jingoism by reminding his audience of Okakura’s 
idealism.60  
In contrast, Asian discourse was not a popular genre in early 
twentieth-century China for historical reasons. On the one hand, as a long-time 
hegemonic power in its world order, China did not have to build a self-image in 
relation to its neighbors, as Japan strove to do; on the other, it was not obliged 
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to define itself against a Western colonizer like India did. Critically, most of the 
remarks on Asian union made by Chinese intellectuals at that time consisted of 
two interconnected themes: blame for the militaristic pan-Asianism gaining 
dominance in Japan, and a demand that Japan conform to the moral decency 
that were held to be Chinese—thus traditional East Asian—norms.61 Given 
China’s political disadvantage vis-à-vis modernization, Tagore’s speeches in 
China tended to appeal to the past glory of the East and the future blossoming of 
its noble, enduring humanism, with mild warnings against whole-scale 
Westernization.  
Geographical proximity, historical interaction, and personal affinity to 
Japan and China all account for Tagore’s desire to create an Asian alliance with 
these two countries. But viewed historically, it is obvious that his choices were 
influenced by a deeper structure of knowledge. In his conversation with Feng 
Youlan in 1920, Tagore roughly categorized China, India, Japan as “Eastern 
Asia,” and categorized Persia and the Arabic world as “Western Asia.”62 For 
convenience’s sake, he told Feng that they could focus on the eastern part of 
Asia for the time being. As an Indian, such a division of Asia was not immune 
from political concern. In 1916 he said in Tokyo: 
 
I cannot but bring to your mind those days when the whole of Eastern 
Asia from Burma to Japan was united with India in the closest tie of 
friendship…through which messages ran between us about the 
deepest needs of humanity.63 
 
This appeal did not differ from those of Chinese intellectuals in their efforts 
to claim the moral and cultural authority in the East to which Japan was 
supposed to defer. Stephen Hay’s comment is particularly to the point here: 
“Each Asian Orientophile…entertained a somewhat different notion of the 
essential features of this civilization, his image of the East consisting usually of 
an expanded version of those particular traditions he most wished to 
revitalize.”64 That the western part of Asia was not included in this alliance was, 
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perhaps, not merely a matter of convenience: 
 
Eastern Asia has been pursuing its own path, evolving its own 
civilization, which was not political but social, not predatory and 
mechanically efficient, but spiritual and based upon all the varied and 
deeper relations of humanity.65 
 
Whenever Tagore talked about “Eastern Asia,” it was always in conjunction 
with “humanity,” which, however, was supposed to be applicable to the whole 
East in his own scheme of civilization. There was no reason to omit “Western 
Asia” in the above statement. Therefore, perhaps it is not far-fetched to recall 
Edward Said’s argument that India was treated by European Orientalists as a 
submissive object, with their sense of danger being reserved for the Islamic part 
of Orient.66 As a scion to a Westernized family in Bengal, Tagore must have 
inherited this intellectual world map of the contemporary West and privileged 
India, China, and Japan to form his ideal Asia, albeit he was strongly 
sympathetic towards Muslims given their huge presence in India.  
Moreover, while Tagore observed similarities between Chinese and Indian 
traditions, Japan was included as an ally mainly for a functional reason: its 
successful modern transformation that witnessed the undying vigor of the East. 
This, again, dovetails with the view of world history prevalent in the early 20th 
century. In Jaspers’ argument, China and India, two giant Eastern civilizations, 
constitute perennial contrasts with the West:  
 
China and India always lived in continuity with their own past; Greece, 
on the other hand, lived beyond its own past in continuity with an 
alien, Oriental past.67 
 
Here derives a critical conclusion. While Asia (China and India) tended to 
define itself in its own terms, thus becoming stagnant, the West (Greece) 
incessantly sought a self-image in its changing relationships with the “Other” 
(mainly Asia), thus allowing for continual self-renewal. This observation serves 
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to perpetuate Jaspers’ theory that ancient China, India, and Greece all belonged 
to the “axial age civilizations,” each experiencing a spiritual breakthrough 
independently from 800 to 200 BCE to form a mainstream civilization that was 
to assimilate peripheral cultures. While Western civilization—a combination of 
the Greek and Jewish axes—was capable of a self-triggered transformation that 
is called modernization, China and India did not possess this momentum of 
radical transformation. Although Japan did not feature in Jaspers’ 1949 
monograph The Origin and Goal of History, later interpreters of the axial age 
theory, especially S. N. Eisenstadt (1923-2010) and Robert Bellah (1927-2013), 
credit much significance to Japan for its uniqueness: being a non-axial 
civilization but capable of a modernization almost as complete and successful as 
that of the core Western countries.68 It seems that Tagore belonged to this 
intellectual lineage, only with some Eastern variation.  
Some explanations of Tagore’s world view are necessary before ending this 
section. While he adhered to the West-originated East-West dichotomy, as a 
laurelled prophet and self-appointed cultural messenger, his proposition of 
harmonious fusion between the two hemispheres was as realistic as humanistic 
and spiritual. 
He never simplistically opposed the West. His main objection was directed 
at nationalism and materialism, which not only ravaged the non-Western world 
but suffocated the noble humanity of the West as well. In China, Tagore claimed 
that the “impertinence of material things is extremely old. The revelation of 
spirit in man is modern: I am on its side, for I am modern.”69 His dialectical 
view of modernization was even more eloquently expressed in Japan: 
 
I must warn them that modernizing is a mere affectation of 
modernism...It is nothing but mimicry, only affectation is louder than 
the original...One must bear in mind, that those who have the true 
modern spirit need not modernize, just as those who are truly brave 
are not braggarts.70  
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Finally, apart from being a great interpreter of the mystic Upanishads, 
Tagore’s appreciation of Hinduism was sociologically or even anthropologically 
oriented: 
 
India tried her best to respect the social freedom of all the individual 
sections of the population contained within her boundaries, while 
claiming allegiance to one social autocracy. This has produced a 
stupendous organisation, named Hinduism, which is almost 
impossible to define. It contains under its shelter manners and 
customs and creeds, varied and contradictory…If we must know where 
this spirit abides, it is not so much in ritualism and customs, — it is in 
ideas.71  
 
Apparently, while remaining idealistic and spiritual, Tagore’s proposition 
of an Eastern or Asian culture was more than a slogan. He well understood the 
achievement of Indology in France and Germany,72 but he urged a cordial 
mutual understanding between East and West, which motivated him to 
establish Visva-Bharati University. Unfortunately, his initial image in the West 
proved too narrow for an accurate evaluation of his broad concerns. 
Responsibility for this limited view of Tagore lies both in his manner of 
self-representation and in the general intellectual ambience prevalent in the 
early twentieth-century West. 
 
2 .5  Tagore in  the East-West Paradigm 
 
Edward Thompson had a definite view of the reasons for Tagore’s biased 
image in the West: 
 
First, he [i.e. Thompson] blamed Yeats for representing Tagore as only 
a mystic poet, and Tagore for conceding that image. Second, he held 
Tagore responsible for his translation methods of cutting away 
whatever he thought was difficult for western readers. Third, 
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Thompson argued that Tagore’s poetry was bound to date swiftly as it 
came to judgement in the age of the First World War…73 
 
While all the three observations can be generally agreed upon, the cultural 
and historical backgrounds of this (mis)representation need to be reviewed in 
this concluding section.  
In a letter to Thompson, Tagore stated that Yeats was responsible for 
selecting the poems to be included in the English version of Gitanjali.74 There 
were many similarities between the Indian and Irish poets that impelled the 
latter to choose what he thought represented the best of the former.75 However, 
the basic question is, as Gitanjali represents only a tiny portion of Tagore’s 
tremendous literary output, why did he choose to translate these poems rather 
than others for a few select readers in London? Of course he might have wanted 
to present a solemn, mystic image, but this conclusion only deserves passing 
consideration, for Tagore was almost unknown outside Bengal at that time. 
Therefore, a more reasonable assumption would be that those poems were 
particularly dear to the poet and were thought to be translatable, perhaps more 
in spirit than in language as he could not hope to replicate the original meter.76 
This suggests that there is a universal character pervading the mystic poems, 
which appealed to many Westerners of different tastes, including Yeats, Pound, 
Gide, as well as the Nobel Prize Committee.  
That the initial praise from Yeats, Pound, and the Committee of Tagore all 
sound similar—despite critical differences in details—indicates a general 
Western preference that was not attributable to any particular propaganda 
about Tagore’s mystic image. In this sense, what Yeats embodied was a 
collective endeavor of the West to represent the East, notwithstanding the fact 
that he was also caught between empire and colony, and gravely troubled by 
issues of nationalism and identity. Romain Rolland, one of the best-known 
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mystics and kindred spirits of Tagore in early twentieth-century Europe, gave 
an in-depth account of the Indian poet: 
 
Tagore is scarcely known in France save through the solemn face of 
the Poet-Prophet, that imposing figure veiled in mystery, whose calm 
voice, harmonious gestures, and luminous brown eyes shaded by dark 
brows, radiate a serene majesty…When Europe thinks of the great 
Inspired Ones of India, she only bears in mind their seriousness…It is 
we, blockheads from the West, who fix our features in a uniformly 
serious solemnity. Their sacred legends laugh…Tagore was born in a 
tragic age in which is being decided the destiny of humanity, and 
particularly of his own multifarious people…That is why words of 
poetic and prophetic inspiration take the foremost place in his creation, 
and he has attached less importance to his works of observation. 
Europe has taken little notice of the latter; for while the poems and the 
great essays are of a universal appeal, the field of observation in his 
novels and short stories is naturally Indian…77 
 
Rolland’s portrayal is quoted at length to show how a leading Western mind 
was reflecting on an extraordinary moment of cultural interaction in the modern 
era. Rolland well understood how Tagore posed himself and was mythologized; 
he knew the stereotype of the East in Europe; he observed the versatility of 
Tagore and proposed a wider reading of the poet’s socially-oriented works, along 
with those of other great Indian minds: “Aurobindo Ghose, Jagadish Chunder 
Bose,—and that saint the Mahatma.”78 This account is dated November 1924, 
eleven years after Tagore’s meteoric rise to fame, so Rolland was addressing an 
international image of Tagore that had crystallized over time. In inter-war 
Germany, where the fervor about Tagore was second to no other European 
country, including Britain, there was a mystic Oriental air about the poet: 
“When the noise of battle [i.e. WWI] had just died down,…a man came to them 
[i.e. the Germans] from a world unknown, which to their knowledge or dreams 
was a home of fairy-tales, of magic, of adventures, of mysteries, and talked to 
                                                   
77  Romain Rolland, Alex Aronson tr., “On Rabindranath Tagore,” in Alex Aronson and 
Krishna Kripalani eds., Rolland and Tagore (Calcutta: Visva-Bharati, 1945), pp.3-5. 
78 Ibid., p.6. 
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them,…he made them feel the giant breath of nature and the power of loving 
nearness.”79 Such a public image of Tagore, as mentioned, began to circulate as 
early as 1912, and was sanctioned by the surprising 1913 Nobel Prize in 
Literature. 
Politically, the Prize earned Tagore a reputation overnight, but put him on 
a Procrustean bed as well. The Committee tried hard to incorporate Tagore’s 
literary achievement in British civilization, and to attribute the revival of 
Eastern thought, languages, and literatures to Christian missionaries. 
Therefore, even if the Committee was sincere in its intention to bring together 
the two hemispheres, the effort turned out to embody the conventional and 
highly institutionalized practice of Orientalism.  
Culturally, since it was the West that gave Tagore an unprecedented 
chance to speak for the East, he was compelled—to a certain degree—to cling to 
the mystic image favored by the West to keep his vantage for speaking. This, 
paradoxically, was conducive to the very undoing of Tagore’s own universalism 
because he was obliged to define the East in constant contrast to the West. In 
other words, in spite of the claim that “[f]or me my East is the poet’s East, not 
that of a politician or scholar,”80  Tagore (unwittingly perhaps) became the 
greatest agent of self-Orientalism in his time. 
As discussed in Section 2, it took only a few months for Pound to turn 
satirical about Tagore. The mysticism suited Western needs well but was 
contrary to Pound’s own aesthetic standards. Nonetheless, Pound’s depreciation 
of public taste did not detach him from an entrenched structure in which Yeats 
and the Nobel Prize Committee were also involved. In 1913 Pound wrote: 
 
As a religious teacher he is superfluous. We’ve got Lao Tse [i.e. Laozi 
老子]. And his (Tagore’s) philosophy hasn’t much in it for a man who 
has “felt the pangs” or been pestered with Western civilization.81  
 
Whether Tagore’s message has soothing power is a matter of personal taste. 
However, no essential difference exists between Pound’s comment and the 
                                                   
79 Theodor Heuss, “Tagore and Germany,” in A Centenary Volume: Rabindranath Tagore, 
p.321. 
80 Rabindranath Tagore, Letters to a Friend, collected in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English 
Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VI: Essays, Lectures, Addresses, p.376. 
81 See note 15. 
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expectation of “good tidings” from the remote East; Laozi or Tagore’s 
interpretation of the Upanishads were simply alternatives from a functional 
East. This functional East-West dichotomy was further confirmed by Yeats’ 
words:  
 
Your poems, as you know, came to me as a great excitement; and of 
recent years I have found wisdom and beauty, or both, in your 
prose…and life, when I think of it as separated from all that is not 
itself, from all that is complicated and mechanical, takes to my 
imagination an Asiatic form. That form I found first in your books and 
afterwards in certain Chinese poetry and Japanese prose writers.82 
 
Not only did Yeats equate Asia with spirituality, but the constituents of 
that spiritual Asia—that is, India, China, and Japan—corresponded exactly to 
those of Tagore. This stereotype, as argued in Section 4, had been extant for a 
long time in the West and obtained decisive form in the modern age. Tagore’s 
rise and fall in popularity was simply part of another round of the West’s search 
in the early 20th century for spiritual consolation from the Far East. Both Tagore 
and Yeats were merely agents of this historical trend, and as such, could do no 
more to influence its momentum than frame the Indian poet’s image in the 
Western imagination. 
 
                                                   
82 W. B. Yeats, untitled, in Ramananda Chatterjee ed., The Golden Book of Tagore: A 
Homage to Rabindranath Tagore from India and the World in Celebration of His Seventieth 
Birthday, p. 269. 
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Part II 
Tagore and His “Eastern Asia”: Japan 
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3. Tagore’s Nihonjinron and International Opinion on Asia  
in the Inter-War Period 
 
 
3 .1  Overview 
 
Part I of the dissertation combines historical accounts, research reviews, 
and critical analyses. Chapter 1 examines the process whereby Tagore became 
the representative of the East, and how this image has resulted in 
oversimplification of the Indian polymath for a century. Chapter 2 deals with 
the critical concept of spirituality that characterized this process, and argues 
that Tagore’s articulation of Asia actually served to enhance the Western 
mechanism of Orientalism. The four chapters in Parts II and III delve deeper 
into specific contexts, aiming to reconstruct Tagore’s involvement in the 
intellectual histories of modern Japan and China. As will be demonstrated, the 
idea of “the East” or “Asia” loomed large in the interaction. Such a task of 
reconstruction is carried out through extensive comparison of the ideas of 
Tagore with those of many contemporary intellectual leaders, both Eastern and 
Western.  
When Rabindranath Tagore criticized Western nationalism in the early 
20th century, a main reference for his argumentation was an Eastern country, 
Japan. By examining Tagore’s comments on Japanese culture and politics 
against the genre of Nihonjinron 日本人論  (theory of Japaneseness), 1  this 
chapter explores Japan’s ambiguous image in the modern world. To this end, it 
is necessary to compare the views of Japan and its subtle relationship with the 
idea of Asia held by other contemporary luminaries, such as John Dewey and 
Bertrand Russell. 
While studies on Tagore’s relationship with Japan must take mutual 
depictions into consideration, to make the argument more cogent, it seems 
appropriate to divide the topic into two interconnected projects. The first takes a 
chronological view that weaves the fluctuations in Japanese attitudes towards 
Tagore from the 1910s till the present day into the context of the modern 
                                                   
1 Sugimoto Yoshio’s translation of the term is adopted here. See An Introduction to Japanese 
Society, Third Edition (Melbourne: Cambridge UP, 2010), p.2. Here the original plural form 
is changed into the singular. Sugimoto’s view of Nihonjinron from a sociological perspective 
will be discussed in Section 2.  
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intellectual history of Japan. The second takes a synchronological view to 
analyze the ideological characteristics of Tagore’s theory of Japaneseness, and 
to compare it with observations made by contemporaneous Western thinkers 
who were held in high regard in Japanese academic circle at the time. This 
chapter takes a synchronological approach, leaving the elaboration of a 
chronological treatment to Chapter 4. The two approaches also differ in their 
references. The words of international figures form the backbone of this project, 
whereas various comments and studies that reflect the vicissitudes of attitudes 
towards Tagore in Japan constitute the object of analysis in the other.  
The theory of Japaneseness, or Nihonjinron, is not an inclusive term. It 
refers to a specific genre that aims to portray the “Japanese character” in order 
to stress its uniqueness. Tagore never had any intention to develop this genre. 
However, the style of his expression is reminiscent of the Nihonjinron prevalent 
at the time, and as such, demands inquiry into their similarities and differences, 
as well as the historical circumstances that prompted the genre to thrive. 
Historically speaking, Tagore’s Nihonjinron was a conscious echo of the ideal of 
“Asia is one” proposed by Okakura Kakuzō at the beginning of the 20th century 
(their friendship started in 1901 during Okakura’s India trip and lasted until 
the latter’s death in 1913). 2  In The Ideal of the East, a book that drew 
inspiration from the author’s sojourn in India in 1902 and was published in 1903, 
Okakura gives Asian history a shape by narrating how the thought and artistic 
styles of India and China had developed, and how they had been fused together 
and raised to a new height in Japan. With the passage of time, Okakura’s 
original ideal—nostalgic as well as nationalistic—had strayed into imperialist 
pan-Asianism when Tagore visited Japan in 1916. It continued to develop along 
this vein, a fact of which the Indian poet was aware and tried to caution his 
Japanese audiences against it. Therefore, although Tagore’s lectures 
concentrated on Japan’s significant role in the expected rise of Asia, they were 
no less warnings issued against Japanese militarization. In this regard, while 
Tagore’s comments share some traits with other Nihonjinron superficially, they 
are in sharp contrast in terms of purpose and intellectual premise. To illuminate 
Tagore’s particular formulation of Nihonjinron, with its deliberate linkage to the 
                                                   
2 Okakura Kakuzō, The Ideals of the East, in Okakura Kakuzo: Collected English Writings, 
Vol.1, p.13. For detailed analyses of the exchanges of ideas between Tagore and Okakura, 
see: Rustom Bharucha, Another Asia: Rabindranath Tagore & Okakura Tenshin. 
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ideal of Asia, Dewey’s and Russell’s observations of China and Japan will be 
drawn in comparison.  
Tagore, Dewey, and Russell all visited Japan and China within a few years 
around the end of WWI. It was a period when Japan was rising rapidly to an 
international power but still many years away from its full-scale invasion of 
China. Intellectual activities were thriving in both countries, with foreign ideas 
imported and foreign thinkers invited; among the visitors were Tagore, Dewey, 
and Russell. The welcomes and propaganda accorded to them were tremendous, 
at least in the beginning. Besides expounding their philosophical thought, they 
travelled around and formulated their civilizational observations as well. It is 
precisely because they were neither professional analysts nor political critics 
that their impressions of the Far East 3 —gained from short-term visits, 
exchanges with local figures, and reading of relevant books—came to be typical 
of the overarching civilizational discourses prevalent during the inter-war 
period, which might lack precision and even depth but constitute a significant 
episode of modern intellectual history. Critically, Japan’s ambiguous position in 
the East-West dichotomy finds very different interpretations in the three 
luminaries’ portraits of world civilizations. The differences, as I will argue, 
reflect how the idea of Asia was characterized in the early 20th century from 
different political stances.  
 
3 .2  Intel lectual  Basis  of  Nihonjinron  and Tagore ’s  View of  Japan 
 
To better understand Tagore’s view of Japan in the context of 
early-twentieth-century world politics, a review of the intellectual foundation of 
Nihonjinron and Tagore’s semi-missionary overseas tours after becoming 
world-famous is necessary. Such a review aims to sketch the overlap between 
the increase of Japan’s national confidence and the formulation of Tagore’s 
one-Asia ideology in the early 20th century.  
In An Introduction to Japanese Society, Sugimoto Yoshio describes 
Nihonjinron as “a discourse that…has persisted as the long-lasting paradigm 
that regards Japan as a uniquely homogeneous society.” 4  This concise 
                                                   
3 “East Asia” as a term had not yet gained currency at the time of their visits. This issue will 
be discussed in Section 4.  
4 Sugimoto Yoshio, An Introduction to Japanese Society, Third Edition, p.2. 
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description grasps the spirit of such discourse to define Japanese society as 
essentially homogeneous. The adverb “uniquely” is not to be overlooked. The 
literature not only portrays Japan as homogeneous but also distinguishes it 
from other societies as uniquely so. Among the features that are said to underlie 
Japan’s homogeneity some are often heard, such as dependence on superiors, 
vertical loyalties, group orientation, “consensus society,” etc.5  Furthermore, 
Sugimoto also specifies certain assumptions undergirding these studies: 
 
First, it is presumed that all Japanese share the attribute in 
question…Second, it is also assumed that there is virtually no 
variation among the Japanese in the degree to which they possess the 
characteristic in question…Third, the trait in question…is supposed to 
exist only marginally in other societies…Finally, the fourth 
presupposition is an ahistorical assumption that the trait has 
prevailed in Japan for an unspecified period of time, independently of 
historical circumstances.6 
 
The purpose of Sugimoto’s book is to challenge stereotypes about Japan and 
reveal the complexity of Japanese society, with “homogeneity assumptions” of 
Nihonjinron ranking at the top of those stereotypes. In a monograph of 
Nihonjinron studies, Harumi Befu also pithily characterizes this genre as 
“hegemony of homogeneity” and explains that “Nihonjinron writings share a 
singular objective: to demonstrate unique qualities of Japanese culture, 
Japanese society, and the Japanese people…As such, little or no attention is 
given in writings of this genre to internal variation, whether along the line of 
religion, class, gender, rural or urban settings, or any other criterion.”7 
As a sociologist, Sugimoto adopts statistical methods to demythologize the 
Nihonjinron paradigm without examining it in historical terms. Befu’s 
anthropologic studies mainly focus on the reproduction of this literature in the 
post-war period. In this regard, Minami Hiroshi’s 南博 (1914-2001) Nihonjinron: 
                                                   
5 Ibid., p.3. 
6 Ibid., p.4. 
7 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron 
(Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001), p.4. The idea of Japanese homogeneity has greater 
historical nuances; for a detailed examination of this issue, see Oguma Eiji 小熊英二, Tanitsu 
minzoku shinwa no kigen: Nihonjin no jigazou no keifu 単一民族神話の起源―日本人の自画像
の系譜 (The Myth of the Homogeneous Nation) (sic.) (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995). 
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From the Meiji Era to the Present critically reviews the development of the 
genre over a much longer time span. Minami declared: “This book attempts to 
trace objectively the development of Nihonjinron from the Meiji Restoration 
until the present day [i.e. the last decade of the 20th century, or more precisely, 
the passing away of the Showa Emperor in 1989]. It can be said that the 
outcome is equivalent to a modern history of self-consciousness possessed by the 
Japanese.”8 Minami did not intend to trace the genre to its origin but focused on 
the modern (and perhaps postmodern) period as witnessing the flourishing and 
ramifying of Nihonjinron. After examining hundreds of representative works, he 
concluded:  
 
Nihonjinron rose to prominence concomitant to great social 
transformations from the Meiji era; every time international affairs 
took place, Japanese consciousness of their nation in contrast to 
foreign nations heightened…With the intent to catch up with and 
surpass advanced countries, there emerged a self-understanding and 
self-reflection on the part of the Japanese nation and people based on 
comparisons with Western countries.9 
 
Miyake Setsurei 三宅雪嶺  (1860-1945) provides an apropos example to 
illustrate the above statement. Addressing a Meiji Japan that was confronted 
with increasing Western challenges, he published both The True, Good, and 
Beautiful Japanese and The False, Bad, Ugly Japanese in 1891. The two books 
emphasize contrasting characteristics of the Japanese people, but their 
purposes converge. As a nationalistic traditionalist, Miyake expected the 
Japanese sense of the true, the good, and the beautiful to contribute to a more 
harmonious world, while reminding the Japanese people of their less favorable 
aspects that might prevent that expectation from being fulfilled. He concluded 
that “Even if we tried our best to imitate, our country would become nothing 
more than an inferior Western country, and our people an inferior Western 
people. The result would be a mere increase in inferior Western races. Ah! Is 
this what Nature, which fosters both heaven and earth, really intends?”10 In a 
                                                   
8 Minami Hiroshi, Nihonjinron: Meiji kara konnichi made 日本人論―明治から今日まで 
(Nihonjinron: From the Meiji Era to the Present), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), p.v. 
9 Ibid., p.391. 
10 Miyake Setsurei, Gi, aku, shū Nihonjin 偽悪醜日本人 (The False, Bad, Ugly Japanese), in 
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1907 work, Haga Yaichi 芳賀矢一 (1867-1927) also enumerated ten virtues of 
the Japanese people—loyalty to the emperor and the nation, respect for 
ancestors and family reputation, realism, love of nature, optimism, candidness, 
subtlety, neatness, courtesy and etiquette, and being kind and forgiving—and 
hoped for their preservation in the process of Japan’s interaction with other 
cultures. 11 
Nihonjinron became a major genre during the Meiji era, but this period is 
not to be mistaken for its inception. Indeed, one of the earliest authors of 
Nihonjinron mentioned by Minami is the Edo period scholar Motoori Norinaga
本居宣長 (1730-1801), who, by contrasting the Japanese temperament with the 
Chinese, claimed a uniquely aesthetic psychology of the Japanese.12 However 
far back its historical roots may lie, it can be observed that Nihonjinron is a 
discourse that differentiates Japan from others, whether China or the West, 
while assuming little self-differentiation within Japan. Admittedly, the idea of 
Japanese homogeneity has greater historical nuances and not every scholar 
agrees on the established view of Nihonjinron.13 Nevertheless, concerning the 
ideological and historical backgrounds of this genre, the delineation above is 
sufficient to introduce us to the world that Tagore addressed. 
Rabindranath Tagore received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913. Born 
to an aristocratic family in Kolkata, the cultural capital of British India, Tagore 
was well educated in both Indian classics and modern Western disciplines from 
an early age. Keen awareness of the conflict between Eastern and Western 
civilizations was deeply rooted in his mind. Given the circumstances, the Nobel 
Prize gave him worldwide fame and allowed him unprecedented opportunities to 
travel around the world and exchange ideas with contemporary intellectuals.  
Tagore’s first overseas tour after becoming the Nobel laureate took place in 
1916. The United States was his destination but he stayed in Japan for three 
                                                                                                                                             
Ikumatsu Keizō 生松敬三  ed., Nihonjinron 日本人論  (Theories of Japaneseness) (Tokyo: 
Fuzambō, 1977), p.123. 
11 Haga Yaichi, Kokuminsei jūron 国民性十論 (Ten Theses on the Japanese Character), in 
Ikumatsu Keizō ed., Nihonjinron, pp.262-263. 
12 Ibid., p.5. 
13 Cf. Oguma Eiji 小熊英二, Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen: Nihonjin no jigazou no keifu 
単一民族神話の起源―日本人の自画像の系譜 (The Myth of the Homogeneous Nation) (sic.), 
(Tokyo: Shinyōsya, 1995). Furthermore, as such a literature and relevant studies exist in 
abundance, no characterizations are indisputable. For example, Sugimoto’s and Minami’s 
views differ on the very foundations of Nihonjinron. As a sociologist, Sugimoto tends to 
disavow any credulous homogeneity of Japan, but Minami, as a psychologist, seems to 
acknowledge a collective Japanese mindset. 
 73 
months en route.14 Of the three public lectures Tagore gave there, the last two 
that were delivered in Tokyo later became part of his famous Nationalism. 
Besides, in a series of lectures published in 1922, Tagore in his articulation of 
“East and West” refers to Japan as accommodating the traditional and modern 
worlds at the same time, with the latter eroding the ideal and humanity of the 
former. 15  Hence, disharmony and prospective fusion between Eastern and 
Western civilizations find intensive expression in Tagore’s depiction of Japan. 
Although many studies have elucidated Tagore’s relationship with Japan, the 
critical role that Japan plays in shaping Tagore’s civilizational discourse seems 
to deserve more elaboration, and is thus the subject of the next section.  
It is not without precedent to characterize Tagore’s depiction of Japan as 
Nihonjinron. It has been suggested that his Japan Travelogue “can be counted 
as one of the early examples of Nihonjinron authored by foreign intellectuals.”16 
While Japan Travelogue consists of private letters, it does not differ from 
Tagore’s public lectures in its attempt to discover the uniqueness of Japan and 
to weave it into his overarching discourse whenever appropriate.  
In choosing Nihonjinron written by foreigners for analysis, Minami 
explains his criteria that “consideration is limited to those translated works of 
great influence…Even though some books caused enthusiasm at the time of 
their publication, if they contain no distinctive views, they will not be considered 
here.”17 It is true that Tagore’s works, both collected lectures and private letters, 
are not in monograph forms exploring so-called Japaneseness, but the fact that 
Minami does not mention his name may imply that the Indian poet’s comments 
are either considered insignificant or lacking in insight. Actually, Tagore could 
hardly claim any genuine knowledge of Japan, as Stephen Hay notes: 
                                                   
14 For a review of this Japan-America trip, see Morimoto Tatsuo 森本達雄 , “Tagōru no 
daiikkai sekai junrei: Nihon-Amerika hōmon tenmatsuki” タゴールの第一回世界巡礼―日本
＝アメリカ訪問顛末記 (Tagore’s First World Tour: A Description of His Visits to Japan and 
America), in Tagōru chosakushū, bekkan: Tagōru kenkyū タゴール著作集・別巻―タゴール研
究  (Collected Works of Tagore, Supplementary Volume: Tagore Studies) (Tokyo: Daisan 
Bunmeisha, 1993), pp.309-343. 
15 Rabindranath Tagore, “East and West,” in Creative Unity, p.97. 
16 Morimoto Tatsuo, “Kaidai” 解題  (Explanatory Note), in Tagōru chosakushū daijūkan: 
jiden, kaisō, ryokōki タゴール著作集・第十巻―自伝・回想・旅行記 (Collected Works of Tagore, 
Volume 10: Autobiographies, Reminiscences, and Travelogues) (Tokyo: Daisan Bunmeisha, 
1987), p.606. There is another publication in 1987 regarding Tagore’s Nationalism as a 
Nihonron 日本論 (theory of Japan); see Saeki Shōichi 佐伯彰一, Haga Tōru 芳賀徹, eds., 
Gaikokujin ni yoru Nihonron no meicho 外国人による日本論の名著 (Masterpieces of Theory 
of Japan by Foreigners) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1987), pp.120-125. 
17 Minami Hiroshi, Nihonjinron: Meiji kara konnichi made, pp.v-vi. 
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Bringing with him a preconceived notion of what constituted the 
essence of “the East,” he tried to impose it on a country he had never 
seen before and of whose rich and complex culture, customs, and 
institutions he had very little knowledge.18 
 
Hay is correct in pointing out that Tagore mainly described Japan in 
preconceived terms that fit his East-West framework. Nonetheless, deeper 
exploration indicates that what obliged Tagore to forge his overarching 
discourse was the same trend that fueled the proliferation of Nihonjinron, albeit 
the intentions to foreground Japan’s uniqueness differed. In view of Japan’s 
successful modernization, Tagore charged the country with the dual 
responsibility of moderating the materialistic aspect of the West and endowing 
the East with a reinvigorated spirit. On the other hand, the East-West dialectics 
was also visible in both Miyake’s and Haga’s Nihonjinron cited above, but it was 
addressed more in terms of the tension between the nationalistic and the 
universalistic. Historically, this tension persisted through the 1910s and the 
1920s, and the nationalistic bent emerged into fascist Nihonjinron later.19 For 
example, in 1930 Ōkawa Shūmei 大 川 周 明  (1886-1957) appealed to his 
audiences that “what I would like to see is the revival of an upright and strong 
Japan, which will defeat the evil [i.e. Western influences] that dominates the 
world.”20  
 
3 .3  Tagore ’s  “Nationalism in Japan” and Beyond 
 
When Tagore paid his first visit to Japan in 1916, Japan had already 
become the strongest non-Western country in the world in terms of economic 
                                                   
18 Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and 
India, p.122. 
19 Minami Hiroshi, Nihonjinron: Meiji kara konnichi made, pp.111, 391. In Japan, as well as 
in Minami’s book, the period from the early 1910s to the mid-1920s is referred to by the 
Japanese era name of Taishō, which is followed by the Showa era from 1926 to 1989. In many 
respects, the reign names mark different phases of modern Japanese history. In addition, 
Harumi Befu divides the history of Nihonjinron from the 18th century into five clear-cut 
periods, see: “Nationalism and Nihonjinron,” in Harumi Befu ed., Cultural Nationalism in 
East Asia: Representation and Identity (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, U of 
California, 1993), p.125. 
20  Ōkawa Shūmei, Nihon no genkō 日本の言行  (Japan’s Words and Deeds), in Ōkawa 
Shūmei zenshū: daiikkan 大川周明全集・第一巻 (Complete Works of Ōkawa Shūmei, Vol. 1) 
(Tokyo: Iwazaki Shobō, 1962), p.401. 
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and military prowess. As the subjects of Tagore’s first systematic elaboration on 
issues concerning East versus West in the capacity of a foreign luminary 
through the lingua franca of English, the Japanese witnessed a Nihonjinron 
different from the kind to which they were accustomed. Tagore’s speeches were 
figurative and flowery, which might have bewildered many Japanese in his 
audiences. Nonetheless, his message was clear and he organized his three public 
lectures into a coherent argument. Complementing extant studies of Tagore’s 
warnings to Japan, I will demonstrate the inner logic of Tagore’s public 
addresses in 1916 and interpret them in the context of Nihonjinron. 
The first public speech, delivered in Osaka on June 1, was introductory but 
only partly complimentary. Tagore said he had been dreaming of visiting Japan, 
“where the East and the West found their meeting place and carried on their 
courtship far enough to give assurance of a wedding.”21 This overseas voyage 
reminded him of the adventures of ancient Buddhist monks who brought the 
truths of life from India, through China, to Japan at the easternmost end. While 
those scriptures were transmitted with great difficulty, they retained their 
simplicity in full wisdom and love. In contrast, modern technology, which 
shortened both spatial and temporal distance, simply multiplied things without 
facilitating access to their cores: “All the odds and ends, the vast waste 
materials of civilization floating about it, have created a growing barrier, not 
only shutting out our deeper nature but smothering it to a great extent.”22 
Tagore complained that what greeted his eyes when his ship was docking in 
Kobe was not different from what he had seen in major Western cities. “But this 
is not Japan,”23 thus claimed the poet with his determination to discover the 
uniqueness of the country.  
The second lecture, “The Message of India to Japan,” was given at Tokyo 
Imperial University on June 11. Tagore started with words of gratitude to Japan 
for rejuvenating Asia. He then adapted this rejuvenation to an overarching 
framework, in which both Eastern and Western civilizations have lifecycles. 
After contributing to social, political, and religious ideals, Eastern civilizations 
became inactive and bound in tradition, until “[o]ne morning the whole world 
looked up in surprise, when Japan broke through her walls of old habits in a 
                                                   
21 Rabindranath Tagore, “India and Japan,” in Supriya Roy ed., Talks in Japan: A Collection 
of Addresses Given in Japan – 1916, 1924, 1929 (Kolkata: Shizen, 2007), p.29. 
22 Ibid., p.31. 
23 Ibid. 
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night and came out triumphant.”24 In this sense, Japan’s phenomenal rise was 
not an isolated case but heralded the awakening of the East into its next cycle of 
vigor. Tagore praised Japan with such beautiful descriptions as “modern Japan 
has come out of the immemorial East like a lotus blossoming in an easy 
grace…[it] has also fearlessly claimed all the gifts of the modern age for 
herself.”25 Nonetheless, he argued, “I, for myself, cannot believe that Japan has 
become what she is by imitating the West…The real truth is that science is not 
man’s nature, it is mere knowledge and training.”26 Here Tagore attributed 
Japan’s modern achievements to a spiritual source traceable to a time 
immemorial. He not only defended Japan’s uniqueness against accusations of its 
imitation of the West, but extrapolated to the East in general this capability for 
self-transformation. For Tagore, the modern West and the traditional East 
stand for scientific knowledge and human nature respectively. Japan is 
indispensible to this framework for it showcased what Tagore spoke for and 
warned against at the same time: “Therefore your responsibility is all the 
greater, for in your voice Asia shall answer the questions that Europe has 
submitted to the conference of Man.”27 
The last public lecture, “The Spirit of Japan,” delivered at Keio University 
in Tokyo on July 2, is clear-cut in structure. Tagore praised the Japanese spirit 
in the first part, and admonished it against over-Westernization in the second. 
The Indian poet was effusive in his commendations: “I have travelled in many 
countries and have met with men of all classes, but never in my travels did I feel 
the presence of the human so distinctly as in this land.”28 What follows is an 
observation that captures the outer features—if not the “spirit” as Tagore 
claimed—of Japan: 
 
You see a people, whose heart has come out and scattered itself in 
profusion in its commonest utensils of everyday life, in its social 
institutions, in its manners, that are carefully perfect, and in its 
dealings with things that are not only deft, but graceful in every 
                                                   
24 Rabindranath Tagore, The Message of India to Japan: A Lecture, p.10. 
25 Ibid., p.11. 
26 Ibid., p.12. 
27 Ibid., p.17. 
28  Rabindranath Tagore, The Spirit of Japan: A Lecture (Tokyo: The Indo-Japanese 
Association, 1916), p.5. 
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movement. 29 
 
 Tagore went further to assert that: 
 
This opening of the heart to the soul of the world is not confined to a 
section of your privileged classes…but it belongs to all your men and 
women of all conditions. 30 
 
Moreover, he also depicted Japan as a “civilisation of human 
relationship[s]” maintained by filial duty, and the nation became “one family 
with your Emperor as its head.”31 No more evidence is needed to demonstrate 
the kinship of these comments to Nihonjinron. Not only did Tagore stress the 
uniqueness of Japan, but all assumptions underlying Nihonjinron feature 
prominently here. A turning point came, however, immediately after Tagore’s 
praise: “And this had made me all the more apprehensive of the change…For the 
huge heterogeneity of the modern age, whose only common bond is usefulness, is 
nowhere so pitifully exposed against the dignity and hidden power of reticent 
beauty, as in Japan.”32  
As mentioned above, the two Tokyo lectures constitute (with slight 
abridgement) “Nationalism in Japan,” one of the chapters of Nationalism that 
was published in 1917. It is thus reasonable to ask what “nationalism” meant for 
Tagore, and why it would do so much harm to the Japanese sensibility of beauty. 
An explanation can be culled from these lectures: 
 
The genius of Europe has given her people the power of organisation, 
which has specially made itself manifest in politics and commerce and 
in coordinating scientific knowledge.33 
 
Europe has a great tradition of humanity as Tagore fully acknowledged, but 
its inclination for organization with the help of modern scientific knowledge had 
made it narrowly focused on efficiency and profit-making, which resulted in 
                                                   
29 Ibid., p.6. 
30 Ibid., pp.9-10. 
31 Ibid., p.10. 
32 Ibid., p.11. 
33 Ibid., p.8. 
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nationalism and materialism. 34  Furthermore, “[t]he political civilisation…is 
based upon exclusiveness…It is always afraid of other races achieving eminence, 
naming it as a peril.”35 As Tagore understood, Japan had tried hard to prove 
itself as aggressive as Western nations to win their respect,36 but it also fell 
prey to their exclusiveness. The “Immigration Act of 1924” in the United States 
was a good example, towards which Tagore was to share the same indignation 
with the Japanese. 
It is noted that the third speech was much more critical than the second 
because Tagore had spent some time experiencing Japan.37 Nevertheless, as the 
two lectures were too close for extensive exploration of Japan in between, and 
there is an argumentative logic tying them together, perhaps it can be said that 
Tagore was more preoccupied with drawing Japan into his framework—with a 
view to the nuances this country could provide—than with understanding 
Japan’s history and culture for their own sake.  
Critically, Tagore did not show much historical knowledge in his grand 
narrative. Neither the socio-political conditions of the emergence of nationalism 
in the West nor its practical impact on Japan receives satisfactory explication. 
Nonetheless, Tagore’s critique of nationalism changes the discourse from the 
categories of historical, social, and political studies into civilizational discourse, 
which Uma Das Gupta designates as “a cultural nationalism.” 38  Although 
Tagore was no less a strong supporter of national independence, his Nationalism 
is in essence an anti-nationalist discourse that aims to upset the paradigm of 
Western modernity and crown Asia or the East with supreme humanity. For 
Tagore, only with such a spiritual tradition could Japan, a newly modernized 
country, lead the world into an era of cultural fusion.39 Here lies the crucial 
                                                   
34 Tagore does not define “nationalism” in throughout his lectures in Japan, but he gave a 
definition for “nation” later in America as follows: “A nation, in the sense of the political and 
economic union of a people, is that aspect which a whole population assumes when organized 
for a mechanical purpose. Society as such has no ulterior purpose. It is an end in itself.” See 
Rabindranath Tagore, “Nationalism in the West,” in Nationalism, p.19. 
35 Rabindranath Tagore, The Message of India to Japan: A Lecture, p.21. 
36 Rabindranath Tagore, The Spirit of Japan: A Lecture, p.23. 
37 Rōyama Yoshirō 蝋山芳郎 , “Tagōru to Nihon e no keikoku” タゴールと日本への警告 
(Tagore and His Warning to Japan), in Tagōru seitan hyakunensai kinen ronbunshū, p.273.   
38  “Both in the context of India as well as in his reaction to the world situation, 
Rabindranath’s nationalism was humanitarian and cultural, never political.” See Uma Das 
Gupta, “A Cultural Nationalism,” in The Visvabharati Quarterly, Vol.48, Nos.1-4 (May 
1982-April 1983), p.47. 
39 Harumi Befu has also developed a thesis on the relationship between nationalism and 
Nihonjinron. Of course, Tagore’s criticism of nationalism and its adoption in the general 
literature of Nihonjinron represent two opposite attitudes towards the same concept. See 
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difference between Tagore’s Nihonjinron and the others of a pan-Asianist bent. 
In The Ideal of the East, while acclaiming the oneness of Asia, Okakura Tenshin 
highlights the privileged position of Japan as bridging the two hemispheres. 
Nonetheless, as history unfolded, “Asia is one” gradually developed into a 
jingoist slogan that took pride in Japan’s modern vantage without showing 
genuine respect for cultural inheritance and social responsibility. 
To conclude Tagore’s view of nationalism, one must consider the overall 
structure of the book, as well as what is missing from it. The volume deals with 
nationalism in the West, in Japan, and in India, respectively. The lectures in 
Japan occurred the earliest, with the others delivered in America during the 
latter half of his 1916-1917 journey. Tagore showed unusual perception in 
pointing out the problems and opportunities that were facing India and America, 
but the chapter on Japan is the most theoretically complicated because of the 
pivotal position Japan occupied in the East-West dichotomy.40 However, while 
Tagore said in Tokyo that “[t]he whole world waits to see what this great 
Eastern nation is going to do with the opportunities and responsibilities she has 
accepted from the hands of the modern time,”41 he was not optimistic. Before 
sailing for Japan, Tagore expressed his concerns in a letter: “Japan is the 
youngest disciple of Europe—she has no soul—she is all science—and she has no 
sentiment to spare for other people than her own.”42 The three-month stay in 
Japan modified Tagore’s view, but his suspicion persisted. 
There is subtle evidence for this suspicion. In 1905, Tagore so rejoiced at 
the victory of Japan over Russia that he personally organized a parade in 
Kolkata, but he mentioned nothing about this victory in his 1916 lectures, 
probably to avoid instigating Japanese imperialist pride. Tagore revealed his 
disappointment at Japan during his 1924 visit to China, saying that “the East 
should not be humble when it had come into sudden good fortune.”43 Here 
Japan claimed no more the great tradition of the East, but became a 
                                                                                                                                             
Harumi Befu, “Nationalism and Nihonjinron,” in Harumi Befu ed., Cultural Nationalism in 
East Asia: Representation and Identity (Berkeley: U of California P, 1993), pp.107-135. 
40 For a later review of the lectures made in Japan and America during this trip, see 
Ramachandra Guha, “Introduction: Travelling with Tagore,” in Rabindranath Tagore, 
Nationalism, pp.vii-lxviii. This 2009 Penguin Modern Classics version restores the lectures to 
their chronological order.  
41 Rabindranath Tagore, The Message of India to Japan: A Lecture, p.14. 
42  Cited from Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore: The 
Myriad-Minded Man, p.200. 
43 Rabindranath Tagore, “Talks in China,” in Mohit K. Ray ed. The English Writings of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Volume IV: Essays, p.752. 
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Westernized parvenu, whose expansionism in the inter-war period threatened 
not only China but also India.  
Indeed, Tagore valued China over Japan in terms of cultural ties with India. 
When in China, he mentioned frequently the millennia-long cultural interaction 
between China and India, and alluded to the disadvantages shared by the two 
countries at the time to arouse sympathy from his audience.44 Nevertheless, 
despite this strong affinity, China could not contribute to Tagore’s grand 
narrative about an Asia that he hoped could modify Western modernity. He 
simply mentioned no historical influences of China on Japan in his Tokyo 
lectures, taking “Japaneseness” as naturally coming from an abstract East, 
which, through the example of Japan, proved itself capable of catching up with 
the modern West. Therefore, in Tagore’s discourse, “Asia” was more theoretical 
than real, with tradition versus modernity being the core issue, the greatest 
barrier to a desired cultural unity being West-originated nationalism. In short, 
Asia took its conceptual shape by way of contrast to the West. This is the 
ideological ground of Tagore’s Nihonjinron. 
 
3 .4  China,  Japan,  and Asia in the Eyes of  Western Luminaries  
 
In an essay commemorating Tagore’s centenary in 1961, Takeuchi Yoshimi 
竹内好  (1910-1977) states that “in Japan, generally speaking, Tagore was 
regarded as a poet from a ruined country; in China, he roused sympathy as a 
resistant poet by singing songs of national independence.” 45  While this 
judgment is simplistic and will be examined in later chapters, Takeuchi was 
perceptive in pointing out that “if we do not take Tagore’s relationship with 
China into consideration, we cannot fully understand his relationship with 
Japan.”46 This understanding derived from Takeuchi’s long-standing interest in 
modern Japanese and Chinese intellectual histories. Besides, he was also aware 
that a fuller perspective should include other foreign figures who were 
                                                   
44 “We in India are a defeated race…we do not know how to help or to injure you materially. 
But, fortunately we can meet you as your guests, your brothers and your friends.” Ibid., 
p.746. 
45 Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Tagōru to Chūgoku” タゴールと中国 (Tagore and China), in Takeuchi 
Yoshimi zenshū 竹内好全集 (Complete Works of Takeuchi Yoshimi) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 
1981), Vol.5, p.220.  
46 Ibid. 
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influential in both countries, such as Dewey and Russell.47 
However, as will be demonstrated, this comparison renders the idea of Asia 
problematic. While they all considered China an Asian country, it is a totally 
different issue when Japan was taken into consideration. The fortunes of the 
two countries in the modern world were so different that one might wonder if 
the geographical designation of Asia was appropriate for accommodating such 
contrasting historical experiences. Given the immensity of Asia, Tagore 
consciously divided it into eastern and western parts,48 and claimed that in the 
past “the whole of eastern Asia from Burma to Japan was united with India in 
the closest tie of friendship.”49 What Tagore was referring to was the influence 
of Buddhism. This cultural bond, despite its historicity, does not seem to have 
dovetailed with the realpolitik of the time, as observed by Dewey and Russell.  
John Dewey went to China in response to invitations made by many of his 
former students. He was in the country from May 1919 to July 1921. During this 
period and slightly afterwards, he wrote several essays and published them as 
China, Japan, and the U.S.A. at the end of 1921. The booklet bears a subtitle, 
Present-day Conditions in the Far East and Their Bearing on the Washington 
Conference, aiming to illustrate the complicated international relationships at 
the time. Dewey’s depiction of the political status quo of China soon after WWI 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, but suffice it to say that his treatment of the 
network of international powers provides a more realistic portrait than Tagore’s 
great expectation of the rebirth of Asia. As Dewey headed for China by way of 
Japan (actually he received the invitation from his Chinese students in Japan), 
he made a comparison “on the two sides of the Eastern Seas” and concluded: 
 
It is three days’ easy journey from Japan to China. It is doubtful 
whether anywhere in the world another journey of the same length 
brings with it such a complete change of political temper and 
belief…The difference…concerns the ideas, beliefs and alleged 
information current about one and the same fact: the status of Japan 
                                                   
47 Ibid. In a famous 1960 lecture, Takeuchi discussed Dewey’s view of modernization of both 
Japan and China, with passing reference to Russell’s and Tagore’s views. As a pioneer of such 
comparative work, he expected that detailed comparisons would appear in the future. See 
Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Hōhō toshite no Ajia” 方法としてのアジア (Asia as a Method), in ibid., 
pp.90-115. 
48  See Feng Youlan, “Yu Indu Taiguer tanhua: dongxiwenming zhi bijiaoguan,” in 
Sansongtang quanji, Vol.11, p.4. 
49 Rabindranath Tagore, The Message of India to Japan: A Lecture, p.17. 
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in the international world and especially its attitude toward China.50 
 
What follows is a somewhat humorous description of the political tensions 
pervading China and Japan, which found expression through the very different 
temperaments of the two countries: the Chinese were talkative and 
straightforward, and were unanimous in “the feeling of…the domination of 
Chinese politics and industry by Japan with a view to its final absorption.”51 To 
the contrary, in Japan, “the land of reserves and reticences,” Dewey found there 
“a subtle nervous tension in the atmosphere as of a country on the verge of 
change but not knowing where the change will take it.”52 Indeed, Tagore sensed 
in Japan a similar uncertainty in 1916 and interpreted it as a tension between 
traditional Asian ideals and modern European utility. Dewey focused instead on 
the economic and political problems that were facing Japan, both domestically 
and internationally. The second chapter of the book contrasts the Japanese and 
German treatments of Shandong Province. While Germany took possession only 
of the port city of Qingdao and let the Chinese people lead their daily lives 
unhindered, Japan not only took over Germany’s previous rights but also 
monopolized Shandong’s economy and militarized virtually the entire 
province.53 Here he touched upon the issue of the Twenty-One Demands upon 
China in 1915, by which Japan attempted to subsume the northern part of 
China under its control. Such Japanese ambitions produced an unexpected 
result, however. 
 
But Asia has come to consciousness, and her consciousness of herself 
will soon be such a massive and persistent thing that it will force itself 
upon the reluctant consciousness of the west, and lie heavily upon its 
conscience. And for this fact, China and the western world are 
indebted to Japan.54 
 
In Dewey’s view, Japan’s aggression stimulated Asia into awakening, a 
                                                   
50 John Dewey, China, Japan and the U.S.A: Present-day Conditions in the Far East and 
Their Bearing on the Washington Conference (New York: Republic Publishing Co., Inc., 1921), 
p.3. “On Two Sides of the Eastern Seas” is the title of the first chapter.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
53 Ibid., pp.9-12. 
54 Ibid., p.17. 
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truth that was foisted on the West. But we have to ask: what did Asia signify for 
Dewey?  
 
For continental Asia is, for practical purposes, India and China, 
representing two of the oldest civilizations of the globe…Asia is really 
here after all. It is not simply a symbol in western algebraic balances 
of trade. And in the future, so to speak, it is going to be even more here, 
with its awakened national consciousness of about half the population 
of the whole globe.55  
 
Dewey did not explain what he meant by “for practical purposes.” 
Nevertheless, from his description, “continental Asia” seems to entail a set of 
long-standing conditions of civilization totally different from those of the 
modern West, thus excluding Japan for reasons that were more complicated 
than simply geographical or political. In the early 20th century, Japan 
constituted a European-like power that sought to maximize profits in China, or 
continental Asia. Under the circumstances, from Dewey’s point of view, the only 
force to preserve the integrity of Asia—territorially and economically—was 
America. He directed many of his arguments in China, Japan and the U.S.A. to 
a single prospect: the important role that America was to assume at the 
Washington Conference. Not only must the “open door policy” to China be 
insisted upon, but “the door [should] be opened to light, to knowledge and 
understanding.”56 What really mattered was “the need of China and the Orient 
in general for freer and fuller communications with the rest of the world.”57 
Dewey ended his book with the following caution: 
 
To shirk this responsibility on the alleged ground that economic 
imperialism and organized greed will surely bring the Conference to 
failure is supine and snobbish. It is one of the factors that may lead the 
United States to take the wrong course in the parting of the ways.58 
 
Clearly, Dewey’s concern about China was no less intense than that of 
                                                   
55 Ibid., p.16. 
56 Ibid., p.64. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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Tagore. They criticized Western civilization in similar language such as 
“economic imperialism” and “organized greed,” and they were waiting for the 
revival of Asia, whether in political or cultural terms. Nonetheless, we observe 
in Tagore, as an Asian, a desire to see Asia stand on its own feet, which accounts 
for the significance he attached to Japan. Dewey, by contrast, wanted to see Asia 
rise under the auspices of America.  
Now let’s turn to Bertrand Russell for a European perspective of Asia in the 
early 20th century. Russell was also invited to visit China during this era. He 
arrived in China in October 1920 and left Beijing on the same day as Dewey in 
July, 1921. On the way back to England he made a brief visit to Japan. Shortly 
after returning home, he published The Problems of China in 1922, which is a 
work of comparative civilizations. Russell understood that the problems of 
China were significant on account of their vast scale: 
 
In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by the 
development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive factor, 
for good or evil, during the next two centuries.59 
 
On a deeper level, however, it seems that Russell expected China to provide 
an alternative civilizational paradigm to the modern West, against parts of 
which he nursed strong resentment. He valued China highly for the 
pervasiveness of its folk art, intuitive happiness, and human relations. These 
qualities, claimed Russell, had long disappeared in the modern West, which 
mostly gained its property “by widespread oppression and exploitation.”60 Of 
course, China had its own cultural predicaments, and Russell had witnessed 
there the struggle between pro-Westernization forces and the traditionalists. 
But he believed that China would be more capable of achieving an organic 
growth from its own tradition while assimilating what was good from the West if 
time permitted, an expectation that Tagore placed on Japan.  
Interestingly, Russell’s perception of Japan is also tinged with Nihonjinron. 
However, unlike Tagore, this uniqueness of Japan was for Russell a source of 
misgivings, and did not have inherent potential to mitigate its borrowed vices: 
 
                                                   
59 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of China, p.9. 
60 Ibid., p.12. 
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For sociology, for social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is 
an extraordinarily interesting country. The synthesis of East and West 
which has been effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of 
the East than appears on the surface; but there is everything of the 
West that tends to national efficiency.61 
 
This particularity of Japan, for Russell, derived from Japan’s rather 
confused self-identity, in terms of its geographical and historical relations to 
mainland Asia: 
 
From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as 
a unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, 
and India…could be self-subsistent economically…Japan, like Great 
Britain, must depend upon commerce for power and prosperity. As yet, 
Japan has not developed the Liberal mentality appropriate to a 
commercial nation, and is still bent upon Asiatic conquest and military 
prowess.62 
 
Here we see a similarity between Russell and Dewey. For them, Asia was 
basically “continental Asia,” whose pillars were China and India. Whether 
Russia was included or not, Japan did not seem compatible with this unity. 
Russell pointed out that the vast plains of China, India, and Russia could afford 
them independence of commerce and indifference to progress. This is the 
economic as well as cultural foundation of the history of Asia. Japan, 
notwithstanding its geographical proximity, was characterized by two 
incompatible ambitions: “On the one hand, they wish to pose as the champions 
of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the other hand, they wish to 
be admitted to equality by the white Powers.”63 Although Tagore was conscious 
of the dilemma, he could not afford this division between continental Asia and 
Japan, at least at the beginning of his international career, because it would 
undermine his ideal of an Asia that was very much in need of modern 
transformation that Japan had achieved.  
                                                   
61 Ibid., p.98. 
62 Ibid., p.119. 
63 Ibid., p.120. 
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Both Dewey and Russell visited China and Japan during the inter-war 
period. They both showed admiration for Chinese tradition and repugnance 
toward the aggression of modern Japan.64 They were also both in a position to 
predict the future of the Far East after WWI. Their views differ on the 
Washington Conference. While Dewey expected America to take a moral stance, 
Russell, whose book was written after the conference, regarded America as 
nothing more than a great power that supported China on the Shandong 
problem mainly out of political considerations.65 Nevertheless, when it came to 
Asia, what figured in their minds was China in terms of its fundamental 
difference with the West. On the contrary, “modern Japan must count as a 
Western product.”66 
 
3 .5  Japan in Asia:  An Intel lectual  Tension 
 
This chapter contextualizes Tagore’s view of Japan into the discursive 
space of Nihonjinron. Through his comments, Tagore was actually addressing 
the unbalanced power structure of the modern world. Although Tagore did not 
claim any authority on the issue of Japan, he involved himself in modern 
Japanese intellectual history by participating in the country’s efforts of defining 
“Japaneseness”.  
Minami Hiroshi claimed, “There are no other peoples comparable to the 
Japanese in terms of the fondness for defining their national character.”67 
Doubtlessly, such an inclination is not a modern product, as Edwin Reischauer 
(1910-1990), the great American Japanologist and former ambassador to Japan, 
attested:  
 
Early in their history the Japanese developed the habit of cataloguing 
foreign influences and contrasting them with “native” characteristics. 
                                                   
64 These, of course, are their opinions during the inter-war period. Furthermore, personal 
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66 Ibid., p.14. 
67 Minami Hiroshi, Nihonjinron: Meiji kara konnichi made, p.v. 
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One result has been a frequent emphasis in Japanese history on 
primitive and therefore supposedly native Japanese traits.68 
 
Despite the early roots of this tendency of defining the “national character,” 
the modern period, or the time since the Meiji era from the mid-19th century, 
witnessed the proliferation of Nihonjinron with Japan’s growing necessity for 
self-definition in a fiercely competitive world. What Tagore appealed to was a 
Japan seeking to secure its identity and profits by growing imperialistic; both a 
unified Asia against the West and the idea of “surpassing modernity” were of 
great interest to lecturer and audience; only the purposes to stress the 
uniqueness and mission of Japan were opposite.   
As Takeuchi Yoshimi noted, one cannot separate Tagore’s Japanese 
experiences from his Chinese experiences. Although he did not explain why, the 
reason is simple: Japan and China stood for successful modernization and great 
tradition respectively, and were indispensable to the revival of Asia along with 
Tagore’s native India. This issue of pan-Asianism constituted one of Takeuchi’s 
intellectual concerns throughout his scholarly career. However, even though 
Tagore showed stronger affinity toward China, it was the tremendous 
achievements of modern Japan that received most articulation in his pan-Asian 
discourse. In contrast, for Western intellectuals such as Dewey and Russell, the 
issue of a unified Asia did not weigh heavily and they were comfortable with an 
idea of Asia without Japan.  
Compared with Dewey and Russell, Tagore focused less on historical 
specifics and political conditions in Japan and China, which become mere 
background for his overarching civilizational discourse. It is this cultural 
orientation that made him praise the Meiji Restoration as “the most wonderful 
revolution that the world has ever seen.”69 Interestingly, for another veritable 
“revolution” that overturned China’s two-millennia long imperial system, that is, 
the 1911 revolution, Tagore gave it not even a passing mention, whether in 
Japan in 1916 or in China in 1924.70 Apparently, this was not ignorance but 
choice, as Tagore had long abandoned the option of overthrowing a government 
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through violence. In China, he paid a visit to the former emperor Puyi 溥儀 
(1906-1967) in the Forbidden City and showed much appreciation for the 
architecture and gardening of traditional China, an action much criticized by 
progressive-minded Chinese intellectuals at the time.71  
In sharp contrast to Tagore’s sentimental culturalism, Russell, who was 
apparently more read than Tagore in Japanese and Chinese histories, had much 
to say about the neo-traditionalist and centralist nature of the Meiji Restoration 
in his The Problems of China.72 Dewey also expressed his suspicion of Japan 
straightforwardly: “[Japan] has modern military weapons, a newly developed 
commerce, and efficient transportation; but she still has not changed her old 
concepts, her old morals, her old habits. As a result of this failure, Japan is 
paying the price both of the old civilization and of the new, without being able to 
reap a full measure of profit from either.”73 
Tagore’s cultural-mindedness is all the more conspicuous in comparison 
with Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866-1925), the father of modern China. Sun invited 
Tagore to Guangzhou during the latter’s 1924 trip. Although the visit could not 
be scheduled into Tagore’s itinerary, it is reasonable to assume that Sun was 
well informed of the content of Tagore’s lectures in China. At the end of the 
same year, Sun visited Japan and gave a famous speech in Kobe on “Great 
Asianism.” Like Tagore, he tried to address the issue in cultural terms: 
 
What kind of problem is it for the “Great Asianism” we are speaking of? 
In brief, it is a cultural problem, a problem of comparison and conflict 
between Eastern and Western cultures.74 
 
Sun defined “Great Asianism” as a “cultural problem,” which, on the part of 
Eastern cultures, was to commit Japan and China to an Asian unity. As to 
Europe, Sun emphasized that only military means were feasible to reclaim the 
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rights of Asian countries.75 As Dewey noted, Sun remained a revolutionist type 
of nationalist throughout.76 He reminded his Japanese audiences of the victory 
over Russia in 1905 and remembered how the Westerners were shocked by 
Russia’s defeat. The anxiety of the “yellow peril” had risen in Europe again as 
Tagore also observed. The difference lies in that Tagore was too worried about 
the militarization of Japan to mention this victory and only proposed a 
self-defensive armed force.77 The advice fell on deaf ears at the time. However, 
after World War II, Tagore’s cordial warnings have been remembered and 
frequently cited by many Japanese. 
A final note. As suggested previously, Nihonjinron and pan-Asianism are 
two intertwined discourses from the early 20th century. Despite changes of 
historical contexts, Sugimoto Yoshio critically points out that the propagation of 
“Asian values” today is “almost a pan-Asian version of Nihonjinron.”78 Both 
discourses of Asianess and Japaneseness assume a Western other and are 
premised on considerable economic and political maturity. Such an ideology 
already took root when Japan tried to assert its entitlement in the world a 
century ago. 
 
                                                   
75 Ibid., p.408. 
76 John Dewey, China, Japan and the U.S.A: Present-day Conditions in the Far East and 
Their Bearing on the Washington Conference, p.41.  
77 Rabindranath Tagore, The Spirit of Japan: A Lecture, pp.14-15. 
78 Sugimoto Yoshio, An Introduction to Japanese Society, Third Edition, p.20. 
 90 
4. Changing Perspectives on Tagore in  
Modern Japanese Intellectual History 
 
 
4 .1  Reception of  Tagore in  Japan 
 
In 2011, many countries celebrated the 150th anniversary of the Indian poet 
Rabindranath Tagore. Japan was no exception. Historically, as Tagore’s 
international career as an interpreter of Eastern civilization overlapped Japan’s 
rise to a great power in the early 20th century, their mutual depictions have left 
clear records on both sides of the interaction. While I have examined Tagore’s 
characterization of Japan in the context of Nihonjinron,1 the purpose of this 
chapter is to trace the vicissitudes of Tagore’s reputation in Japan from the 
early 1910s to the present, thus revealing the major trends in modern Japanese 
intellectual history through the case of Tagore.  
Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913. This honor 
brought him great opportunities to travel frequently and exchange ideas with 
intellectuals worldwide. Tagore took his first long-term overseas tour in 1916 
after becoming an international figure when he stayed in Japan for three 
months en route to the United States. Before this visit, a Tagore fever had 
spread among the Japanese who, as one of the peoples of Asia, were strongly 
sympathetic to the first non-European Nobel laureate. Nevertheless, this tour 
marked a watershed for Japanese attitudes towards Tagore, whose “Asian 
project” was of a humanistic and spiritual nature, and as such, was in 
contradiction to Japan’s national interests as well as to its modern intellectual 
direction. Although Tagore showed great appreciation for the Japanese sense of 
beauty and refined manners, he was disturbed by the overwhelming 
Westernization of Japan, and his untimely warnings alienated many of his 
former admirers.  
Takeuchi Yoshimi once commented: “How was Tagore generally treated in 
Japan? He was regarded as a poet from India, singing an elegy for a ruined 
country.”2 This was an unfriendly but logical consequence of Tagore’s criticism 
of Japan’s modern achievements. As Takeuchi received his formal education 
                                                   
1 See Chapter 3. 
2 Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Hōhō toshite no Ajia”, in Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū, Vol.5, p.105. 
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during the inter-war period, it can be said that his impression was to a great 
extent shared by many Japanese at the time, when the first craze for Tagore in 
Japan had already faded. In another essay that introduces a memorial volume 
published in celebration of Tagore’s centenary in 1961, Takeuchi says that 
“glancing through the list of relevant documents at the end of the volume, which 
also includes the titles of news coverage on Tagore, it is interesting to trace how 
Japanese attitudes towards Tagore changed.” 3  As a perceptive intellectual 
historian, Takeuchi viewed this transformation against the social background of 
Japan in the first half of the 20th century and asserted: “That is, roughly 
speaking, the change from Taishō kyōyōshugi [大正教養主義 ; i.e. a form of 
culturalism prevalent during the 1910s and early 1920s] to the invasion of 
China was paradoxically reflected by the mirror called Tagore.”4  
Although Takeuchi was not a Tagore scholar, his interest in the Indian poet 
was nothing less than natural, as the latter was eager to criticize West-centric 
nationalism and modernity and to call for Japan and China to form an Asian 
unity with India. These are all topics that Takeuchi frequently revisited 
throughout his scholarly career. Given this like-mindedness, Takeuchi observed 
that while Tagore’s inheritance from both the Indian classics and Western 
humanism had long been noted in Japan, reevaluations of Tagore around 1961 
showed signs of increasing emphasis on his opinion of “Asian nationalism,” 
which Takeuchi expected would draw more and more attention from Japanese 
scholars.5  
This chapter places Takeuchi Yoshimi’s comments in a historical context. 
Both the relevance and limitations of his comments will become clear as the 
argument unfolds. Taking a longer view of the fluctuations of Tagore’s 
reputation in Japan in the past hundred years, three different stages can be 
discerned: the years before Tagore’s death in 1941, the years around Tagore’s 
centenary in 1961, and the current period from the 1980s that reached a climax 
in 2011, namely, Tagore’s 150th anniversary. The criteria for this periodization 
will be clarified in each of the following sections, and the analyses are aimed to 
                                                   
3 Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Tagōru kinenkai hen Tagōru hoka” タゴール記念会編『タゴール』他 
(Tagore Edited by the Tagore Memorial Association and Others), in ibid., p.219. For the list, 
see “Nihon ni okeru Tagōru bunken mokuroku” 日本におけるタゴール文献目録 (Reference 
Materials on Tagore Issued in Japan) (sic.), in Tagōru kinenkai ed., Tagōru seitan 
hyakunensai kinen ronbunshū, pp.12-37 (from the back). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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demonstrate how Tagore’s public images in Japan have been closely connected 
to Japan’s changing self-identity in the modern world.  
 
4 .2  First  Stage:  The Years before 1941 
 
Tagore’s interaction with Japanese intellectuals started in 1901 when 
Okakura Kakuzō made a one-year sojourn to India, where he became acquainted 
with the Tagore family and established a relationship between Bengali and 
Japanese artists. “This was where the reformation of Japanese art and the 
Bengal Renaissance intersected, which was an event of extreme significance in 
the history of interaction between Japan and India in the modern era.”6 
Although the Tagore family and Rabindranath Tagore himself constituted 
an integral part of the cultural life in Bengal from the early 19th century, his 
fame was restricted to Bengali-speaking regions before the 1913 Nobel Prize. 
After the event, however, Tagore’s profile increased dramatically all over the 
world. In Japan, the first Tagore-related report was also on his earning of the 
Nobel Prize at the end of 1913.7 Both introductory and scholarly works began to 
multiply from 1914, which culminated with Tagore’s visit to Japan in 1916. As 
mentioned above, Tagore took on the mission of appealing to Japan for a 
humanistic Asian union, and thus warned Japan against Westernization. The 
following statement epitomizes Tagore’s anxiety about Japan’s modernization:  
 
I am quite sure that there are men in your country who are not in 
sympathy with your inherited ideals…They are loud in their boast 
that they have modernised Japan. While I agree with them so far as to 
say that the spirit of the race should harmonise with the time, I must 
warn them that…[t]rue modernism is freedom of mind, not slavery of 
taste. It is independence of thought and action, not tutelage under 
European schoolmasters.8 
 
This admonition was not well received by the Japanese and their 
enthusiasm about Tagore subsequently began to recede. Indeed, there were 
                                                   
6 Azuma Kazuo 我妻和男, Tagōru タゴール (Tagore) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1981), p.5. 
7 “Indo shijin no eiyo,” in Yomiuri shinbun on November 16, 1913.  
8 Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism, pp.93-94. 
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fewer than three years between the “Tagore boom” and “Tagore bashing” in 
Japan,9 but this period was significant in two respects in terms of Tagore 
studies. Firstly, although there have been recurrent reviews of Tagore in 
Japanese academia, neither their number nor the intensity of interest is 
comparable to the early 1910s. Secondly, this interaction and concomitant 
contradiction between the Indian poet and the Japanese has since constituted 
the core concern of such issues as “Tagore and Japan,” with his later visits in 
1924 and 1929 receiving less attention. As detailed analyses of this encounter 
are abundant, this section focuses on Tagore’s relationship with the intellectual 
trend in Japan from the 1910s to the 1940s. In doing so, some rarely cited 
materials will be referenced to sketch this history. 
Concerning the change in attitude towards Tagore in Japan in 1916, 
Charles Freer Andrews (1871-1940), one of Tagore’s English friends who 
accompanied the poet on this trip, has left us first-hand testimony: 
 
They received him with enthusiasm at first, as one who had brought 
honour to Asia. But when he spoke out strongly against the militant 
imperialism which he saw on every side in Japan and set forward in 
contrast to his own ideal picture of the true meeting of East and West, 
with its vista of world brotherhood, the hint went abroad that such 
“pacifist” teaching was a danger in wartime, and that the Indian Poet 
represented a defeated nation. Therefore, almost as rapidly as the 
enthusiasm had arisen, it subsided. In the end, he was almost isolated, 
and the object for which he had come to the Far East remained 
unfulfilled.10 
 
As a foreign visitor who did not know Japanese, Andrews must have based 
his conclusions on accounts conveyed by interpreters about Tagore and 
                                                   
9 The terms “Tagore boom” and “Tagore bashing” are frequently used in Nakajima Takeshi 
中島岳志, “Tagōru, awareru: Taishō shoki no ‘Tagōru netsu’ to shorainichi o megutte” タゴー
ル、現る―大正初期の「タゴール熱」と初来日を巡って (The first visit to Japan of Tagore, R.: 
Concerning the Cult of Tagore Early in the Taisho Period and His Visit to Japan) (sic.), in 
Ōkurayama ronshū 大倉山論集  (Bulletin of Ōkura Institute for the Study of Spiritual 
Culture), No.55 (March, 2009) (Yokoyama: Ōkura Institute for the Study of Spiritual 
Culture), pp.221-261. 
10 Charles Freer Andrews, introductory note to Rabindranath Tagore, Letters to a Friend, in 
Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VI: Essays, 
Lectures, Addresses, p.317. 
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comments on him published in English newspapers. But there were factors more 
profound than what Andrews could grasp.  
Before Tagore was regarded as a poet from a defeated nation, there had 
been philosophical discussions on Tagore’s thought as well as critiques of the 
uncritical admiration for Tagore in Japan. In fact, what Takeuchi Yoshimi noted 
as a considerable number of studies on Tagore’s relationship with both Indian 
and Western cultures mostly appeared during this period. For example, the 
magazine Rikugō zasshi designated its May, 1915 issue as a “Special Number 
for Tagore and India.”11 Monographs such as Tagore and the Realization of Life, 
Tagore: Life of a Saint, The Philosophy of Tagore, Tagore’s Thought and 
Religion were also published in 1915.12 In the same year, a collection of essays 
entitled Views of Tagore Held by Notable Figures also came out, which includes 
critical evaluations of Tagore’s literature, philosophy, and popularity in Japan.13 
Therefore, prior to Tagore’s involvement in ideological disputation, we see that 
“a number of acknowledged leaders in their respective fields did speak out, and 
the very diversity of their opinions is an index of the healthy state of intellectual 
life in this period of Japan’s modern history.”14 Furthermore, Japanese scholars 
were so eager for imported ideas that “[t]ension among the many traditions 
penetrating from abroad was if anything more serious than the concurrent 
tension between foreign and indigenous traditions.” 15  On the other hand, 
criticisms from thinkers such as Tanaka Ōdō 田中王堂 (1868-1932) aimed to 
put a brake to the overheated reception of Tagore outside academia, a 
phenomenon he regarded as belonging to a larger trend of pursuing foreign 
thought without well digesting it.16 
The “Tagore boom” arose in 1915 when it was rumored that Tagore was to 
visit Japan. Although this plan was abandoned and enthusiasm cooled for a 
                                                   
11 Rikugō zasshi 六合雑誌, No.412 (May, 1915). 
12 Nakazawa Rinsen 中澤臨川, Tagōru to sei no jitsugen タゴールと生の実現	 (Tagore and 
the Realization of Life) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1915); Yoshida Genjirō 吉田絃二郎 , Tagōru 
seisha no seikatsu タゴール聖者の生活	 (Tagore: Life of a Saint) (Tokyo: Tengendō Shobō, 
1915); Saiki Sensui 斎木仙酔 , Tagōru no tetsugaku タゴールの哲学  (The Philosophy of 
Tagore) (Tokyo: Tōadō Shobō, 1915); Ebe Ōson 江部鴨村, Tagōru no shisō oyobi shūkyō タゴ
ールの思想及宗教 (Tagore’s Thought and Religion) (Tokyo: Jitsugetsusha, 1915). 
13 Kiyosawa Iwao 清澤巌, ed., Meishi no Tagōru kan 名士のタゴール観 (Views of Tagore 
Held by Notable Figures) (Tokyo: Jyōnansha, 1915). 
14 Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and 
India, p.118. 
15 Ibid., p.123. 
16 Tanaka Ōdō, “Tagōru ryūkō ni tsuite no ichikansatsu” タゴール流行に就ての一観察 (An 
Observation on the Tagore Fashion), in Kiyosawa Iwao, ed., Meishi no Tagōru kan, pp.1-18.  
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while, it was rekindled when an itinerary was confirmed and then realized at 
the end of May, 1916. The extraordinary welcome accorded to Tagore 
crystallized into a single volume, St. Tagore, which incorporates some of 
Tagore’s speeches, comments on him by Japanese authors, and a detailed 
itinerary of the first fortnight of his trip.17 Since the volume was prepared in 
June and published in early July as a tribute to Tagore, it emphasized the most 
lustrous side of the visit, leaving Tagore’s later isolation unrecorded. The 
Rikugō zasshi, which dedicated an issue to Tagore and India the previous year, 
launched a special issue on Tagore again in July, 1916, but this time some of the 
articles were more critical in tone, in response to Tagore’s deflating comments 
on Japan’s modernization. While Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1856-1944), one 
of Japan’s leading philosophers at the time, still structured his criticism in 
dialectical terms,18 Tanimoto Tomeri 谷本富 (1867-1946) dismissed Tagore as a 
mere Indian poet whose advice was not applicable to Japan, which was seeking 
to catch up with Western powers: 
 
It is hard to imagine that listening to Tagore will contribute to the 
flourishing of very many aspects of our empire…Although it is very 
good to often belittle imitation and elevate imagination, has our 
country been able actually to create [anything] from ancient times? As 
the optimal policy for the future increase in our country’s power, we 
must learn not just physically, but metaphysically, how to have the 
strength of advanced civilized countries.19 
 
Here a common misunderstanding must be pointed out. Tagore, even in his 
lectures in Japan that proposed a spiritual Eastern civilization, had never 
shown any disrespect for science. On the contrary, he praised science 
                                                   
17 Kyōiku gakujyutsu kenkyūkai 教育学術研究会 (Association for Education and Academic 
Research), ed., Sei Tagōru 聖タゴール (St. Tagore) (Tokyo: Dōbunkan, 1915). 
18  “It goes without saying that science is not all-powerful and the existence of other 
intellectuals than scientists is necessary…however, to refuse science rashly will not bring 
any benefits… In some respects Tagore’s words are not without insight. But he always 
expresses himself in the tone of a defeated India. Such a tone is inevitable considering India’s 
religious philosophy.” See Inoue Tetsujirō, “Tagōru shi no kōen ni tsuite” タゴール氏の講演に
就て (On Tagore’s Lectures), in Rikugō zasshi, No.426 (July, 1916), p.28. The English title is 
given. 
19 Tanimoto Tomeri, “Tagōru wa shijin nomi Indojin nomi” タゴールは詩人のみ印度人のみ 
(Tagore is Nothing but a Poet and an Indian), in ibid., p.36. Interestingly, the title of this 
article is omitted in the English table of contents. 
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enthusiastically and regarded it as a noble way to seek truth. What he warned 
against was utilitarian application of science for profit-seeking and 
empire-building. This nuance, nevertheless, failed to appeal to most of his 
Japanese audience, whether academic circles or other communities, who simply 
dismissed his message as being conservative, or even obstinate.20 
It has been noted that, from the very beginning, Tagore was considered by 
the Japanese to be more of a thinker than a poet. Several factors accounted for 
this unbalanced image, including reading of Tagore’s poems through multiple 
translations, political struggles in both Japan and India, and the attention given 
to Tagore in Japan by Buddhist monks and politicians.21 Together with Tagore’s 
own intention to dissuade Japan from over-Westernization, all these factors 
became an obstacle to genuine appreciation for Tagore’s poetic subtlety. Indeed, 
opinions on Tagore’s literature were not uncommon in the 1910s, but were 
mostly expressed by scholars rather than by literary figures. In a 1915 volume 
introducing modern foreign thinkers, the authors even claim that Tagore was 
awarded the Nobel Prize because of his philosophical sermons, The Realization 
of Life, while overlooking his literary achievements. 22  This emphasis on 
Tagore’s thought was diversified, as mentioned above, but became more and 
more politically oriented soon after Tagore criticized Japan’s modernization. 
Amid the voices against Tagore, Ōkawa Shūmei constituted an interesting 
exception. As one of the representative nationalistic pan-Asianists in early 
twentieth-century Japan, Ōkawa lamented that the vigor of the Japanese nation, 
which had reached its zenith in the Meiji era (1868-1912), was declining during 
the reign of the Taishō Emperor (1912-1926); if the stupor continued, Japan 
would not be the strongest country in Asia or in the world.23 To encourage his 
                                                   
20 Takahashi Gorō 高橋五郎, “Tagōru no gangu” タゴールの頑愚 (The Obstinacy of Tagore), 
in Jinsei tetsugaku chawa 人生哲学茶話 (Tea Talks on Life Philosophy) (Tokyo: Daitōkaku, 
1918), pp.130-134. 
21 Niwa Kyōko 丹羽京子, “Tagōru to Nihon” タゴールと日本 (Tagore and Japan), in Tagōru 
chosakushū, bekkan: Tagōru kenkyū タゴール著作集・別巻―タゴール研究 (Collected Works 
of Tagore, Supplementary Volume: Tagore Studies) (Tokyo: Daisan Bunmeisha, 1993), 
pp.355-358. 
22 Nakazawa Rinsen, Ikuta Chōkō 生田長江  eds., Kindai shisō jyūrokkō 近代思想十六講 
(Sixteen Talks on Modern Thought) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1915), p.470. In another book that 
bears a parallel title and was issued by the same publisher, Tagore is also discussed in a 
philosophical vein. See Ikuta Chōkō et al., Kindai bungei jyūnikō 近代文芸十二講 (Twelve 
Talks on Modern Literature and the Arts) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1921), pp.105-115. 
23 Ōkawa Shūmei, Indo ni okeru kokumiteki undō no genjō oyobi sono yurai 印度に於ける国
民的運動の現状及び其の由来 (The Current State and Origin of Indian National Movement), 
in Ōkawa Shūmei zenshū: dainikan 大川周明全集・第二巻  (Complete Works of Ōkawa 
Shūmei, Volume 2), p.535. 
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fellow Japanese, Ōkawa drew on Tagore’s message and in 1916 made the 
following comment: 
 
As an Asian poet laureate and a loyal servant to India, Tagore’s view 
of the position and mission of Japan in Asia during his brief stay here 
was to the point. He was welcomed as a victorious general when he 
came, but was sent away like a stranger when he left. Such a change of 
attitude probably did not make him happy. However, it is fortunate 
that his judgment was not distorted by emotion. He fearlessly told a 
correspondent of the Manchester Guardian that Japan is the 
indisputable leader of Asia.24 
 
In addition to Ōkawa, another influential Japanese thinker who favored 
Tagore’s proposal of Eastern civilization was Kita Reikichi 北昤吉 (1885-1961), 
who wrote in a 1915 article that Tagore’s being awarded the Nobel Prize was a 
sign of the resurrection of Eastern thought; Japan must take this opportunity to 
reflect on its attitude towards Western civilization, so that the ideal of 
“Japanese spirit with Western arts” (和魂洋才) could be realized in the future.25 
After mid-1916, Kita Reikichi also turned critical towards Tagore’s idealistic 
political view, although he still took his thought seriously. 26 Obviously, both 
Westernizers and traditionalists tended to read Tagore in a highly political and 
nationalistic context. In most cases, the Japanese did not regard Tagore as first 
and foremost a poet. However, once they found his message unpleasant, he was 
relegated to the status of being a poet from a ruined country.  
Besides the 1916 trip, Tagore gave public lectures in Japan in 1924 and 
1929 as well. Tagore shared the Japanese indignation at the “Immigration Act of 
1924” passed in the United States,27 and he turned to Japan in 1929 after being 
                                                   
24 Ibid., p. 536. 
25  Kita Reikichi, “Tōyō shisō no fukkatsu” 東洋思想の復活  (Resurrection of Eastern 
Thought), in Hikari wa Tōhō yori 光は東方より (Light Comes from the East) (Tokyo: Dai 
Nippon Yūbenkai, 1918), pp.172-183.  
26 Kita Reikichi considered Tagore’s political view lofty but impractical. See ‘’Tagōru no 
shisō” タゴールの思想  (Tagore’s Thought), in Ningenkan 人間観  (View of Human Life) 
(Tokyo: Kyōbunsha, 1928), pp.413-417. Kita also translated several of Tagore’s 1924 lectures 
(mainly in China, but a few in Japan) from English into Japanese. See Kita Reikichi tr., 
Inishie no michi: Tagōru kōenshū 古の道―タゴール講演集  (The Way of the Old Days: 
Collection of Tagore’s Lectures) (Osaka: Pulatonsha, 1924).  
27  For an analysis, see Nancy Stalker, “Suicide, Boycotts and Embracing Tagore: The 
Japanese Popular Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law,” in Japanese 
 98 
offended by an American customs official, yet the “Tagore boom” in Japan never 
resurged. 28  The dwindling number of Tagore fans in Japan from 1916 on 
prompts a scholar to make the following comment: “If anything, Rabindranath 
became the possession of a limited coterie of his admirers.”29  
Later in 1931, intellectuals around the world prepared a memorial volume, 
The Golden Book of Tagore, in celebration of the poet’s 70th birthday, to which 
Inoue Tetsujirō also contributed an essay. As a response to Tagore’s earlier 
criticism, this essay defends Japan’s national essence:  
 
The wholesale adoption of Western civilization by this country after 
the Meiji Restoration of 1868 has for a few obscured the real direction 
and significance of “Gods’ Own Way,” and has caused no little 
confusion in our manner of thinking…Yet it is indisputable that the 
unshakable “Gods’ Own Way” still reigns over the great majority of the 
Japanese people.30  
 
Furthermore, Inoue also euphemized Japan’s march towards militarism: 
 
This does not mean that our michi [道; i.e. Way] does not embrace the 
doctrine of non-resistance, but that it considers the realization of 
abiding [sic.] international peace and goodwill as more worthy of its 
dignity. Indeed, it may rightly be said that its aim and ultimate end is 
the bringing about of world peace.31 
 
Generally speaking, this essay was an indication of Japan’s political and 
                                                                                                                                             
Studies, Vol.26, No.2, pp.153-170. 
28 A useful list of Asia-related news items appearing in the newspaper Chūgai Nippō from 
1897 to 1945 helps visualize the decreasing degrees of interest in Tagore around his three 
major visits to Japan. See Tsukinoki Mizuo 槻木端生, “’Chūgai Nippō’ shi no Ajia kankei kiji 
mokuroku” 「中外日報」紙のアジア関係記事目録 (A Catalogue of Asian News in the Chugai 
Nippo) (sic.), in Dōhō Daigaku Bukkyō bunka kenkyūsho kiyō 同朋大学仏教文化研究所紀要 
(Bulletin of Dōhō University Buddhist Culture Institute), No.17 (1997), pp.1-375. 
29 Niwa Kyōko, “Tagōru to Nihon,” in Tagōru chosakushū, bekkan: Tagōru kenkyū, p.362. 
The situation might not be as discouraging as the statement suggests. While there was much 
less public attention and fewer miscellaneous comments about Tagore after the second half of 
his 1916 trip, later authors who mentioned Tagore, generally speaking, showed genuine 
interest in his poetry and philosophy.  
30 Inoue Tetsujirō, “‘The Gods’ Own Way’ and World Peace,” in Ramananda Chatterjee ed., 
The Golden Book of Tagore: A Homage to Rabindranath Tagore from India and the World in 
Celebration of His Seventieth Birthday, p. 114. 
31 Ibid., p. 116. 
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intellectual milieu before total war with China broke out in 1937. The final 
significant interaction between Tagore and the Japanese prior to his death in 
1941 was the famous dispute with the poet Noguchi Yonejirō. Considering the 
general indifference to Tagore shown by Japanese literary figures, Noguchi’s 
interest in Tagore—though not always positive—was unusual; from the early 
1910s to the 1940s he continued commenting on Tagore’s personality, thought, 
and literature. Knowing Tagore’s humanistic stance well and even contributing 
a poem to the 1931 memorial volume,32 Noguchi, in defense of his country’s 
militarism, wrote to the aged poet in 1938: “Believe me, it is the war of ‘Asia for 
Asia.’…our young soldiers go to the front. Their minds are light and happy, [as] 
the war is not for conquest, but the correction of [a] mistaken idea of China[;] I 
mean [the] Kuomingtung government, and for uplifting her simple and ignorant 
masses to better life and wisdom.”33 Needless to say, Tagore refuted such a 
pretext and ended his response to Noguchi with a curse on Japanese militarism.  
As Takeuchi Yoshimi observed, changing Japanese attitudes towards 
Tagore reflected a certain form of culturalism in the Taishō era that 
transformed into full-scale invasion of China in the late 1930s. Such culturalism 
was characterized by a belief in the full development of human character and 
talent, and encouragement for absorbing avidly whatever was considered 
cultural. 34  Arguably, passionate interest in Tagore had developed in this 
atmosphere. On the other hand, this culturalistic atmosphere is also recognized 
as lacking in proper concern for serious social problems,35 which could possibly 
be the prime factor for the waning of Japanese vigor, as lamented by Ōkawa 
Shūmei. Nevertheless, Ōkawa did not find Tagore’s message disappointing from 
his nationalistic pan-Asianist viewpoint. To sum up, around the time Tagore 
first visited Japan in 1916, there was still a complexity in the Japanese 
intellectual world that fostered a healthy, well-diversified academy. With time, 
                                                   
32 Ibid., pp. 184-185. 
33 “Tagore and Noguchi,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, 
Volume VIII: Miscellaneous Writings, pp.1135-1136. Noguchi translated two of his own 1938 
letters to Tagore into Japanese and included them as “Tagōru e no kōkaijō” タゴールへの公開
状 (Open Letters to Tagore) in Noguchi Yonejirō, Sōshiten 想思殿 (Hall of Thought) (Tokyo: 
Shunyōdō Bunko, 1943), pp.327-354. 
34 A summary from the definition in Kōno Toshirō 紅野敏郎, “Taishōki kyōyōshugi” 大正期教
養主義 (Culturalism during the Taishō Era), in Hashikawa Bunzō, Kano Masanao 鹿野政直, 
Hiraoka Toshio 平岡敏夫, eds., Kindai Nihon shisōshi no kiso chishiki 近代日本思想史の基礎
知識 (Basic Knowledge of Modern Japanese Intellectual History) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1971), 
p.239. 
35 Ibid. 
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however, militaristic ideology prevailed in Japan, and after Tagore’s death in 
1941, some Japanese, such as Noguchi Yonejirō, Mushanokōji Saneatsu 武者小
路実篤 (1885-1976), and Arai Kanpō 荒井寛方 (1878-1945)—a poet, a writer, 
and a painter—mixed personal memories of Tagore with clear or vague tinges of 
sentiment towards a “Great East Asia.”36 
 
4 .3  Second Stage:  The Years around Tagore ’s  Centenary in 1961 
 
 The first period of intensive studies on Tagore in Japan was from early 
1914 to mid-1916. Afterwards his fall from grace was as dramatic as his sudden 
rise; relevant research also became sporadic. A recollection by Morimoto Tatsuo 
森本達雄, one of Japan’s leading Indologists, testifies to the history : 
 
I remember clearly the day of my first encounter with Tagore’s 
poems…It was some years after the end of the Second World 
War.…Although I knew the name of Mahatma Gandhi as the great 
national leader of India from my school days, I had never heard of 
Rabindranath Tagore, who had been popular among the older 
generation in Japan. The lingering sound of his beautiful voice…had 
almost faded away during my school days, in the noisy crunch of boots 
in military marches.37 
 
According to the “Reference Materials on Tagore Issued in Japan,” on which 
Takeuchi based his observation, we can see that discussions on Tagore did not 
really cease in Japan, even at the height of WWII and during the gloomy years 
after the devastation of defeat in 1945. They just became irrelevant, with most 
of the records being brief introductions or memories scattered in magazines, 
books, or dictionaries of philosophy.38 
                                                   
36 Noguchi Yonejirō, “Shijin Tagōru” 詩人タゴール (Tagore the Poet), in Tateyo Indo 起てよ
印度  (Rise up, India!) (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 1942), pp.265-275; Mushanokōji Saneatsu, 
“Tagōru no shi” タゴールの死 (The Death of Tagore), in Kibō to kaisō 希望と回想 (Wishes 
and Memories) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1942), pp.134-139; Arai Kanpō, “Shishi Tagōru ō” 志
士タゴール翁  (Tagore the Patriot), in Amidain zakki 阿弥陀院雑記  (Amida Temple 
Miscellany) (Hōryūjimura: Ikaruga kokyōsha Shuppanbu, 1943), pp.1-27. Mushanokōji’s 
aspiration for a great East Asia can be discerned in other works in the book.  
37 Morimoto Tatsuo, “My Tagore,” in Bhudeb Chaudhuri and K. G. Subramanyan, eds., 
Rabindranath Tagore and the Challenges of Today (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced 
Study, 1988), pp.286-287.  
38 See note 3. The list is not exhaustive but reflects the general trend of Tagore studies in 
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The second tide of Tagore studies rose in Japan from 1958 in preparation 
for Tagore’s centenary in 1961. The event was well celebrated, in accordance 
with the international vogue, but there were deeper concerns that addressed the 
postwar Japanese intellectual world. For instance, a new magazine, Apollon, 
appeared in May, 1958. This magazine bore the subtitle, Cultural Bridge 
between the East & the West, and designated the first issue as a “Special 
Number for Rabindranath Tagore.” The opening statement reads: 
 
Apollon is a magazine that synthesizes diverse fields such as thought, 
literature, and the arts. It aims at harmonious fusion of Eastern and 
Western civilizations and the creation of a new spiritual culture in the 
20th century…We decided to dedicate the first issue to Rabindranath 
Tagore with the aim of achieving this objective.39 
 
 This was the first time in nearly three decades that an issue of a Japanese 
magazine had been dedicated to Tagore. 40  Although Apollon was rather 
short-lived (four issues in total), it marked the beginning of another round of 
systematic Tagore studies in Japan. This round, however, was somewhat 
different in nature than the former “Tagore boom”: it attempted to remind the 
Japanese of Tagore’s foresight and sincere warnings rather than to reintroduce 
him as a star. In other words, a more or less “Japan-centric” form of Tagore 
research was taking shape, with the interaction between the poet and the nation 
being the core issue. The editor’s postscript to the “Special Number” of Apollon 
well expresses this attitude: 
 
Tagore showed respect and love for Japan…but his criticism of 
Japanese militarism caused a sudden cooling of Tagore fever, which 
                                                                                                                                             
Japan prior to 1961. However, evidence shows that post-war review of Tagore in Japan can 
be traced to an early date. For a 1947 example, see Hashimoto Fukuo 橋本福夫, “Tagōru no 
Tōyō teki hyūmanizumu” タゴールの東洋的ヒューマニズム (Tagore’s Eastern Humanism), in 
Hashimoto Fukuo Chosakushū III: Eibei bungakuron 橋本福夫著作集 III―英米文学論 
(Works of Hashimoto Fukuo 3: On English and American Literature) (Tokyo: Hayakawa 
Shobō, 1989), pp.246-250. This article is not mentioned in the list.  
39 “Hakkan no kotoba” 発刊のことば (Opening Statement), in Aporon: shisō to bungaku ア
ポロン―思想と文学 (Apollon: Cultural Bridge between the East & the West), Vol.1, No.1: 
Tagōru tokushū タゴール特集 (Special Number for Rabindranath Tagore), p.2. All English 
titles are given. 
40 The journal Igirisu bungaku イギリス文学 (English Literature) issued an extra Tagore 
number in June 1929, which was the last such special issue before 1958.  
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was unfortunate for Japan. In planning this special number, we were 
surprised to find that students and youngsters today are mostly 
ignorant of this great Eastern poet. Tagore was the first Nobel 
laureate from Asia and a profound thinker who, along with Gandhi, 
inspired the national independence movement of India. He also deeply 
influenced Prime Minister Nehru.41 
 
This statement is factual and supports Morimoto’s reminiscences cited 
above, but the logic and mindset it embodies was quite new for Japan. Before 
the 1950s, very few Japanese regarded the cooling of Tagore fever as 
“unfortunate.” While Tagore had long been admired as Asia’s first Nobel Prize 
winner, his active role in India’s independence movement was overlooked by 
many Japanese intellectuals, who were more willing to label him as “a poet from 
a ruined country.”  
Actually, this renewed interest in Tagore belonged to a larger-scale 
reaffirmation of humanism in postwar Japan, for which many other foreign 
authors provided spiritual resources. The French writer Romain Rolland and 
the German writer Hermann Hesse (1877-1962) were among the frequently 
reviewed figures. Not only did discussions on them appear in the later issues of 
Apollon, Morimoto also says that in remembering his search for spiritual 
anchors in the late 1940s, “I was then a student of a university in Kyoto and was 
earnestly seeking in literature and religion a new mental prop which would 
never betray me again. Goethe, Romain Rolland, Tolstoy, Hermann Hesse and 
others were my favorite authors.”42 However, Tagore still occupied a special 
position among these foreign figures in postwar Japanese academia, precisely 
because of his much strained relationship with inter-war Japan. After having 
been engulfed in militarism and suffered from a ruinous defeat, Japanese 
intellectuals became willing to take seriously the spirit of world brotherhood 
Tagore proposed decades earlier. In a 1958 work that introduces many Eastern 
spiritual mentors, the chapter on Tagore ends with the following account: 
“Tagore’s last wish was to see the realization of ‘the world as one family’ based 
on the supreme compassion of the Buddha, which must also become the wish of 
                                                   
41 “Henshū goki” 編集後記 (Editor’s Postscript), in ibid., p.191. 
42 Morimoto Tatsuo, “My Tagore,” in Bhudeb Chaudhuri and K. G. Subramanyan, eds., 
Rabindranath Tagore and the Challenges of Today, p.287.  
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the Japanese.”43 
The first series of selected works of Tagore in Japanese translation came 
out in installments from 1959 (former publications were all single volumes).44 
Starting from the same year, several magazines were launched to commemorate 
the coming centenary of Tagore, including Bulletin of Tagore Memorial 
Association (one issue, 1959), Monthly Bulletin of Tagore Memorial Association, 
which was renamed Sachiya from the second number (twenty-two issues in total, 
1959-1962), and Tagore (six issues, 1960-1965). None of these lasted long, but a 
great portion of articles contained therein deals with Tagore’s interaction with 
Japanese intellectuals, his relationship with the country as a whole, and his 
humanistic and pacifist message.45 A highlight of the celebration in Japan of 
Tagore’s centenary was the publication of an essay collection edited by the 
Tagore Memorial Association, which still serves as a crucial reference for 
Japanese scholars who are interested in Tagore today. Both of the two prefaces 
to the volume are worth citing. Ōkura Kunihiko 大倉邦彦 (1882-1971) stated 
that “perhaps what was most significant in celebrating Tagore’s centenary was 
the revelation of his spirit in the present age, and the finding of ways to solve 
contemporary problems from his thought.” 46  Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴 木 大 拙 
(1870-1966; known as Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki in the West), the leading Japanese 
Buddhist scholar of his time, commented that “the philosophy of Easterners is 
never detached from humankind…Our art is grounded in the human world as 
well…I believe Tagore is a typical Eastern thinker and artist. Although we do 
not have such philosophers as Hegel, Kant, and Aristotle in India, China, or 
Japan, it is not a minus for the East at all.”47 
Apparently, the very reasons Tagore was much criticized from the 1910s to 
                                                   
43 Inadu Kizō 稲津紀三, “Tagōru” タゴール (Tagore), in Furukawa Tetsushi 古川哲史 ed., 
Ningen no kyōshi: tōyō hen 人間の教師―東洋編 (Mentors of Humankind: the East) (Osaka: 
Osaka kyōiku tosho kabushiki kaisha, 1958), p.248. 
44 Eight volumes were planned but only seven of them were published from 1959 to 1961 by 
Aporonsha, publisher of the magazine Apollon. 
45 Tagōru kinenkai kaihō タゴール記念会会報 (Bulletin of Tagore Memorial Association), 
No.1 (Tokyo: Tagōru kinenkai, 1959); Tagōru kinenkai geppō タゴール記念会月報  and 
Sachiya さちや (Monthly Bulletin of Tagore Memorial Association), Nos.1-22 (Tokyo: Tagōru 
kinenkai, 1959-1962); Tagōru タゴール  (Tagore), Nos.1-6 (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Tagōru 
kinenkai, 1960-1965). 
46 Ōkura Kunihiko, “Tagōru seitan hyakunensai ni yosete” タゴール生誕百年祭によせて 
(Foreword), in Tagōru kinenkai ed., Tagōru seitan hyakunensai kinen ronbunshū, p.2. The 
English title is given. 
47 Suzuki Daisetsu, “Tagōrushi ni tsukite omou koto” タゴール氏につきて思ふこと  (My 
Feelings on Tagore), in ibid., p.5. The English title is given. 
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the 1930s, such as for his opposition to total Westernization and his proposition 
of a spiritual Asian civilization, became great inspiration for Japanese 
intellectuals in the 1950s. Contemporaneous with this trend of reevaluating 
Tagore’s thought was development of critical reflection on Japan’s historical 
path in the first half of the 20th century. It would be an exaggeration to say that 
Tagore was the agent that brought about such reflection, but his Japanese 
experiences provided a brilliant case for later generations to observe how Japan 
was becoming overwhelmed by militaristic and ultranationalist ideologies 
during the inter-war period. As Takeuchi Yoshimi pointed out, the 1961 
memorial volume contains three relevant articles on Asian nationalism.48 In the 
history of Tagore studies in Japan, these articles not only constituted the first 
intensive effort to examine Tagore’s criticism of nationalism and Japan’s 
militarization, but also heralded many later works that deal with the issue in 
greater detail. This is a development that Takeuchi expected and would be glad 
to see. 
One thing should be noted before finishing this section. To the end of the 
“Reference Materials on Tagore Issued in Japan” appended to the 1961 
memorial volume, the editors added a concluding remark: “While Tagore studies 
in Japan have not yet entered a real research phase, by tracing the publishing 
dates of related documents we can construct an overview of our national 
character and intentions, as well as some of the intellectual trends of the time. 
We would feel honored if this observation could serve as a guideline for future 
research.” 49  This wish is very similar to the one expressed by Takeuchi. 
Nevertheless, the interest in Tagore rekindled from 1958 cooled soon after the 
celebration of Tagore’s centenary was over. After all, Tagore had already become 
“the possession of a limited coterie of his admirers” after his 1916 visit. Even in 
intellectual circles, this second tide did not last long, and it would take another 
two decades for Japanese academia to formulate a somewhat tenuous third 
stage in Tagore studies. 
 
                                                   
48 Sakamoto Tokumatsu 坂本徳松, “Tagōru to Ajia nashonarizumu” タゴールとアジア・ナシ
ョナリズム (Tagore and Asian Nationalism), in ibid., pp.241-262; Okakura Koshirō 岡倉古志
郎, “Tagōru to heiwakyōzon” タゴールと平和共存 (Tagore and the Peaceful Co-existence), in 
ibid., pp.263-269;  Rōyama Yoshirō 蝋山芳郎, “Tagōru to Nihon e no keikoku” タゴールと日
本への警告 (Tagore and His Warning to Japan), in ibid., pp.271-282. All English titles are 
given. 
49 Ibid., p. 37 (from the back). 
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4 .4  Third Stage:  The Years s ince the 1980s 
 
 Unlike the previous two stages of Tagore studies occurring in the 1910s and 
1950s respectively, the third stage that began roughly from the 1980s was not 
initiated through any particular event, such as Tagore’s Nobel Prize, his visit to 
Japan, or celebration of his centenary. Despite the lack of a clear beginning of 
this stage, a second series of selected works of Tagore in Japanese translation 
was published in installments from 1981, which contains more works, 
explanatory notes, and background information than did the 1959 series. In 
addition to eleven volumes of translated works, there is a supplementary 
volume of Tagore studies that deals with three major topics—“Tagore’s Life and 
Thought,” “Tagore and the World,” and “The World of Tagore’s Works”—with 
each of the sections containing multiple chapters (some written by Japanese 
scholars and some translated from foreign languages).50 Here we can see a new 
attempt at systematic understanding of Tagore in Japan, which is not intensive 
or following any international trends, but indicates academic and cultural 
interests that are well diversified. While preparing for this new series, 
Morimoto Tatsuo was also engaged in translation of an English biography, 
Tagore: A Life. He states in the “Translator’s Foreword”: 
 
Isn’t the negation of Tagore before the War and oblivion after the War 
a hidden sign of the fundamental poverty and lack of thought of 
Japan?...Nonetheless, in recent years, Japan has become deeply 
contextualized in the world; the spirit of world citizenship and the 
wisdom of harmonious fusion between humankind and nature have 
become necessary. People who are concerned with these issues have 
started to note Tagore’s early message.51  
 
This statement provides a clue for us to understand what the Japanese 
have been seeking in Tagore’s message from the late 20th century, that is, his 
humanism, view of world brotherhood, and a kind of spiritual environmentalism. 
                                                   
50 This last volume of the series was published in 1993. For more information, see note 21. 
51 Morimoto Tatsuo, “Yakusha maegaki” 訳者まえがき (Translator’s Foreword), in Krishna 
Kripalani, Morimoto Tatsuo tr., Tagōru no shōgai タゴールの生涯 (Tagore: A Life) (Tokyo: 
Daisan Bunmeisha, 1981), pp.1-2. 
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None of these issues is new, but they have acquired new meanings and impetus 
in the age of globalization. This trend is well exemplified by another 1981 
volume authored by Azuma Kazuo 我妻和男 (1931-2011), the leading Japanese 
scholar of Bengali literature. This book, Tagore, is more introductory than 
critical, but is somewhat special in terms of content. Since the 1910s, many 
articles or treatises on Tagore’s literature or thought have appeared, yet a 
monograph that aims at a fuller account of Tagore’s life activities and his 
intellectual background had been absent in Japan. Therefore, along with the 
new series of Tagore’s works and the biography, Azuma’s book also contributed 
to broadening Japanese knowledge of Tagore in the early 1980s. Nonetheless, as 
explained in the previous two sections, the issue of “Tagore and Japan” is a 
unique historical research paradigm that has developed around Tagore’s 
criticism of Japan’s Westernization. In this regard, Azuma’s introductory 
volume is a product of an established convention in research. It starts with the 
chapter “Tagore’s Praise of and Warning for Japan,” reviewing the forty-year 
interaction between Tagore and the Japanese. Furthermore, the book ends with 
“Tagore in the World” and “The Modern Significance of Tagore,” embodying a 
transition in Japanese intellectual concerns from the reflection upon pre-war 
thought and politics in the 1950s to an appeal to global humanism in the 
1980s.52  
As Takeuchi Yoshimi observed, Tagore’s criticism of “Asian nationalism” 
was gaining increasing attention in Japan around 1961. In the new wave of 
Tagore studies from the early 1980s, this issue still constitutes a major focus. 
For instance, in 1982, Ōzawa Yoshihiro 大澤吉博 (1948-2005) published a book 
entitled Light and Shades of Nationalism: Sōseki, Kipling, Tagore, which 
compares the three writers’ views of nationalism through both textual and 
contextual approaches.53  A more frequent object of comparison is Okakura 
Kakuzō, who was the most renowned articulator of a common Eastern culture in 
early twentieth-century Japan and greatly inspired Tagore’s pan-Asian 
idealism.54 Complementary to this focus on nationalism, Japanese scholars are 
                                                   
52 For the publication details of this book, see note 6. This volume belongs to the 80-volume 
series of Man’s Intellectual Heritage published by Kōdansha. Tagore is regarded as one of the 
greatest thinkers in the history of humankind. 
53 Ōsawa Yoshihiro, Nashonarizumu no meian: Sōseki, Kipuringu, Tagōru ナショナリズムの
明暗―漱石・キプリング・タゴール (Light and Shade of Nationalism: Sōseki, Kipling, Tagore) 
(Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1982). 
54 For an overview of Tagore’s exchange of ideas with Okakura, see Morimoto Tatsuo, 
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rediscovering the full spectrum of Tagore’s creativity as well. While his 
educational ideal, a village reform project, and achievements in songwriting and 
painting received intermittent discussions from the beginning, these aspects of 
Tagore were treated in Japan in a more intensive manner in the late 20th 
century, echoing a global interest in Tagore as a multifaceted genius. Another 
introductory volume by Azuma Kazuo published in 2006 reflects these ramified 
interests to a certain degree.55  
Strictly speaking, Tagore studies in Japan from the 1980s have not really 
formed a trend, but are less sporadic than in the previous two decades; 
discussions are now systematic, elaborate, and diversified. Nevertheless, the 
diversification of Tagore studies in Japan does not eclipse the main theme of 
searching for a humanistic civilization, which was the principal message that 
Tagore imparted to Japan in 1916. After decades of Tagore languishing in 
oblivion, both postwar retrospection and the accelerating pace of globalization 
have obliged the Japanese to reexamine his remonstrations. In this vein, he is 
often discussed in conjunction with Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) or Romain 
Rolland with a view to their shared spiritual ideals. For example, Ebihara 
Tokuo 蛯原徳夫 (1904-1988) asserts in his Romain Rolland and Tagore that “of 
the two men, one is a Westerner and the other is an Asian, which has very 
important significance; perhaps it could even be said that as a universal 
problem of humankind [i.e. racial and cultural divisions] they assume the most 
inestimable, lofty symbolism.”56  
A symposium convened in Japan in 2001, “Rediscovering Tagore and 
Gandhi,” claimed that “What Tagore and Gandhi kept conveying to us is: 1. 
harmony and symbiosis between nature and humankind; 2. fusion and dialogue 
between West and East; 3. interaction and reconciliation between races, nations, 
                                                                                                                                             
“Tagōru to Okakura Tenshin” タゴールと岡倉天心 (Tagore and Okakura Tenshin), in Tagōru 
chosakushū, bekkan: Tagōru kenkyū, pp.186-205. Okamoto Yoshiko 岡本佳子 compares the 
views of nationalism of the two figures in detail. See “Rabindoranāto Tagōru to Okakura 
Kakuzō (Tenshin): nashonarizumu o megutte” ラビンドラナート・タゴールと岡倉覚三（天心）
―ナショナリズムをめぐって  (Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Kakuzō (Tenshin) on 
Nationalism), in Asian Cultural Studies, Special Issue, 17 (2008), pp.49-75. There is also an 
English work on their Asian imaginations and ideals. See: Rustom Bharucha, Another Asia: 
Rabindranath Tagore & Okakura Tenshin (New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2006). 
55  Azuma Kazuo, Tagōru: shi, shisō, shōgai タゴール―詩・思想・生涯  (Tagore: Poetry, 
Thought, Life) (Kashiwa: Reitaku UP, 2006). 
56 Ebihara Tokuo, Roman Roran to Tagōru ロマン・ロランとタゴール (Romain Rolland and 
Tagore) (Tokyo: Daisan Bunmeisha, 1980), p.161. 
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and religions. At the basis of these concerns is the respect for ‘life’.” 57 
Furthermore, from August 2011, the monthly Todai also started publishing in 
installments a dialogue between Ikeda Daisaku 池 田 大 作  and Bharati 
Mukherjee. The dialogue was entitled “Poetry of the Global Civilization: A Talk 
on Tagore and World Citizens,” which constituted a non-academic interest in 
Tagore in Japan.58  
This latest surge of interest in Tagore reached a climax in 2011 when Japan, 
together with many other countries, celebrated the 150th anniversary of the 
Indian poet.59 As mentioned, Tagore’s multiple artistic and intellectual legacies 
came into the limelight but, at least in Japan, it is his earnest appeal for world 
peace and cultural fusion that continues to receive particular attention.60 
 
4 .5  A Century of  “Tagore and Japan” 
 
This chapter reviews the fluctuations of Tagore’s image in Japan in the 
past century. The Japanese approach to Tagore has always been unique because 
of his special message for Japan at a momentous time in modern history. By the 
time Tagore visited Japan in 1916, Japan had already become the strongest 
non-Western military and economic power, had acquired Taiwan (1895) and 
Korea (1905) as colonies, and was seeking to annex the northern part of China. 
Japan sought the notorious Twenty-One Demands of China in 1915. Under the 
circumstances, Tagore came to Japan in the capacity of “the representative of 
the East,” praising Japan as inheriting the best of both the traditional East and 
                                                   
57 Sōsō no jiyū o susumeru kai 葬送の自由をすすめる会, ed., Tagōru to Gandī saihakken タ
ゴールとガンディー再発見 (Rediscovering Tagore and Gandhi) (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 2001), p.ii. 
The discussants at this symposium, including Morimoto Tatsuo, Azuma Kazuo, Yamaori 
Tetsuo 山折哲雄, and Nagasaki Nobuko 長崎暢子, are all reputed Indologists or religious 
scholars in Japan. 
58 Ikeda Daisaku and Bharati Mukerjee, “Aratana chikyū bunmei no uta o: Tagōru to sekai 
shimin o kataru” 新たな地球文明の詩を―タゴールと世界市民を語る (Poetry of the Global 
Civilization: A Talk on Tagore and World Citizen) in Todai 灯台  (Lighthouse), No.611, 
(August, 2011), pp.44-59. 
59 Information on many of the events can still be found online. An exhibition of Tagore’s close 
relationship with Japan was held at the Ōkura Memorial Hall, Yokoyama, in November 2011. 
For the activities, see the special number “Indo no shisei Tagōru to Nihon bunka” インドの詩
聖タゴールと日本文化 (The Great Indian Poet Tagore and Japanese Culture), in Ōkurayama 
ronshū, Vol.58 (March, 2013), pp.1-102. 
60 For an example of this concern, see Okakura Takashi 岡倉登志 “Rabindoranato Tagōru no 
shisō to kōdō: Tagōru seitan hyakugojyūshūnen ni yosete” ラビンドラナート・タゴールの思想
と行動―タゴール生誕百五十周年によせて―  (Rabindranath Tagore’s Thought and Action: 
For Tagore’s 150th Anniversary), in Tōyō kenkyū 東洋研究 (Studies of Asia and Africa), 
No.177 (November, 2010), pp.1-29 (from the left).	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the modern West on the one hand, and urging it to assume the responsibility of 
mitigating the over-aggressive aspects of Western modernity on the other.61  
As has been demonstrated, in the 1910s when Tagore had not yet involved 
himself in ideological debates in Japan, he received intellectual attention 
deserving of an international luminary. However, once Japan’s modernization 
was accomplished under a strong government whose neo-traditionalism fostered 
belief in a mystic national polity and imperial lineage, a bent towards 
ultra-nationalism remained a conspicuous element in modern Japanese 
intellectual history. This ideological undercurrent, complicated by economic and 
political conditions, surfaced rapidly in the early 20th century. Tagore witnessed 
this process firsthand through changing Japanese attitudes towards himself in 
1916. Decades later, the disastrous conclusion of WWII not only destroyed the 
Japanese empire but also swept away its remaining memories of Tagore. It was 
not until several years after the war that he was rediscovered. Many authors 
started reviewing Tagore’s poetry and philosophy, but his warning against 
Japan’s militarization was what gained the most attention. This issue still 
receives frequent examination in the age of globalization. Hence, from the very 
beginning, Tagore’s image in Japan has been intertwined with the country’s 
self-identity. While the research topic of “Tagore and Japan” is inevitably 
politically oriented, we see a return to cultural concerns from the early 1980s. 
The new cultural concerns, nevertheless, are more ethical than critical 
compared with the first trends in Tagore studies before 1916, precisely because 
this revisiting of Tagore is connected with Japan’s memory of war and its 
postwar intellectual milieu. Moreover, as Nakajima Takeshi indicates, in the 
1910s, the Japanese were accustomed to viewing Tagore from an Orientalist 
perspective, characterizing him as feminine and coming from a mysterious, 
exotic, and uncivilized country.62  Based on Inoue Tetsujirō’s and Tanimoto 
Tomeri’s progressive-minded remarks mentioned in Section 2, it is not difficult 
to imagine that such an imperialist view was prevalent in early 
twentieth-century Japan. Nonetheless, with the rapid change of global 
environment after WWII, many Japanese scholars have sought to reexamine the 
idea of Asia, and to seek Asian cooperation through more humanistic and 
                                                   
61 See Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis. 
62 Nakajima Takeshi, “Tagōru, awareru: Taishō shoki no ‘Tagōru netsu’ to shorainichi o 
megutte,” in Bulletin of Okura Institute for the Study of Spiritual Culture, No.55 (March, 
2009), pp.230-233. 
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cultural approaches. For them Tagore provides a rich intellectual resource.  
The arguments of this chapter mainly derive from Takeuchi Yoshimi’s 
observations. While Takeuchi made insightful comments on Tagore’s 
involvement in modern Japanese intellectual history, he underestimated the 
complexity of the relationship between Tagore and China by claiming that “in 
China, he roused sympathy as a resistance poet by singing songs of national 
independence.”63 “Tagore in modern Chinese intellectual history” constitutes 
another significant issue and is treated separately,64 yet it is worth mentioning 
that Takeuchi’s view, though not accurate, reflects the self-criticism of certain 
postwar Japanese thinkers, who felt regret for the great suffering their country 
inflicted on China and other neighboring countries. By contrast, reactions to 
Tagore in two of Japan’s colonies, Taiwan and Korea, seem to have focused 
mainly on anti-imperialism. Literati in the two colonies found great inspiration 
in Tagore’s works, although the Indian poet never visited either place.65 Finally, 
as indicated in Chapter 1, India and the West form the two mainstream 
approaches to Tagore studies. While Indians tend to emphasize Tagore’s 
versatility and creativity, Westerners—especially British and Americans—have 
tended to examine Tagore in a postcolonial context in recent years. Obviously, 
the convention of Tagore studies in Japan is historically contextualized and 
quite different from these two mainstream approaches. Such a difference in 
research methodologies, however, is not one between center and periphery, but 
reveals a crucial episode in modern Japanese intellectual history and 
demonstrates the complexity of both sides—Tagore and Japan—of the inquiry. 
 
                                                   
63 Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Tagōru to Chūgoku,” in Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū, Vol.5, p.220. 
64 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
65  Wang Baiyuan 王白淵 , one of the Taiwanese poets writing in Japanese, expressed 
indirectly his anti-imperialist thought through his praise of Tagore. See “Shisei Tagōru” 詩聖
タゴール (The Great Poet Tagore), in Toge no michi 蕀の道 (Road of Thorns), in Kawahara 
Isao 河原功, ed., Taiwan shishū 台湾詩集 (Poem Collections of Taiwan) (Tokyo: Ryokuin 
Shobō, 2003), pp.93-121. Wang Baiyuan’s Toge no michi and the general response to Tagore 
in colonial Taiwan is discussed in Liu Shu-chin’s 柳書琴 Jingji zhi dao: Taiwan luriqingnian 
de wenxuehuodong yu wenhuakangzheng 荊棘之道―臺灣旅日青年的文學活動與文化抗爭 
(Road of Thorns: The Literary Activities and Cultural Resistance of Taiwanese Youths 
Studying in Japan) (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 2009), Ch3, pp.77-135. For a review of 
Koreans’ reception of Tagore, see Kim Yang-shik, “Tagore and Korea,” in Rabindranath 
Tagore in Perspective (Calcutta: Visva-Bharati, 1989), pp.217-225. 
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5. The Chinese Experiences of Dewey, Russell, and Tagore  
during the May Fourth Era 
 
 
5 .1  A Facet  of  Modern Chinese Intel lectual  History  
 
Following Part II that explores Tagore’s Nihonjinron in the context of 
modern Japanese intellectual history, Part III focuses on Tagore’s relationship 
with another pillar that constituted his Asian vision: China. Differences 
between Tagore’s attitudes towards new and old Asia become apparent by 
contrasting his relationship with the two countries. Changing views of Tagore in 
Japan and China are in turn closely related to their respective perceptions of the 
East-West paradigm. 
This chapter compares Tagore’s Chinese experiences with those of Dewey 
and Russell during the May Fourth Era. An examination of their observations of 
and advice to China, as well as the reactions they aroused, will shed light on a 
major trend in modern Chinese intellectual history. These visits, either as 
separate cases or as a general cultural phenomenon, have elicited frequent 
discussions.1 By examining the relationships between these foreign luminaries 
and contemporary Chinese intellectuals, this chapter complements Chapter 3 
and demonstrates how the views of such ideas as “modernity” and “Asia” 
diverged in early twentieth-century Japan and China. For the sake of coherence, 
it is necessary to explicate the key ideas that constitute the core of this chapter. 
First of all, what was the May Fourth Movement? In spite of myriad 
answers, what is indisputable is that researchers rarely focus on the parade 
spearheaded by some Peking University students on the date of May 4, 1919, 
but regard the event as a symbol of Chinese modernization. The significance of 
this symbol has elicited innumerable and widely diversified interpretations for 
decades. Indeed, the May Fourth Movement is too complex in terms of content, 
constituents, and ramifications for a unanimous definition. With the change of 
political and cultural milieus, views on different aspects of the Movement have 
                                                   
1 For a recent review of this cultural phenomenon in connection with modern Chinese 
intellectual history, see Zheng Shiqu 鄭師渠, “Wusiqianhou waiguomingzhe laihuajiangxue 
yu Zhongguosixiangjie de biandong” 五四前後外國名哲來華講學與中國思想界的變動 (Visits to 
and Lecturing in China of Celebrated Foreign Thinkers during the May Fourth Era and 
Transformation of the Chinese Intellectual World), in Jingdaishi yanjou 近代史研究 (Modern 
Chinese History Studies), No.188, (March, 2012), pp.4-27. 
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inevitably changed in accordance with spatial and temporal requirements. As 
Yu Ying-shih 余英時 comments: “The May Fourth intellectual world consisted 
of communities of great variety and fluidity. Not only did there exist many ‘May 
Fourth projects’ that were changeable and that contradicted each other, but 
each project itself contained different versions. Perhaps an accurate 
generalization can be made about the May Fourth Movement only through an 
understanding that encompasses its multiple facets and directions.”2 Based on 
this multiplicity, this chapter understands the May Fourth Movement from a 
broad perspective, which Chow Tse-tsung 周策縱 (1916-2007) delineates in his 
classic, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, as 
follows:  
 
The May Fourth Movement then may be defined as a complicated 
phenomenon including the “new thought tide,” the literary revolution, 
the student movement, the merchants’ and workers’ strikes, and the 
boycott against Japan, as well as other social and political activities of 
the new intellectuals, all inspired by the patriotic sentiments after the 
Twenty-one Demands and the Shantung resolution, and by the spirit 
of Western learning and the desire to reevaluate tradition in the light 
of science and democracy in order to build a new China.3 
 
This definition treats the patriotic movement and the New Culture 
Movement evenly without simplistically identifying or separating the two 
currents. As to the beginning and end of the Movement, while Chow observed 
that most significant events took place between early 1917 and late 1921, he did 
not apply strict demarcation. This chapter follows this flexible timeframe. 
As specified by Chow, May Fourth is generally regarded as a movement 
that pursued “Western learning” in order “to build a new China.” However, as 
the political predicament of early twentieth-century China did not allow people 
to thoroughly digest Western thought, the “learning” hardly went further than 
                                                   
2 Yu Ying-shih, “Wenyifuxing hu? Qimengyundong hu? Yige shixuejia dui Wusiyundong de 
fansi” 文藝復興乎？啓蒙運動乎？―一個史學家對五四運動的反思  (The Renaissance? The 
Enlightenment? A Historian’s Reflection on the May Fourth Movement), in Yu Ying-shih et 
al., Wusi xinlun 五四新論 (New Interpretations of May Fourth) (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 
1999), p.26. 
3 Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1975), p.5. 
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mere borrowing and peddling. Another theory is that traditional Chinese 
thinking was subject to “pragmatist reasoning” (實用理性), which demanded 
practical use of imported Western ideas and was thus unfavorable for 
exploration of fundamental principles.4 In any case, importation of foreign ideas 
during the May Fourth era was rather haphazard and hasty. The most 
expedient approach, which mainly aimed for short-term social impact, was to 
invite notable foreign figures to give public lectures or conduct academic 
seminars in China.  
These short-term visits of foreign luminaries aroused transitory interest in 
China, although their long-term effects are subject to doubt. Nonetheless, by 
examining the observations these visitors made of China and the 
(mis)interpretation of their messages by the Chinese people, it is possible to 
sketch a specific—rather confused, actually—profile of the modern Chinese 
intellectual world. Furthermore, exploration of the exchange of ideas between 
the Chinese and foreign visitors will reveal how China was positioned in the 
hierarchy of world civilizations, and how messages from the East and the West 
weighed respectively in the thinking of May Fourth intellectuals. I will start 
with an explanation of the background of these invitations. 
 
5 .2  The Visits  of  Many International  Luminaries  to  China 
 
In The Search for Modern China, Jonathan Spence contributes a section to 
“The Facets of May Fourth,” giving an account of the intensive flow of notable 
foreign visitors to China around 1920:  
 
Bertrand Russell traveled extensively in China in 1920 and 
1921…Russell’s brilliant expositions of mathematical logic enthralled 
his audiences, while his ideas on the importance of pacifism also found 
ready listeners. John Dewey lived in Peking during 1919 and 1920 [i.e. 
1921], taught several courses, traveled and lectured widely…En route 
to Japan, Albert Einstein visited China in late 1922, just after 
completing his first work on general relativity theory. A little later, in 
                                                   
4 Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou” 啓蒙與救亡的雙重變奏 
“Duet of Enlightening and Saving Country,” in Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang shilun 現代中國思
想史論  (On the Intellectual History of Modern China) (Beijing: Joint Publishing, 2008), 
pp.1-46. 
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1923 [i.e. 1924], Rabindranath Tagore, the Nobel Prize-winning Indian 
poet, gave a Chinese lecture tour to present his views on aesthetics, 
nonviolence, and the construction of rural communities...5 
 
Numerous visits by foreign luminaries constituted a cultural phenomenon 
in early twentieth-century China, as Spence comments: “Through the force of 
such characters and ideas, the May Fourth movement brought changes in 
consciousnesses that in turn opened new possibilities for life and action in 
China.” 6 Of course, those mentioned above are the most prominent; many 
lesser-known visitors from Europe, America, Russia, and Japan also contributed 
to the trend. In addition, certain figures who did not actually visit China also 
exerted influence through their writings, such as the Russian novelist Leo 
Tolstoy (1828-1910), the Russian anarchists Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) and 
Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921), the German philosopher Rudolf Eucken 
(1846-1926), the Norwegian dramatist Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), the American 
humanist Irving Babbitt (1865-1933), the Japanese leftist economist Kawakami 
Hajime 河上肇 (1879-1946), the Japanese writer and practitioner of the “New 
Village Movement,” Mushanokōji Saneatsu, and so forth. Hence, microanalyses 
of the general trend will reveal a more nuanced portrayal of the Chinese 
intellectual world in the early 20th century. 
Liang Qichao was a key individual in the project of inviting international 
luminaries. From the end of 1918, he went to Europe with five colleagues for a 
cultural, social, and political tour. Soon after returning to China in early 1920, 
Liang published his Record of Reflections during the European Trip, 7 and 
subsequently invited foreign thinkers to come to China for intellectual 
interaction—an idea he conceived during his European trip. The “Chinese 
Lecture Association” was established for this purpose in the autumn of 1920.8 
                                                   
5 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York, London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1991), p.317.  
6 Ibid.. 
7 Liang Qichao, Ouyou xinyinglu 歐遊心影録 (Record of Reflections during the European 
Trip), in Yinbingshi heji 飲冰室合集 (Collected Works of Yinbing Chamber) (Taipei: Chung 
Hwa Book Company Limited, 1970), Wenji 文集 (Monographs), no.23. 
8 For a brief introduction to the “Chinese Lecture Association,” see Li Yongqiang 李永強, 
“Liang Qichao yu Jiangxueshe” 梁啓超與講學社  (Liang Qichao and the Chinese Lecture 
Association), in Journal of Heze University, Vol.28, No.6 (December, 2006), pp.97-100. In 
addition, Chang Peng-yuan 張朋園  also mentions the function of the Chinese Lecture 
Association when he discusses the relationship between Liang Qichao and the May Fourth 
Movement. See “Liang Qichao yu Wusi yundong 梁啓超與五四運動 (Liang Qichao and the 
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When Liang addressed the party for welcoming Bertrand Russell, he claimed: 
 
Our attitude towards the cultural movement current in China is “to 
import [foreign ideas] without limits.” The world is now in a time of 
change, and many schools of thought are inevitably mushrooming in 
this age of skeptical experimentation. Although contradictions are 
visible superficially, each of them contributes positively to future 
development.9 
 
The meaning of Liang’s statement can be better understood by considering 
his background. Liang was one of the pioneers of political reform in late imperial 
China. He assumed responsibility for the importation of new ideas to enlighten 
the Chinese people, and proposed the system of constitutional monarchy. After 
the reformists and revolutionists parted ways, however, he gradually came to be 
viewed as a spent force. After establishment of the Republic, Liang continued to 
involve himself in both political and academic activities for years, but he finally 
devoted himself to study, which led to the European trip. Originally a fervent 
Westernizer, the devastation of Europe after WWI obliged him to reexamine the 
pros and cons of Chinese tradition; through discussions with prominent thinkers 
such as Henri-Louis Bergson (1859-1941), Liang became convinced that the 
outstanding aspects of Chinese culture could provide remedy for the ills of the 
modern West. Therefore, although his Record of Reflections during the 
European Trip was aimed to be a reference for domestic reforms, he showed 
great expectation in the book for the revival of Chinese culture, thereby eliciting 
diverse comments from various factions. It can be said that if unlimited import 
of foreign ideas was imperative for a culturally-sensitive political moderate such 
as Liang, then it must have been the top priority for those more Western-minded 
Chinese intellectuals in the 1920s. 
Invitations of foreign figures to China being delimited by both human and 
material resources, the issue of choice and representativeness emerged, from 
                                                                                                                                             
May Fourth Movement) in Wong Young-tsu 汪榮祖 ed., Wusi yanjiu lunwenji 五四研究論文
集 (Essays of May Fourth Studies) (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 1979), p.277-310. 
9 Liang Qichao, “Zai Jiangxueshe huanying Ruosu zhi shenghui yanshuoci” 在講學社歡迎羅
素之盛會演説詞 (Address for Welcoming Russell at the Party Hosted by the Chinese Lecture 
Association), in Xia Xiaohong 夏曉虹  ed., Yinbingshi heji jiwaiwen 飲冰室合集集外文 
(Addenda to Collected Works of the Yinbing Chamber ) (Beijing: Peking UP, 2005), Vol.2, 
p.855. 
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which derived a result almost inevitable for a radicalized China: namely, foreign 
figures became objects of both factional admiration and criticism simultaneously. 
As will be shown below, conflicts were usually more ideological than critical; 
while the leftists stood firmly against liberalist or conservative ideas, there was 
strife between non-leftists as well. Furthermore, no doubt such invitations were 
made out of good will, yet their real effects were questioned by contemporary 
and later observers. Before Tagore came to China in 1924, Guo Moruo 郭沫若 
(1892-1978) had already commented sarcastically: 
 
After Dewey left, Russell came; after Russell left, Driesch came...What 
we have learned from past experiences is that the successive 
invitations are nothing more than the revelation of our vainglory. We 
do not have profound understanding of their thought and necessity for 
their message, we are simply motivated by worship of famous 
people…It is said that the Indian Tagore will come here soon…10 
 
The political and intellectual backgrounds of Guo’s comment will be 
discussed in Section 4; here it is cited to indicate the general intellectual milieu 
of early twentieth-century China. Besides, the four visitors mentioned by Guo, 
that is, Dewey, Russell, Hans Driesch (1867-1941), and Tagore were those whom 
the Chinese Lecture Association successfully contacted before the organization 
ceased functioning in 1924.11 Through extensive translation of their works, 
advertisements (or critiques) in newspapers, special numbers of magazines 
dedicated to their thought, seminars and publication of their lectures, the four 
luminaries received extensive attention in China. Interestingly, after the fad 
faded, Driesch was rarely mentioned by either contemporary or later 
researchers for reasons that are still to be confirmed; when these visitors are 
mentioned in studies or recollections, Dewey’s and Russell’s names often appear 
together, while Tagore is assigned to another category. For instance, in his 
reminiscences, Jiang Menglin 蔣夢麟 (1886-1964) specified Dewey and Russell 
as two indicators of the enthusiasm for learning prevalent at Peking University 
                                                   
10  Guo Moruo, “Taigeer raihua de wojian” 太戈兒來華的我見  (My Opinion on Tagore’s 
Visiting China), in Guo Moruo quanji: Wenxue bian 郭沫若全集・文學編 (Complete Works of 
Guo Moruo: Literature) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1990), Vol.15, p.268. 
11 Dewey’s arrival in China in May 1919 was earlier than establishment of the Chinese 
Lecture Association. The Association took over the task of entertaining Dewey’ later. See the 
two articles mentioned in note 8.  
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in the early 1920s.12 Jiang did not refer to Tagore in the context of the May 
Fourth Movement, but gave a passing mention to the fact that he attended 
Tagore’s lectures when he was a student in California.13 Feng Youlan, when 
reviewing Chinese academia in the 1920s, states in his autobiography that 
“during the May Fourth era, Liang Qichao and others organized an association, 
inviting the American pragmatist philosopher Dewey and the British neo-realist 
philosopher Russell to give lectures in China.”14 
That Dewey and Russell always appear in pairs in the writings of Chinese 
scholars does not in any way indicate confusion of the two men’s ideas, 
especially when both Jiang and Feng were Dewey’s students at Columbia 
University. Feng even specified the different philosophical schools to which they 
belonged. However, on the level of cultural psychology, perhaps Jiang and Feng 
also shared the popular recognition that Dewey and Russell were great thinkers 
from the West, whereas Tagore was a poet from the East. In fact, when Tagore 
went to America at the end of 1920, Feng, who was then studying in New York, 
paid a visit to Tagore and asked his opinion about the differences between 
Eastern and Western civilizations. Feng translated their conversation into 
Chinese and submitted the record (including his personal reflections) to a 
Chinese journal later, which is also mentioned in his autobiography. 15 
Generally speaking, the Eastern background of Tagore shaped his image in the 
eyes of Chinese intellectuals and determined the reception he was to be given in 
China. On an intellectual level, Tagore was a poet proposing humanistic 
universalism while Dewey and Russell were philosophers renowned for their 
systems. Thus, for some revolution-minded Chinese, who were brandishing the 
slogans of “science” and “democracy,” Tagore’s message was more controversial 
than those of Dewey and Russell. This intellectual estrangement was 
compounded by an ideological division between East and West, which made the 
environment even more unfavorable to Tagore. As will be demonstrated, a 
comparison of the three visitors’ Chinese experiences provides a way for 
observing the cultural tension—or rather, confusion—of the May Fourth era, 
                                                   
12 Jiang Menglin, Xichao 西潮 (Tides From the West) (Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book Co., 
2008), p.139.  
13 Ibid., p.85. 
14 Feng Youlan, Sansongtang zixu 三松堂自序 (Autobiography of the Sansong Chamber), in 
Sansongtang quanji, Vol.1, p.179. 
15 Ibid., p.173. See Chapter 6 for a thorough discussion of this conversation between Tagore 
and Feng. 
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and indicates how the leftists who ultimately rose to power in China were 
gaining momentum at the time. 
 
5 .3  Advice  to  China from Dewey,  Russel l ,  and Tagore  
 
This section does not delve into the specialized theories of Dewey, Russell, 
and Tagore, but rather focuses on their general observations of Chinese culture 
and society. There are multiple reasons for this focus: firstly, both the space 
here and the author’s expertise are limited; secondly, most Chinese in the 1920s 
were not familiar enough with Dewey’s and Russell’s philosophies to respond 
appropriately; thirdly, both Dewey and Russell were aiming at general 
methodologies and universal systems, which are not context-dependent and 
assume rational and objective forms. Here we touch upon the point that 
differentiates Dewey and Russell from Tagore; that is, although Tagore firmly 
upheld a cosmology—one of the “oneness of humankind and Brahma”—and 
proposed a “philosophy of love,” he showed an express disinterest in systematic 
philosophical discourse and never assumed the title of philosopher.16 Moreover, 
as the first Nobel laureate from Asia, he felt responsible for encouraging 
confidence in Eastern culture,17 so most of his lectures in China dwelled on the 
superiority of “Eastern spiritual civilization.” His audiences were hardly given 
access to his multifaceted talents and the social activities in which he was 
involved. Such a narrow focus on Tagore’s part resulted in his being regarded as 
a blind traditionalist and made him subject to vicious criticism. Overwhelmed 
by this world-civilizational ideology that was shaped by a West-centric view of 
progress and modernity, Chinese intellectuals responded differently to Dewey’s, 
Russell’s, and Tagore’s “China projects.” Ultimately, their China-related 
discourses, though subjective and partially-informed, contributed no less than 
their specialized philosophical articulation to the complexity of modern Chinese 
intellectual history. 
Among the three visitors, Dewey went to China the earliest and spent the 
longest time there. He was invited to Japan in February, 1919, from where he 
traveled to China, arriving in Shanghai on May 1. He returned to America more 
than two years later, in July, 1921. Besides Jiang Menglin and Feng Youlan, 
                                                   
16 Rabindranath Tagore, “Preface,” in Sadhana: Realisation of Life, p.vii.  
17 See Chapters 1 and 2 for detailed analyses. 
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many weighty figures in contemporary Chinese academia such as Hu Shi 胡適 
(1891-1962) and Tao Xingzhi 陶行知 (1891-1946) were also Dewey’s students, 
thus adding to his popularity in China. More importantly, Dewey’s name was to 
be connected with modern Chinese intellectual history because three days after 
he arrived in the country, the May Fourth Movement broke out. Dewey watched 
the student-led movement closely and began exploring the tradition and future 
prospects of Chinese culture, which eventually turned his short-term voyage 
into a two-year sojourn.18 Perceiving the intertwining of cultural and political 
factors in the May Fourth Movement and the boisterousness of the Chinese 
intellectual world, Dewey believed that educational reform would be the only 
way for China to eradicate its long-standing social diseases and facilitate 
modernization. After he left China, Hu Shi concluded that “what Mr. Dewey 
cared the most about is the reform of education; lectures on education also 
occupied the greatest part of his overall lectures in China.”19 Hu Shi went on to 
summarize the theory of his mentor:  
 
Mr. Dewey did not give us any proposals for addressing any particular 
problems, such as communism, anarchism, freedom of love, etc. What 
he gave us was simply a philosophical methodology, by which we have 
to solve our own problems. This philosophical methodology is called 
“experimentalism.”20 
 
Hu Shi summarized the definition of “experimentalism” in two points, 
namely, the “historical method” and the “experimental method.” While the 
former seeks to contextualize every event or concept with a view to its causation, 
the latter critically examines the practical effects of knowledge and ideals 
without adhering to authoritative opinions.21  How well Hu Shi understood 
Dewey’s philosophy has long been a subject of debate, but the summary above is 
                                                   
18 Dewey made the decision to visit China when he was in Japan. Some of his former 
students happened to be in Japan at the time, so they sent an invitation to Dewey to give 
lectures in China as well. See “Duwei boshi zhi Hu Shi jiaosho han” 杜威博士致胡適教授函 
(Letter from Dr. Dewey to Professor Hu Shi), in Zhang Baogui 張寶貴 ed., Shiyongzhuyi zhi 
wojian: Duwei zai Zhongguo 實用主義之我見―杜威在中國 (Ideas of Pragmatism: Dewey in 
China) (Nanchang: Jiangxi Higher Education Press, 2009), p.3. 
19 Hu Shi, “Duwei xiansheng yu Zhongguo” 杜威先生與中國  (Mr. Dewey and China), in 
Ouyang Zhesheng 歐陽哲生  ed., Hu Shi wenji 胡適文集  (Complete Works of Hu Shi) 
(Beijing: Peking UP, 1998), Vol.2, p.279. 
20 Ibid., pp.279-280. 
21 Ibid., p.280. 
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generally applicable to Dewey’s Chinese lectures.22 As Dewey focused on real 
problems rather than on abstractions, many of his lectures in China were 
directed at issues concerning social development, such as scientific knowledge, 
public education, democratic politics, and industrial economics. It can be said 
that Dewey’s ideas dovetailed with and even encouraged the pursuit of 
“democracy” and “science” by the May Fourth intellectuals. 
To make his comments relevant, it was necessary for Dewey to develop a 
Chinese discourse. Arguably, his view of China and comparisons of East-West 
civilizations were based on the status that “science” occupies in intellectual 
history. Dewey claimed that the ancient Greeks had laid the foundation for 
objective learning in the West; although the authority of the Church prevailed 
for a long time, once society was galvanized during the Age of Reason, a tension 
between science and religion was created that lasted for centuries. Such tension 
was nonexistent in the East: 
 
[T]raditional Chinese culture was more concerned with a philosophy of 
life than with the natural sciences, so that science never developed 
enough to be incorporated into the general pattern of politics, religion, 
and other aspects of social life…the introduction of new ways of 
thinking did not provoke any marked reaction…About the only thing 
that most people noticed was that the change brought new words into 
their vocabularies.23 
 
Furthermore, due to the lack of competition of ideas and inexperience in 
pursuing freedom of thought under ecclesiastical social control, traditional 
China was not motivated towards scientific research, which for Dewey was not 
only materially but also morally significant, as the development of science “has 
introduced new hope into life, and has provided the basis for new courage in 
                                                   
22 It is generally agreed that Hu Shi did not grasp the essence of Dewey’s thought. What 
remains problematic is the degree of his understanding. See Wu Sen 呉森, “Duwei sixiang yu 
Zhongguo wenhua” 杜威思想與中國文化 (Dewey’s Thought and Chinese Culture), in Wong 
Young-tsu ed., Wusi yanjiu lunwenji, pp.125-156；Zhang Baogui, “Duwei zaihua jingli” 杜威
在華經歷 (Dewey’s Chinese Experiences), in Zhang Baogui ed., Dewey yu Zhongguo 杜威與中
國 (Dewey and China) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei People’s Publishing House, 2001), pp.3-63. 
23  John Dewey, Robert W. Clopton and Tsuin-chen Ou trs., eds., Lectures in China, 
1919-1920 (Honolulu: UP of Hawaii, 1973), pp.233-234. Since not all manuscripts of Dewey’s 
and Russell’s lectures in China are available, many of the citations in this chapter are 
back-translated into English from Chinese records by either previous scholars or myself. 
Tagore, on the other hand, edited his lectures in China and published them in the 1920s.  
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living.” 24  Critically, Dewey distinguished between “science” and “the 
development of science;” while the latter was concerned more with “a scientific 
attitude,” the former was all too often confused by Oriental people with “the 
results of science—the development of technology.” 25 According to Dewey, since 
a scientific attitude had always existed in parallel with material exploration, 
the West was not, paradoxically, as inclined to polarization between the 
material and spiritual as was the East. Dewey further elaborated on the 
relationship between the material and spiritual in a pragmatic way: “The point I 
am going to establish is that the development of material civilization and of 
moral ideals and ways of thinking should go hand in hand, so that we can 
control material developments and direct them toward promotion of human 
welfare.”26 Obviously, at least in the lecture on “Science and the Moral Life,” 
Dewey defined “spiritual” or “moral” in terms of being “non-material,” mainly 
addressing the mental function of rationalization, rather than of meditation or 
self-reflection that the term “spiritual” generally encompasses.  
From the gist of Dewey’s Chinese observations presented above, we can 
obtain a clear idea of the origin of Hu Shi’s optimistic scientism. Such a 
philosophical stance has been subject to frequent criticism and revision, but that 
does not undermine either Dewey’s or Hu’s respective positions in intellectual 
history. Dewey in one of his lectures introduced three contemporary Western 
philosophers to his Chinese audience, one of which was Bertrand Russell, who 
was to visit China in October, 1920. Given the experimentalist nature of 
Dewey’s theory, there was not much gap between logic and life, or theory and 
practice. Nonetheless, in Dewey’s eyes, Russell was a thinker who embodied a 
temperament opposite to his: “on ethical and social matters, he shows an 
inclination that is radically democratic, but when it comes to theory, he is 
aristocratic—he worships reason and neglects feelings; he emphasizes 
commonality and despises individuals; he prefers reason to experiences and 
shows signs of a rationalist.”27 Indeed, people crowded the lecture halls when 
                                                   
24 Ibid., p.239. 
25 Ibid., p.238. 
26 Ibid. 
27  Duwei 杜威 , “Xiandai de sange zhexuejia” 現代的三個哲學家  (Three Contemporary 
Philosophers), in Yuan Gang 袁剛 et al. eds., Minzhizhuyi yu xiandaishehui: Duwei zaihua 
jiangyanji 民治主義與現代社會―杜威在華講演集 (The Principle of Government by the People 
and Modern Society: Collection of Dewey’s Lectures in China) (Beijing: Peking UP, 2004), 
p.258. 
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Russell was expanding on his mathematical philosophy and logic, but the 
theories were too sophisticated for the Chinese to digest. This situation 
perplexed Russell, who felt the Chinese trip had not helped him to refine his 
ideas: “they don’t want technical philosophy; what they want is practical advice 
on social reform.” 28   Notwithstanding the mismatch between lecturer and 
audience, Chinese experiences still added something to Russell’s erudition and 
social awareness. He left China in July, 1921. The next year, he published The 
Problems of China, which is a work of comparative studies on Chinese, Japanese, 
and Western cultures and modern world politics. 
Generally speaking, Russell was severely critical of modern Western 
civilization. He addressed the welcoming party held for him in Shanghai as 
follows:  
 
Reviewing the past century, it could be said that many of the 
fundamental ideas that dominated Europe have been far from perfect, 
and in fact, have actually fostered unconscionable deeds and 
encouraged violence and exploitation. If I were a Chinaman, I would be 
opposed to implementation of these European ideas in China, ideas 
that could set the country on a perilous track. Traditional Chinese 
culture, such as its literature and the arts, is indeed magnificent and 
worth preserving. Furthermore, as the European War has revealed to 
us, a terrible price must be paid in order to create a new civilization. 
But in China such tremendous sacrifice is not necessary since some 
mistakes are avoidable.29  
 
This statement epitomizes what Russell would have to say to China in the 
coming ten months. 30  Throughout his sojourn in China and even in the 
                                                   
28  Cited from Zhu Xueqin 朱學勤 , “Rang ren weinan de Ruosu” 讓人為難的羅素  (An 
Embarrassing Russell), in Cao Yuanyong 曹元勇  ed., Tongwang ziyou zhilu: Ruosu zai 
Zhongguo 通往自由之路―羅素在中國 (The Way to Freedom: Russell in China) (Nanchang: 
Jiangxi Higher Education Press, 2009), p.9.  
29 Luosu 羅素, “Zai Shanghai qituanti huanyinghuishang de daci” 在上海七團體歡迎會上的
答辭 (Address at the Welcoming Party Hosted in Shanghai by Seven Organizations), in Yuan 
Gang 袁剛 et al. eds., Zhongguo dao ziyou zhilu: Ruosu zaihua jiangyanji 中國到自由之路―
羅素在華講演集  (China’s Road to Freedom: Collection of Russell’s Lectures in China) 
(Beijing: Peking UP, 2004), p.2. My translation. 
30 What follows is a condensed account of Russell’s interaction with Chinese intellectuals. 
For a detailed analysis, see Feng Chongyi 馮崇義, Luosu yu Zhongguo: Xifangsixiang zai 
Zhongguo de yicijingli 羅素與中國―西方思想在中國的一次經歷  (Russell and China: An 
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arguments of The Problems of China, Russell eagerly tried to persuade the 
Chinese to cut out a third path between wholesale Westernization and blind 
traditionalism. Russell expressed resentment toward both capitalism and 
nationalism, claiming that—in his own terms—commerce and the nation 
stimulate the “possessive impulse,” which is exclusive in nature, while the 
“creative impulse” encourages original artistic and intellectual activities and 
can naturally be shared.31 From the perspective of comparative civilizations, 
Russell thought that the Chinese were far superior to Westerners in terms of 
seeking satisfaction and pleasure in life: 
 
The typical Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as 
possible in his environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as 
much and as delicately as possible…We in the West make a fetish of 
“progress,” which is the ethical camouflage of the desire to be the cause 
of changes.32 
 
Russell astutely pointed out the Western fascination with “progress.” 
Indeed the generalization is too rough to be precise, but it is obvious that China 
provided a reference for Russell to criticize Western civilization.  
If Russell made his critiques as a Western elite, Tagore issued his warnings 
as an Eastern thinker against the modern West that he thought was plagued by 
materialism. To propose an “Eastern spiritual civilization,” China was an object 
that Tagore earnestly appealed to in view of its millennium-long cultural 
interaction with India. Therefore, during his short-term stay in China from 
April 12 to May 30, 1924, Tagore frequently reminded his audience of the 
cultural kinship between their countries. While Tagore showed high regard for 
science as a way to truth, he lamented its abuse by modern Europeans in 
personal, national, and racial conflicts, which turned the technologically 
advanced 20th century into “the darkest age in human civilization.” 33  For 
Tagore, human civilization could reach its consummation only through love, 
                                                                                                                                             
Episode of Western Thought in China) (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1994). 
31 Luosu 羅素, “Shehui gaizao yuanli” 社會改造原理 (Principles of Social Reform), in ibid., 
p.3; see also Duwei, “Xiandai de sange zhexuejia,” in Yuan Gang et al. eds., Minzhizhuyi yu 
xiandaishehui: Duwei zaihua jiangyanji, p.263. 
32 Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1922), 
p.202. 
33 Rabindranath Tagore, Talks in China, in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Volume IV: Essays, pp.748-750. 
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mutual help, and sacrifice. The Sino-Indian relationship that was centered upon 
the dissemination of Buddhism evidenced the spiritual power of love that 
overcame hardship and obstacles.34 Despite the fact that both China and India 
are ancient Eastern civilizations, the former is more secular and less religious 
than the latter. Tagore was keenly aware of this difference, so he adroitly placed 
his praise for China in the dialectics between the spiritual and material, and 
between East and West: 
 
I have heard it said…that you are pragmatic and materialistic; that 
you cling to this life and this world; that you do not send out your 
dreams into the air, searching the distant heavens for a far-away life 
beyond…I have my own idea, superstition if you like, that no people in 
Asia can be wholly given to materialism… Materialism is exclusive, 
and those who are materialistic claim their individual rights of 
enjoyment, of storing and possessing. You are not individualists in 
China. Your society is itself the creation of your communal soul…It is 
true that you love this world and the material things about you with 
an intensity of attachment, but not by enclosing your possessions 
within walls of exclusiveness.35 
 
Tagore stood firmly against exclusive materialism, objecting to 
over-satiation of human desires and over-dependence on machines that risked 
trading the spiritual for power and wealth. On a political level, nevertheless, 
both early twentieth-century China and India were subjugated to Western 
imperialism, to which Tagore provided no practical advice for structural change. 
He encouraged the Chinese people to endure pain and tribulation; after the 
darkness the spirit of the East would shine all over the earth again.36 
Critically, despite their different philosophical stances, the views of China 
held by Dewey, Russell, and Tagore all belonged to the genre of East-West 
civilizational discourse that was prevalent in the early 20th century. In this 
grand narrative, the East was differentiated from the West in terms of scientific 
knowledge, polity of the nation-state, industrial economics, and so forth, which 
                                                   
34 Ibid., p.757. 
35 Ibid., pp.759-760. 
36 Ibid., p.750. 
 127 
received different degrees of elaboration in the remarks of all three men. In brief, 
in the march of modernization, the factors that gave Western countries their 
supremacy in the modern era occupied the minds of most intellectuals around 
the world. The East-West dichotomy became entrenched—geographically as well 
as culturally—with ensuing attempts to examine, revise, suture, or transcend 
the division. In China, given its specific social conditions and intellectual milieu 
in the early 20th century, the issue of modernization in the context of East-West 
debate constituted one of the most ideologically turbulent episodes of the 
country’s history, as will hereby be demonstrated. 
 
5 .4  Foreign Visitors  during the Intel lectual  Storm of  May Fourth 
 
Dewey, Russell, and Tagore offered advice to China based on the premise of 
an irreconcilable East-West dichotomy, which, from today’s point of view, needs 
more nuanced interpretations. However, in early twentieth-century China 
where foreign ideas were eagerly sought after, every idea found its enthusiastic 
advocate and adversary among Chinese intellectuals. Hence, even though the 
Chinese discourse of the three luminaries does not at all represent the best of 
their thinking, through the responses they received from the Chinese people, a 
tendency towards radicalization of modern China can easily be pictured. 
It is true that Dewey’s thought was not properly understood by the Chinese 
people, but, at any rate, nothing he said caused much controversy, either. Just 
as Hu Shi indicated, Dewey said nothing about “isms,” but spoke only of 
methodology; furthermore, Dewey was himself a strong supporter of democracy 
and science, for which most Chinese intellectuals were searching. Hence, despite 
some articles that question the premises or logical foundation of 
experimentalism,37 Dewey did not become the center of any fierce polemics. 
Nevertheless, at the early stage of Dewey’s sojourn in China, there was a 
disputation tangentially relevant to Dewey that was significant in intellectual 
history, that is, the famous “debate between questions and isms.” The episode 
began with a brief essay by Hu Shi, “Study Questions More; Talk Less about 
                                                   
37 Cf. Zhang Shuiqi 張水淇 , “Zhishi guoshi gongju ma?” 知識果是工具麼  (Is Knowledge 
Really a Tool?), in Zhang Baogui, ed., Shiyongzhuyi zhi wojian: Duwei zai Zhongguo, 
pp.101-103; Zhu Yanjun 朱言均, “Bo shiyanzhuyi” 駁實驗主義 (Rebutting Experimentalism), 
in ibid., pp.104-107. It should be noted that what these two articles argue against is Hu Shi’s 
interpretation of experimentalism, which might not be in accordance with Dewey’s theory.  
 128 
Isms.” Hu Shi did not advocate experimentalism in this article, yet his 
exposition of the formulation of thought is no different from his summary of 
Dewey’s philosophy:  
 
The first step in formulating thought is to study the many facts related 
to a question, seeing what problems are encountered. The second step 
is to…figure out different kinds of solutions to those problems 
according to the experiences and learning gained in one’s life. Based on 
life-long experiences and learning, with the help of imagination…the 
third step is to reason out every possible hypothetical solution, and 
then choose one of the hypothetical solutions to be one’s own proposal. 
All proposals of any value come from these three steps.38 
 
Hu Shi’s article elicited two responses that either repudiated or tried to 
complement his view. One was “Questions and Isms” by Lan Gongwu 藍公武 
(1887-1957), the other was “Questions and Isms II” by Li Dazhao. In “Questions 
and Isms III,” Hu Shi summarized the main points of the two articles by Lan 
and Li, respectively: “There is one point shared by Mr. Lan and Mr. Li, that is, 
they both say that an ‘ism’ is ‘a common ideal’ (Li), ‘a standard of actions 
followed by most people, or a common attitude towards a certain specific 
question’ (Lan). Such a definition is not in contradiction with what I explained 
in the original essay…”39 It is not necessary to go into the details of their debate, 
but what is noteworthy is that Li Dazhao concluded his article from the 
perspective of Marxism, arguing that while the materialistic view of history, 
whose core thesis is economic determinism, reveals the truth of the development 
of human society, the “common ideal” of socialism cannot be achieved without 
the help of class struggle.40 On this point, Hu Shi made his counterargument in 
“Questions and Isms: IV”: 
 
The theory of class struggle demonstrates the reasons for which the 
bourgeoisie cannot coexist with the proletariat, which is quite 
                                                   
38 Hu Shi, “Duo yanjiu xie wenti, shao tan xie zhuyi” 多研究些問題，少談些主義 (Study 
Questions More; Talk Less about Isms). In Ouyang Zhesheng ed., Hu Shi wenji, Vol.2, p.252. 
39 Hu Shi, “Sanlun wenti yu zhuyi” 三論問題與主義 (Questions and Isms: III), in Ouyang 
Zhesheng ed., Hu Shi wenji, Vol.2, p.266. 
40 Li Dazhao, “Zailun wenti yu zhuyi” 再論問題與主義 (Questions and Isms: II), in Ouyang 
Zhesheng ed., Hu Shi wenji, Vol.2, pp.265-266. 
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significant in the history of socialism and the Labor Party. This type of 
theory, however, overemphasizes “class consciousness” and fosters 
hostility between classes. It encourages an uncompromising hatred of 
labor to capital, and makes capitalists feel that labor is a real enemy.41 
 
Hu Shi was criticizing the negative effects of “isms” and “ideology.” Ideas 
that undergo radicalization and absolutization bear no resemblance to the 
“historical attitude” proposed by Hu Shi that seeks to judge everything in terms 
of cause and effect.42 If the argument between experimentalism and Marxism is 
not so obvious in the above articles, Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白 (1899-1935) challenged 
experimentalism directly for its dwelling on methodology without making any 
claims for truth. For Qu, only Marx’s view of dialectical historical materialism 
grasps the objective principles of the world, which “can change society 
thoroughly, rather than be satisfied with the dispensation of trivial problems.”43 
As specified in the previous section, at the welcoming party upon his 
arrival, Russell warned China against total Westernization and encouraged the 
Chinese people to preserve whatever was fine and excellent in their tradition. 
This comment was nothing less than natural for such a relentless critic of 
Western politics and economics as Russell. On the other hand, Russell might 
have wanted to be complimentary to his host out of courtesy. But this brief 
comment immediately evoked criticism. The newspaper Shen Bao published “A 
Report on Dr. Russell’s Welcome by Many Institutions” the next morning 
(October 14, 1920), which bears the subtitle, “Dr. Russell Said that China 
Should Preserve Its National Essence.” 44  Zhou Zuoren 周作人  (1885-1967) 
responded in the newspaper, Chen Bao, five days later, claiming that the great 
tradition of China was already dead without the tiniest “essence” being left. At 
the end of the article he asserted that “we welcome Russell’s opinions on social 
                                                   
41 Hu Shi, “Silun wenti yu zhuyi” 四論問題與主義 (Questions and Isms: IV), in Ouyang 
Zhesheng ed., Hu Shi wenji, Vol.2, p.277. 
42 Ibid., p.277-278. 
43 Qu Qiubai, “Shiyan zhuyi yu geming zhexue” 實驗主義與革命哲學 (Experimentalism and 
the Philosophy of Revolution), in Qu Qiubai wenji: zhengzhililun bian 瞿秋白文集・政治理論
編 (Complete Works of Qu Qiubai: Political Theories) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 
1987), Vol.2, p.627. 
44  “Ge tuanti huanying Ruosu boshi ji: Luo boshi yan Zhongguo yi baocun guyou guocui” 各
團體歡迎羅素博士記―羅博士言中國宜保存固有國粹  (A Report on Dr. Russell Welcome by 
Many Institutions: Dr. Russell Said that China Should Preserve Its National Essence), in 
Cao Yuanyong ed., Tongwang ziyou zhilu: Ruosu zai Zhongguo, p.12.  
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reform; this is our only request of him.”45 Such a request testified to the sense of 
powerlessness that gripped Russell later: he complained that the Chinese 
showed no interest in his logical analyses but asked only for prescripts for social 
reform. Actually, a glance through some relevant discussions indicates that not 
all commentators were ready anti-traditionalists, yet they were quite sensitive 
to the proposal to “preserve national essence,” which they thought was a sign of 
resurgence of the traditionalists who had just lost the “debate on East-West 
civilizations.” Apparently, Russell had inadvertently become involved in the 
ideological vortex of early twentieth-century China. As will be demonstrated, 
among anti-traditionalists, the leftists were the force that was rising the most 
rapidly.  
In his farewell address Russell concluded: “There is one question which I 
find on the lips of almost all the thoughtful Chinese whom I have met and that is 
the question: ‘How can we develop industry without at the same time developing 
capitalism and all its evils?’”46  This is further evidence of the intellectual 
orientation during the May Fourth era, which invariably concentrated on 
practical issues and showed the increasing influence of Marxism. Russell was 
sympathetic to Bolshevism, although not without reservations. In one of his 
lectures, he highly praised the social system that, at least in theory, claims to 
abolish all classes.47 Such a stance irritated the incumbent Beijing government, 
which even sought to expel Russell from the country. In response to the practical 
question raised above, Russell’s idea was that development of industry should 
be based on a reliable government, which in turn is premised upon a 
well-educated people; both qualifications were absent in early twentieth-century 
China. Hence, he suggested that China consider Soviet-style “State Socialism,” 
which pushes the advancement of industry and education through governmental 
direction. 
 
State Socialism has grave drawbacks, and in an undeveloped country 
                                                   
45 Zhou Zuoren, “Ruosu yu guocui” 羅素與國粹 (Russell and National Essence), in Zhong 
Shuhe 鍾叔河 ed., Zhou Zuoren sanwen quanji 周作人散文全集 (Complete Essays of Zhou 
Zuoren) (Guilin: Guangxi Normal UP, 2009), Vol.2, p.251.  
46 Bertrand Russell, “China’s Road to Freedom,” in Richard A. Rempel et al. eds., The 
Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell 15: Uncertain Paths to Freedom: Russia and China, 
1919-22 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p.265. 
47 Luosu, “Buershiweike di sixiang” 布爾什維克底思想 (Thought of the Bolsheviks), in Yuan 
Gang et al. eds., Zhongguo dao ziyou zhilu: Ruosu zaihua jiangyanji, pp.203-207.  
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reproduces many of the evils of capitalism. But I believe it is easier to 
pass from it to a better system, when industrial and educational 
progress makes it possible, than it is to eradicate capitalism when once 
it has acquired the hold it has in England and America.48 
 
Despite his preference for state socialism, Russell warned China against 
the bureaucratic tyranny and fervent desire for power that were visible in the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, he did not agree with economic determinism and 
thought that ethics was at least as significant as economic factors in making a 
sound country.49 Obviously, the socialism proposed by Russell was mixed; it 
bore a tint of liberalism and was tinged with moralism. This was different from 
the radical views held by Chinese intellectuals, and thus incited disagreement. 
For instance, Qu Qiubai criticized Russell’s socialist ideas as incomplete: 
 
There are not a few brilliant points in Russell’s lectures. But he is so 
misled that he assumes what the Bolsheviks want to create is merely 
national socialism, or national capitalism. This is a great fallacy. 
Furthermore, while he admits that the national capitalism that is 
currently being implemented in Russia is for the good of the masses 
and society, he denies the necessity for revolution.50 
 
This ideological chasm found expression in a forum in the magazine La 
Jeunesse, which is entitled “Discussions on Socialism.”51 In view of the extreme 
poverty suffered by the Chinese hinterland, Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886-1973)  
proposed gradual social change and referred to Russell as the source of his 
opinion: 
 
He seems to have said that China must first focus on education, 
helping those without knowledge become knowledgeable, and making 
                                                   
48 Bertrand Russell, “China’s Road to Freedom,” in Richard A. Rempel et al. eds., The 
Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell 15: Uncertain Paths to Freedom: Russia and China, 
1919-22, p.266. 
49 Ibid. 
50  Qu Qiubai, “Ping Ruosu zhi shehuizhuyiguan” 評羅素之社會主義觀  (Comment on 
Russell’s View of Socialism), in Qu Qiubai wenji: zhengzhililun bian, Vol.1, p.510. 
51 Zhang Dongsun et al., “Guanyu shehuizhuyi de taolun” 關於社會主義的討論 (Discussions 
on Socialism), in Xinqingnian 新青年 (La Jeunesse), Vol.8, No.4 (December, 1920), pp.1-24. 
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those who are already knowledgeable more advanced in knowledge. 
The second priority is to develop industry to satisfy material needs. 
There is no harm in postponing the practice of socialism.52 
 
Russell’s original speech is not available now, and Zhang Dongsun 
employed ambiguity in his paraphrase, which implies the possibility of garbling. 
In any case, the non-radical stance of Russell dissatisfied Chen Duxiu, who 
wrote an open letter to Russell, asking him to clarify his ideas, “so that you may 
not mislead the Chinese people, and that progressive-minded Chinese would not 
feel disappointed with you.”53 This dispute was centered around Russell’s words, 
but what was under debate remained unchanged: whether China should develop 
capitalism and industrialize itself first, or if it could bypass this phase and go 
directly to socialism. In other words, what Russell had said did not really matter; 
his words were mere pretexts for the ideological rift between contemporary 
Chinese intellectuals. 
Speaking of debate, no other foreign visitor to China was involved in a 
bigger storm than Tagore. As mentioned, Zhou Zuoren was antipathetic to 
Russell’s suggestion of “preserving national essence.” He even pointed a dagger 
at Tagore:  
 
Why do the Chinese like the Indian Tagore? Because he praises 
Easternization over Westernization. Why are the Chinese delighted 
when it comes to “national essence” or Easternization? Because we are 
lazy. We are afraid of using our minds and of changing our way of 
life.54 
 
This article was written in October, 1920, three and a half years earlier 
than Tagore’s visit to China, an indication that Tagore’s identity as the 
“spokesperson for Eastern culture” had already become widespread in Chinese 
cultural circles. Zhou Zuoren said that “we welcome Russell’s opinions on social 
reform; this is our only request of him.” Remotely echoing this criticism, the 
leftist writer Mao Dun 茅盾  (Shen Yanbin 沈雁冰 , 1896-1981), wrote a 
                                                   
52 Ibid., pp.7-8. My italics. 
53 Ibid., p.8. 
54 See note 45. 
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comment on the very day Tagore arrived in China: “We are resolutely against 
the Tagore who praises Eastern culture…What we welcome is the Tagore who 
involves himself in peasant movements (although the way he sponsors peasant 
movements is not what we approve of), the Tagore who sings ‘follow the light’!”55 
Apparently, what Tagore faced in China was an audience that had experienced 
the fierce “debate on East-West cultures.” Furthermore, on the eve of his arrival, 
the curtain of the “debate between science and philosophy of life” had just fallen, 
which resulted in Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1887-1969) and Liang Qichao—those 
who did not believe that the problems of human existence could be fully solved 
through scientific methods—being ridiculed as “metaphysical devils” (玄學鬼). 
Since Tagore was invited by the Chinese Lecture Association, people tended to 
think that Liang Qichao and his comrades sought to rally again by way of 
Tagore’s international reputation. Zhou Zuoren in another essay also pointed 
out: “I think we should show hospitality to Tagore, but it is not right to peddle 
metaphysics through the old man.” 56  Temporally speaking, Liang Qichao’s 
invitation to Tagore predated the debate, so it was wrong to accuse him of trying 
to use Tagore. Hu Shi, although a supporter of scientism, also objectively 
defended Liang’s innocence.57 Nonetheless, things were more complicated than 
Liang Qichao’s attitude as criticisms of Tagore came not only from one party or 
clique but virtually from all directions.  
As mentioned in Section 2, Guo Moruo made a sarcastic remark at Tagore’s 
impending visit to China. Guo admitted that, during his student days in Japan, 
he was so fascinated with Tagore’s poetry that he tried to imitate the style. But 
by the end of 1923 when the comment was made, Guo had already become a 
leftist who not merely criticized the spiritual ideal of the East but also 
emphasized: 
 
I believe historical materialism is the only way that can lead to the 
solution of world problems. Without reform of economic systems, 
                                                   
55 Shen Yanbin, “Duiyu Taigeer de xiwang” 對於太戈爾的希望 (My Expectations of Tagore), 
in Mao Dun quanji 茅盾全集 (Complete Works of Mao Dun) (Beijing: People’s Publishing 
House, 1989), Vol.18, p.424. 
56 Zhou Zuoren, “’Daren zhi weihai’ ji qita” 「大人之危害」及其他 (“Danger of the Giant” and 
Others), in Zhong Shuhe ed., Zhou Zuoren sanwen quanji, Vol.3, p.403. 
57 “Taigeer zaijing zuihou zhi jiangyan” 泰戈爾在京最後之講演  (Tagore’s Last Speech in 
Beijing), in Sun Yixue 孫宜學 ed., Shiren de jingshen: Taigeer zai Zhongguo 詩人的精神―泰
戈爾在中國 (Spirit of the Poet: Tagore in China) (Nanchang: Jiangxi Higher Education Press, 
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slogans such as the reality of Brahma, self-dignity, and the gospel of 
love are nothing more than the opiate of the propertied and leisurely 
bourgeoisie; the proletariat has no alternative but to sweat and bleed to 
the end.58 
 
Guo Moruo’s criticism was relatively moderate. Qu Qiubai went further to 
call Tagore “a man of the past” because he was not interested in social 
revolution.59 Among the leftists, Chen Duxiu launched the fiercest attack on 
Tagore. Chen was a pioneer of the pro-Westernization faction in the “debate on 
East-West cultures;” he was also the first to juxtapose “democracy” and “science” 
for modern China as the country's two objectives. Therefore, nearly everything 
Tagore proposed, such as Eastern civilization and anti-materialism, ran counter 
to Chen Duxiu’s agenda. Chen published around a dozen articles criticizing 
Tagore, many of which are not much different from slander.60 
The leftists were not the only ones who reviled Tagore, however. The 
extreme rightist Wu Zhihui 呉稚暉 (1865-1953) also warned that “Mr. Tagore, 
you just write your poems. Other countries are not your business. Don’t talk 
about world affairs!”61 Wu continued sarcastically that “our great writer Liang 
Qichao was championing such a poor and despicable theory of Easternization 
and Westernization five years ago. As the proverb goes, ‘great minds think 
alike.’”62 Wu was referring to Liang Qichao’s Record of Reflections during the 
European Trip (see Section 2). Even such moderates as Lin Yutang 林語堂 
(1895-1976) also turned cynical towards Tagore: “When one lives in a ruined 
country, it is quite natural that (s)he would feel subdued and depressed…if (s)he 
is unable, or unwilling, to embark on assassination, revolution, passive protest, 
or constitutional reform, then a final, boring alternative would be spiritual 
consolation!”63 Historically speaking, while Tagore’s message might have had 
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62 Ibid., p.252. 
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healing power for a Europe ravaged by WWI, it could do very little to help China 
avoid imminent collapse, due to both internal and external pressures, in the 
early 20th century.  
From the examples above, it is clear that the criticisms of Tagore made by 
Chinese intellectuals were totally different in nature from their criticisms of 
Dewey and Russell. While explanations of this difference will be given later, 
here a common fact must be pointed out: that is, despite the alleged character of 
the Renaissance or the Enlightenment, China during the May Fourth era did 
not have genuine interest in fundamental theories or principles on the whole. 
Chinese intellectuals tended to judge complicated ideas according to political 
criteria, so the three visitors were all more or less involved in disputations of 
different scales. Furthermore, during the period from Dewey’s arrival in 1919 to 
Tagore’s departure in 1924, Chinese society was overwhelmed by ideologies, 
with the leftists gaining the strongest momentum. This tendency is well 
exemplified in the two introductions to the collection of polemic essays, “Science 
and the Philosophy of Life,” by Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, respectively (the 
“debate between science and the philosophy of life” took place in 1923). Hu Shi 
adhered to his optimism that scientific methodology could lead to a thorough 
understanding of human psychology; Chen Duxiu went further to claim that all 
philosophies of life were mere products of socio-economic environments, with 
which Hu did not agree. Thus Hu and Chen also traded fire in their 
introductions to the volume.64 
 
5 .5  Ripples in  May Fourth Intel lectual  Trends 
 
As explicated earlier, this chapter focuses on the civilizational discourse of 
Dewey, Russell, and Tagore without elaborating on their philosophies. As for the 
responses they received from China, only the debates they aroused are treated 
here, with the myriad introductions, acclamations, and analyses being omitted. 
Such a focus allows us to discern major tendencies in the Chinese intellectual 
world during the May Fourth era. As Lin Yu-sheng 林毓生 claims:  
                                                                                                                                             
文學史的人對於貴推該怎樣想呢  (How Should a Scholar of Literary History Think about 
Goethe?), in Sun Yixue ed., Shiren de jingshen: Taigeer zai Zhongguo, p.287. 
64 For Chen’s and Hu’s introductions, see Zhang Junmai, Ding Wenjiang 丁文江  et al., 
Kexue yu renshengguan 科學與人生觀 (Science of the Philosophy of Life) (Jinan: Shandong 
People’s Publishing Hose, 1997), pp.1-8, 9-25. Hu Shi wrote another response to Chen Duxiu, 
see pp.26-28; Chen also replied to Hu, see pp.28-32. 
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What was the May Fourth spirit? It was a sense of mission towards 
world affairs that was specific to Chinese intellectuals…Its 
fundamental objective was to make the country strong and 
wealthy…The May Fourth Movement was a patriotic movement guided 
by the principles of reason, humanity, and development of a rich 
civilization, so it was inseparable from the pursuit of freedom, 
democracy, rule of law, and science.…The substance of May Fourth 
thought, however, failed to detach itself from the monistic mode of 
thinking of traditional China, which was responsible for the formalistic 
total rejection of tradition.65 
 
Bearing a sense of mission towards the world to achieve the objectives of 
freedom, democracy, rule of law, and science, May Fourth intellectuals were so 
paradoxically influenced by the monistic thinking deep-rooted in the Chinese 
psyche that they sided with a wholesale rejection of tradition.66 Politically, 
living in a country devastated by both domestic struggles and imperialist 
exploitation, witnessing the collapse of the capitalist social order of Western 
Europe and being encouraged by the success of the Soviet Revolution, many 
young Chinese turned resolutely to Marxism, which claimed for itself a status of 
scientific truth. As a result, Chinese youth brandished Marxism to break with 
tradition. This sharp turn in modern Chinese thought—arguably the country’s 
most significant—is a topic that has been studied extensively. What is relevant 
to this chapter is that the “tradition” that May Fourth intellectuals rejected was 
an abstract idea, which means their target of criticism was not limited to China, 
but included all non-modern Western cultures. To cite Chen Duxiu’s comment: 
“Because Eastern people are so accustomed to… a pacifism that is suitable to 
slaves, the Indians and Malays are still living a life whereby they eat with one 
hand and wipe excrement with the other; and the Chinese feel gratified for 
alternate subjugations by armies and bandits; all Asian nations have endured 
                                                   
65 Lin Yu-sheng, “Wusi fanchuantong sixiang yu Zhongguo yishi de weiji” 五四式反傳統思想
與中國意識的危機 (The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Era), 
in Sixiang yu renwu 思想與人物 (Ideas and Persons) (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 1983), 
pp.122-124.  
66 See Lin Yu-sheng, “Wusi shidai de jilie fanchuantong sixiang yu Zhongguo ziyouzhuyi de 
qiantu” 五四時代的激烈反傳統思想與中國自由主義的前途  (Anti-traditionalism during the 
May Fourth Era and the Future Prospects of Liberalism in China), in ibid., pp.139-196. 
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the exploitation of Britain, America, the Netherlands, and France without much 
agitation.”67 This remark gives us a clear understanding why Tagore was the 
most criticized among the three luminaries, and why the leftists were the most 
vigorous in such criticisms.  
First of all, Tagore repeatedly claimed to be a poet who came to China for a 
spiritual bond, a theme that would definitely not appeal to most May Fourth 
intellectuals. Secondly, Tagore came from an India under British rule but hailed 
a spiritual civilization while bearing Western laurels, which inevitably seemed 
paradoxical or even absurd to the Chinese people, who were eager to save their 
country from collapse.68 Given this stereotype of Tagore as traditionalist or 
spiritualist, some of his Chinese friends urged him to relate to audiences his 
deep involvement in Bengali social movements. Accordingly, in one of his 
lectures in Beijing, Tagore gave an account of how his family had participated in 
the three major movements—religious, literary, and political—of the Bengal 
region since the 19th century. Tagore said: “Almost from my boyhood I have been 
accustomed to hear[ing] from my own countrymen angry remonstrances that I 
was too crassly modern…For your people I am obsolete, and therefore 
useless…”69 The latter half of the remark finds excellent testimony in Shen 
Zemin’s 沈澤民 (1900-1933, a younger brother of Shen Yanbin) comment:  
 
In India, Tagore has already become a stubborn conservative. By this 
term I don’t mean that Tagore is the counterpart of our Gu Hongming 
[辜鴻銘, 1857-1928] or Kang Youwei [康有為, 1858-1927]; but he is at 
least a Liang Qichao or Zhang Junmai in India. In the “debate between 
metaphysics and science” [i.e. the debate between science and the 
philosophy of life], Zhang Junmai made clear his metaphysical stance 
and asserted independence of spirit. Tagore goes even further; he 
believes in the existence of God.70 
 
                                                   
67  Chen Duxiu, “Taigeer yu dongfang wenhua” 太戈爾與東方文化  (Tagore and Eastern 
Culture), in Ren Jianshu et al. eds., Chen Duxiu zhuzuoxuan, Vol.2, p.657. 
68 Actually, Tagore’s mysticism alienated Russell as well. See Krishna Dutta and Andrew 
Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man, pp.175-178. 
69 Rabindranath Tagore, Talks in China, in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Volume IV: Essays, p.773. 
70 Shen Zemin, “Taigeer yu Zhongguo qingnian” 泰戈爾與中國青年  (Tagore and Chinese 
Youths), in Shen Yihong 沈益洪 ed., Taigeer tan Zhongguo 泰戈爾談中國 (Tagore on China) 
(Hangzhou: Zhejiang Literary Press, 2001), pp.154-155. 
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In fact, Tagore has long been known as a revolutionist in India for his 
groundbreaking contributions to literature, painting, songwriting, social 
criticism, and educational reform. But the problem is that Tagore earned his 
reputation from a West that was becoming anti-war and anti-science, which 
found consolation in Tagore the spiritualist rather than Tagore the Renaissance 
man. It was a time when Western influence on China had reached an 
unprecedented intensity, so such a biased image of Tagore in the West was also 
shared by the Chinese. Very few people bothered to understand Tagore’s life 
experiences, even fewer (perhaps none) were able to appreciate Tagore’s talents 
in the Bengali language. 
In contrast, as Western thinkers, Dewey and Russell found ready 
acceptance in China. While the best of their theories were beyond the grasp of 
most contemporary Chinese, their observations and political views on China 
elicited much discussion, with the strongest opinions issuing from the leftists. 
Even Jiang Menglin, Dewey’s former student, ignored Russell’s elaboration of 
mathematical logic and concluded: “Russell inspired interest in our youth in the 
principles of social evolution. Further studies of these principles of evolution 
made them oppose religion and imperialism at the same time.”71 However large 
an audience Dewey and Russell attracted, what ensued was radicalization of 
Chinese youth quite apart from any influence Dewey and Russell might have 
had, as is well recapitulated by Li Zehou 李澤厚:  
 
The macro trend mattered more than individual influences. Although 
Dewey and Russell came to China and their lectures caused a sensation, 
our impatient and progressive-minded youth were more agitated by the 
simplistic and superficial knowledge of Marxism that had been 
introduced to them; they established or joined the Chinese Communist 
Party, marching towards factories, mines, and rural villages, putting 
into practice the doctrine of “class struggle.”72 
 
Of course, there were other responses, some quite friendly and intellectual, 
to these notable foreign figures. For example, Liang Shuming 梁 漱 溟 
                                                   
71 Jiang Menglin, Xichao, p.140. 
72 Li Zehou, “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou” in On the Intellectual History of 
Modern China, p.24. 
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(1893-1988) examines the terms of “creative impulse” and “possessive impulse” 
coined by Russell in his East-West Cultures and Their Philosophies, expanding 
on the “philosophy of love” advocated by Tagore and comparing it to Confucian 
thought;73 the romantic poet Xu Zhimo 徐志摩 (1897-1931) described Russell’s 
penetrating views and words as lightning and thunderbolts and Tagore’s 
personality as the “sunrise on Mount Tai;” 74  Liang Qichao compared both 
Dewey and Tagore to the great Buddhist monk Kumārajīva (334-413) who went 
to China more than a millennium earlier.75 Hu Shi’s admiration for Dewey 
needs no further explanation. Although he did not favor Tagore’s thesis of 
Eastern civilization, he highly praised Tagore’s achievements in revolutionizing 
Bengali literature, as Hu himself pioneered the vernacular Chinese movement 
in the 1910s.76 
Among the aforementioned persons, both Liang Qichao and Hu Shi held 
considerable social sway, but their views did not become the mainstream. To 
sum up, after the May Fourth Movement, the tendency of “focusing on ‘saving 
the country’ rather than ‘enlightening’” ( 救 亡 壓 倒 啓 蒙 ), 77  namely, the 
preference for revolutionary rather than educational projects, seems to have 
been well reflected by Chinese attitudes towards famous foreign visitors. 
A final point here. In the context of world politics in the early 20th century, 
when Dewey, Russell, and Tagore spoke of Chinese culture, they often referred 
to Japan in conjunction with the West as an example of a successful, modernized 
country east of China. One of the main differences between their lectures in 
China and Japan was the adoption of “Asia” as a cognitive or analytical category. 
In China, Dewey and Russell rarely referred to “Asia” in recognizing China’s 
distinct civilization and its modern predicament. A broad East-West framework 
                                                   
73 Liang Shuming, Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue 東西文化及其哲學 (East-West Cultures and 
Their Philosophies) (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 2002), pp.227-230, 233-234. 
74 Xu Zhimo, “Ruosu youlai shuohua le” 羅素又來説話了 (Russell Comes to Speak Again), in 
Xu Zhimo quanji 徐志摩全集  (Complete Works of Xu Zhimo) (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s 
Publishing House, 2005), Vol.1, pp.364-374; “Taishan richu” 泰山日出 (Sunrise on Mount 
Tai), in ibid., pp.311-313.  
75 “Wutuanti gongjian Duwei xishang zhi yanlun” 五團體公餞杜威席上之言論 (Address at 
the Farewell Party for Dewey Co-hosted by Five Institutions), in Zhang Baogui, 
Shiyongzhuyi zhi wojian: Duwei zai Zhongguo, p.21; Liang Qichao, “Indu yu 
Zhongguowenhua zhi qinshude guanxi” 印度與中國文化之親屬的關係  (Kinship between 
Indian and Chinese Cultures), in Yinbingshi heji, Wenji, no.41, p.46. 
76 “Taigeer zaijing zuihou zhi jiangyan,” in Sun Yixue ed., Shiren de jingshen: Taigeer zai 
Zhongguo, p.65; Hu Shi, “Zhuiyi Taigeer zai Zhongguo” 追憶太戈爾在中國 (Remembering 
Tagore in China), in Ouyang Zhesheng ed., Hu Shi wenji, Vol.7, p.626.  
77 Also see Li Zehou, “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou,” in Xiandai Zhongguo 
sixiang shilun, pp.1-46. 
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sufficed for their arguments. In Japan, however, the term “Asia” frequently 
appeared in their discourse. Historically speaking, what Dewey and Russell 
were addressing in the late 1910s and early 1920s was a Japan that had 
emerged victorious from WWI and become the leading non-Western country on 
the world stage. The notion of pan-Asianism was rapidly gaining credence in 
Japan—in contrast to the country’s previous policy of “leave Asia, enter Europe” 
(脱亜入欧)—to seek unification of Asia against Western hegemony. Dewey and 
Russell were not necessarily aware of the historical details, but their reference 
to “Asia” followed in a similar ideological vein. Being unable to deny the 
geographical fact that both China and Japan are Eastern countries, as shown in 
Chapter 3, Dewey and Russell simply denied Japan an Asian character by 
defining such a character as mainly continental. By making this distinction, 
both philosophers found it easier to explain Japan’s imperialism, and focused 
their generalizations of Eastern civilization on the eastern part of Eurasia. 
Simply put, inclusion or exclusion of Japan from the category of “Asia” was 
essentially a conceptual manipulation, much more so than the “East” was a 
category of real geographical meaning. This issue was further complicated by 
Tagore. As a fervent protagonist in Asian unity, Japan was indispensable to 
Tagore’s civilizational map as it was the only country able to prove that the East 
was capable of self-transformation into modernity. To dovetail his discourse 
with reality, Tagore reproached Japan’s foreign aggression but regarded it as an 
evil based on the modern Western model, which could only be tamed by the 
humanistic spirit of the ancient East (represented by China and India). 
Needless to say, Tagore’s grand narrative is theoretically shaky and his effort to 
solve its contradictions was never satisfactory. Nevertheless, by contextualizing 
both “the East” and “Asia” as a non-Western paradigm, Tagore’s rather wishful 
civilizational vision made clear one critical point: what underlay the issue of 
Chinese or Japanese or Eastern or Asian identity was the challenge of 
West-centric modernity. Many of the previous chapters have touched upon this 
issue; theoretical discussions will be found in the two chapters in Part IV. 
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6. “Tagore and China” Reconsidered:  
Starting from a Conversation with Feng Youlan 
 
 
6 .1  Reflect ion upon Studies on “Tagore and China” 
 
2011 was the 150th anniversary of the birth of Rabindranath Tagore. To 
celebrate this cultural event, the Indian government, as well as organizations 
all over the world, has hosted a considerable number of activities in the past few 
years, hoping to disseminate the artistic and intellectual legacies Tagore left to 
us. 
Rabindranath Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913, 
after which he received numerous invitations from many countries and 
embarked on a life of lecturing around the world. As India was under British 
colonial rule, and WWI caused unprecedented damage to human society, one of 
the fundamental themes of Tagore’s lectures was to propose the spiritual 
civilization of the East as a remedy to the collapsing materialistic civilization of 
the West. In view of this history, when academics around the world celebrated 
the 150th anniversary of Tagore nearly a century later, a frequent focus was on 
Tagore’s ideal of Asia, especially on the similarities and differences between the 
revival of Asian cultures Tagore predicted in the early 20th century and the rise 
of Asia in the age of globalization.  
In China, Tagore studies also reached a peak in 2011. A review of relevant 
studies in the past hundred years shows that there are several phases in this 
field. First of all, Tagore’s name became widely known to the Chinese after he 
received the Nobel Prize in 1913. Introduction to him and translations of his 
works began in a fragmentary manner.1 These preparatory works paved the 
way for Tagore studies to gain momentum in the 1920s, and reached a climax 
when Tagore visited China in 1924. However, Tagore’s lectures on spiritual 
civilization displeased many anti-traditionalists and pro-Westernization 
activists, thus involving him unwittingly in a cultural debate that began in the 
late 1910s in China. Under the circumstances, both parties for and against 
                                                   
1 Many scholars point out that the first article introducing Tagore to the Chinese people 
appeared in 1913, which was “Tagore’s View of Life” by Qian Zhixiu published in The Eastern 
Miscellany. In 1915, Chen Duxiu translated four poems from Gitanjali and published them in 
La Jeunesse.  
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Tagore issued emotional remarks that obstructed a clear understanding of the 
Indian poet thinker. Furthermore, since China was devastated by foreign 
imperialist exploitation and by a struggle for power between warlords 
domestically, very little interest was shown in Tagore after his trip, not to 
mention any systematic research. With normalization of the relationship 
between China and India, and several visits by Zhou Enlai 周恩來 (1898-1976) 
to the latter in the 1950s, Tagore as a pioneer of cultural interaction between 
modern China and India came into the limelight again. In 1961, while Tagore’s 
100th birth anniversary was being celebrated, there arose another “Tagore fever” 
in Chinese academia and the press. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 
1976, there has been a veritable stream of Tagore studies. However, it was not 
until the turn of the 21st century that the frequency of related discussions 
increased. This new interest is attributable to the endeavor of contemporary 
Chinese scholars to reevaluate significant cultural events and intellectual 
resources in the modern era. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it is the rise of 
China and India and the problems of cultural interaction involved in the 
bilateral relationship that are the principal causes of the rekindling of fervor for 
Tagore studies in China. 
After a brief review of studies on Tagore in China, a critical conclusion 
must be drawn—which also constitutes the core issue of this chapter—that they 
have not belonged to the field of “Tagore studies” in the strict sense. Instead, 
they can be better categorized as branches of “Chinese studies,” such as “Tagore 
and China” and a relevant topic of “cultural interaction between China and 
India.” Accordingly, those discussions come closer to cultural history, with 
intellectual issues drawing less attention. While not preventing Chinese 
scholars from attaining in-depth understanding of Tagore’s thought, this 
orientation of research is rooted in an intriguing fact: the mode of interpreting 
Tagore by Chinese intellectuals has been largely based on the message he sent 
to China in 1924. That is to say, when Tagore spoke to Chinese audiences and 
proposed an idealized Eastern civilization, what he repeated time and again was 
that Chinese culture is fundamentally humane and that cultural interaction 
between China and India had existed for millennia. Therefore, during the 
process in which Tagore propagandized “the East,” he “Easternized” or even 
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“provincialized” his own image.2 A more comprehensive grasp of Tagore’s life 
activities—literature, music, painting, religion, philosophy, education, politics, 
village reformation, etc.—and close reading of Tagore’s conversations with 
prominent Western intellectuals show how immense and inspiring his thought 
is. For example, a biography published in 1995, Rabindranath Tagore: The 
Myriad-Minded Man, lays great stress on the versatility of Tagore’s mind.3 
Nonetheless, owing to many environmental and personal factors, Tagore 
restricted his speeches in China to certain topics, 4  which gave rise to an 
unfortunate result: “the East” or “Asia” occupies too large a portion of his 
message to China, thus eclipsing other aspects of his thought worthy of 
attention. It is almost natural that the Chinese people bear a long-term 
misunderstanding toward Tagore, and the frame of research derived thereof 
suffers from rigidity to a certain degree. 
As previously described, studies on Tagore in contemporary Chinese 
academia have two principal foci, “Tagore and China” and “cultural interaction 
between China and India,” which crystallize into two interrelated research 
paradigms.5 Concerning the former, as early as 1961, Ji Xianlin 季羨林 wrote a 
long essay entitled “Tagore and China: In Memory of the Centenary of Tagore,” 
                                                   
2 A critical issue here is how those Chinese intellectuals who were most welcoming of Tagore 
created a public image of the latter to meet their own needs. There are many observations. 
For example, the great leftist writer Lu Xun commented in 1934 that “had our poets not 
made him [i.e. Tagore] a living god, our youth should not have been so distant from him…” 
See his “Masha yu pengsha,” in Lu Xun quanji, Vol.5, pp.615-617.  
3 Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man. 
4 For instance, Tagore enjoyed tremendous popularity in Europe, which was the result of his 
proposition of spiritual civilization of the East satisfying the psychological need of his 
audiences. Consequently, he made the same appeal in China. Furthermore, the devastation 
caused by WWI also convinced Tagore that it was best for the Chinese people to return to 
their humanistic tradition. Therefore, Tagore’s praise of science was not fully echoed in his 
speeches made in China. There are many discussions on this point; a recent, brief analysis 
can be found in: Amartya Sen, “Tagore and China,” in Tan Chung and Amiya Dev eds., 
Tagore and China, pp.3-10. 
5 It is noteworthy that Tagore’s initial influence on China was felt in the New Literature 
Movement in the 1910s and 1920s. Indeed, literature was the most palpable connection 
between the Indian poet and his Chinese admirers, a fact that has never failed to draw 
critical attention. However, given the intellectual milieu of late twentieth-century China 
described above, literature is not a main contributor to the resurging interest in Tagore and 
thus hardly forms a research paradigm. For a general discussion of this literary connection, 
see Zhang Yu 張羽, Taigeer yu Zhongguo xiandaiwenxue 泰戈爾與中國現代文學 (Tagore and 
Modern Chinese Literature) (Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 2005). A 
miscellany of analyses of Tagore’s literature, thought, cultural inheritance and influence is 
Wei Liming’s 魏麗明  “Wanshi de luren” Taigeer: cong Shipo, Yiesu, Shashibiya dao 
Zhongguo「萬世的旅人」泰戈爾―從濕婆、耶穌、莎士比亞到中國 (Tagore the “Traveler of Ten 
Thousand Generations”: from Shiva, Jesus, Shakespeare to China) (Beijing: Chinese 
Compilation & Translation Press, 2011). Interestingly, neither author ignores the ideological 
disputations that Tagore aroused in China in 1924.  
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which is one of the earliest articles reflecting upon Tagore’s visit to China and 
its concomitant lessons. 6 As yet the most exhaustive study on Tagore’s lectures 
made in Asian countries (including China, Japan, and India) and their 
respective responses to his message is Stephen Hay’s Asian Ideas of East and 
West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India published in 1970.7 
Drawing on a profusion of primary sources, Hay’s perspective has been largely 
adopted by later Chinese scholars; that is, their focus remains on Tagore’s 1924 
trip to China and the disputations he aroused there, with varying degrees of 
precision of detail. Ai Dan’s Debating and Discussing: Tagore in China (sic.) is a 
recent example. The author traces the history of Tagore studies in China, 
expanding on the itinerary of Tagore’s 1924 visit and on his interaction with 
several leading intellectuals in early twentieth-century China. While this book 
is worth referencing, it overlaps many previous studies; the sections on 
intellectual background and future prospects would benefit from more insight. 
The author states that “for over half a century, studies on ‘Tagore and China’ 
have produced significant results;” she also points out some limitations inherent 
in existing research. However, in repeating chronological details and superficial 
differences between Tagore’s thought and that of contemporary Chinese 
intellectuals, this work is not immune from those very drawbacks.8 
On the other hand, studies on “cultural interaction between China and 
India” must be placed within the context of the rise of Asia, with Tagore 
considered a pioneer in reconnecting the two countries in the modern era. There 
are some representative works in this field, such as Across the Himalayan Gap: 
An Indian Quest for Understanding China published in 1998,9 and CHINIDA: 
Idealism and Realization, published in 2007.10 In August, 2010, a conference 
entitled “Understanding Tagore: New Perspectives and New Research” was 
convened at Peking University, and the collection of papers that resulted were 
                                                   
6 Ji Xianlin, “Taigeer yu Zhongguo: jinian Taigeer dansheng yibai zhounian,” in Ji Xianlin 
wenji, Vol.5, pp.180-213. 
7 Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and 
India. 
8 Ai Dan, Taigeer yu wusishiqi de shixiangwenhua lunzheng, pp.15-17. Those limitations 
include: 1. duplication of research; 2. narrowness of research perspectives; 3. unvarying 
research methods.  
9 Tan Chung ed., Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China. 
This book has a later, parallel Chinese volume, that is, Zhang Minqiu 張敏秋 ed., Kuayue 
Ximalaya zhangai: Zhongguo xunqiu liaojie Indu 跨越喜馬拉雅障礙―中國尋求了解印度 
(Across the Himalayan Gap: A Chinese Quest for Understanding India) (Chongqing: 
Chongqing Publishing House, 2006). 
10 Tang Chung ed., Zhong-In datong: lixiang yu shixian. 
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published in 2011 under the title of Tagore and China.11 The contributors to 
this volume are the current leading scholars on Tagore studies. Besides 
continuing to explore the relationship between Tagore and China, some authors 
even attempt to establish a new paradigm of civilizational discourse based on 
the long cultural interaction between China and India. In addition, in Taiwan, a 
research group headed by Shih Chih-Yu 石之瑜, professor of the Department 
and Institute of Political Science, National Taiwan University, has published 
many studies on Tagore’s ideal of Asia and the prospects it provides for the 
Sino-Indian relationship in the 21st century.12 
All the research mentioned above is conducive to a better understanding of 
Tagore, and is evidence that the single topic of “Tagore and China,” if 
thoroughly probed and connected with relevant issues, showcases the 
complexity of Tagore’s intellectual activities. 13  Complementing previous 
research, this chapter shifts the focus to the intellectual world of early 
twentieth-century China through a refraction of Tagore. To achieve this goal, I 
dispose of the conventional frame of argument and construct a space of 
civilizational discourse that differs from the ideological debate that occurred 
when Tagore visited China. By referring to a different set of texts, it is hoped 
that some hitherto hidden dimensions of this significant cultural event can be 
revealed.  
 
6 .2  The Conversation between Tagore and Feng Youlan 
 
At the end of 1920, Tagore went to America for several months to raise 
funds for Visva-Bharati, the university he was to establish to further cultural 
interaction between the East and the West. During Tagore’s stay in New York, 
Feng Youlan, who was studying for a PhD degree at Columbia University and 
was to become one of the leading philosophers of modern China, went to visit 
                                                   
11 Tan Chung and Amiya Dev eds., Tagore and China. This book was published in an 
English-Chinese bilingual version in China in 2011. 
12  Huang Wei-Lin’s master thesis, Wenmingchayi yu xiandaixing: Taigeer de 
zhengzhilixiang jiqi dui Zhongguowenming de qipan, is one of the examples. A brief 
discussion of this book can be found in Chapter 1.  
13 Besides the two main problematics specified above, that is, historical reconstruction of the 
1924 disputations and great expectations of a closer relationship between China and India, 
Tagore’s criticism of West-centric modernity and materialistic culture also proves a 
thought-provoking issue for rapidly developing China in the 21st century. An example of such 
reflection is Zhang Rulun’s 張汝倫 “Ruguo Taigeer jintian laihua” 如果泰戈爾今天來華 (If 
Tagore Visited China Today), in Dushu 讀書 (Reading), No.384 (March, 2011), pp. 28-36. 
 146 
Tagore and ask his opinion about the differences between Eastern and Western 
civilizations. They conversed in English, but Feng recorded the content in 
Chinese and published the dialogue in a journal in China in 1921 (referred to as 
“Conversation” hereafter). The account is not long but many philosophical issues 
are touched upon therein. Here I will summarize “Conversation” and leave my 
analyses to the next section.  
To begin with, Feng Youlan explained the motivation for his visit: 
 
Since I came to America, I have been interested in comparing 
everything foreign with that of China. At first I compared only 
concrete, individual things, which I then extended to abstract, 
general things. Finally those comparisons crystallized into an 
overarching one, that is, a comparison between Eastern and Western 
civilizations…In the Peking University Daily I received days ago 
there was a lecture given by Liang Shuming on East-West 
Civilizations and Their Philosophies. Unfortunately only the 
introduction was given. To my pleasant surprise, Tagore, who is from 
India, is now in New York. As he is currently a leading figure in the 
East, what he has to say about this question can represent what a 
majority of Easterners think…14 
 
The record of their conversation follows, starting with Tagore’s expression 
of his long-standing wish to visit China, and his heartfelt welcome of the young 
Chinese. After exchanging greetings, Feng Youlan opened their philosophical 
dialogue with the statement: 
 
Although the civilization of ancient China was brilliant, it is outmoded 
now. In recent years, we have a new movement to reform everything 
old in China—philosophy, literature, art, and all social 
institutions—to adapt the country to the modern world…15 
 
To this Tagore replied:  
                                                   
14 Feng Youlan, “Yu Indu Taiguer tanhua: dongxiwenming zhi bijiaoguan,” in Sansongtang 
quanji, Vol.11, p.3. 
15 Ibid., p.4. 
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Adaptation is urgent indeed...Western civilization prospers because 
its force is concentrated…On the other hand, our Eastern countries 
are scattered, do not study each other, and do not seek cooperation; 
therefore, Eastern civilization declines day by day. I am in America 
this time in order to raise funds for a university that will conduct 
focused studies on Eastern civilization. What to preserve and what to 
abolish must be decided by our own judgment and through our own 
research. We cannot be blindly influenced by Westerners…16 
 
Afterwards, Feng delved into a deeper philosophical inquiry stemming 
from the general discussion on civilization:  
 
Recently a question has been lingering in my mind, that is, whether 
the difference between Eastern and Western civilizations is a 
difference of degree, or a difference of kind?17 (Feng’s own English 
expressions are in italics; the same afterwards) 
 
Tagore’s response is as follows: 
 
I can answer this question. It is a difference of kind. The purpose of 
life in the West is “activity,” whereas in the East it is “realization.” 
Westerners look to activity and progress without a definite aim ahead, 
so their activities gradually come to be unbalanced…According to 
Eastern philosophy, truth is intrinsic to human beings but is 
temporarily covered over. Once we remove the cover, truth will come 
to light.18 
 
“The way of learning requires daily accruement; the way of the Dao 
requires daily reduction.” Feng immediately cited two lines from Laozi 老子 to 
interpret Tagore’s views and then confirmed: “Western civilization is ‘daily 
accruement,’ while Eastern civilization is ‘daily reduction.” Is that correct?”19 
                                                   
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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Tagore agreed with the analogy and elaborated further: 
 
The drawback of Eastern life is that it is too passive. Isn’t it a 
disadvantage that comes with “daily reduction”? Being too passive is 
undeniable, but it is also part of truth. Truth consists of both active 
and passive sides. For instance, voice is passive and singing is 
active…The active changes ceaselessly but the passive remains 
constant…Eastern civilization is like voice and Western civilization 
is like singing, both of which are indispensable…Now what the East 
can contribute to the West is “wisdom,” while the West can contribute 
“activity” to the East.20 
 
Then Feng applied conventional Chinese terms to Tagore’s remarks: “So 
we can call the passive ‘capacity’ and the active ‘action’.” Tagore approved of this 
analogy again.21 When evaluating the pros and cons of the real world, Tagore 
said that if reality is instrumental to mental creativity, then it is good; it is bad 
if obstructive to such creativity. But what really matters is how the human mind 
treats material things, which led to Tagore’s conclusion that “creation is not 
possible without the help of either mind or matter.”22 When Feng asked for 
advice for the Chinese people, Tagore replied: 
 
…I have only one piece of advice for China: “Learn science quickly.” 
What the East lacks and badly needs is science…China has had many 
inventors in its civilization; I firmly believe that such a great country 
can learn science and make contributions to it…23  
 
Finally, Feng politely inquired about how to help the establishment of the 
university, and Tagore made a simple reply; thus ended the conversation. 
However, Feng Youlan added two more paragraphs to the record as his own 
conclusion and self-reflection.  
 
                                                   
20  Ibid., p.5. There are at least three different ways of dividing this paragraph and 
attributing the words to Tagore or Feng, or both. This chapter follows the version included in 
the complete works of Feng Youlan, which is presumably more reliable.   
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., p.6. 
23 Ibid., pp.6-7. 
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…What Tagore says seems, at first glance, similar to the old Chinese 
slogan, “Chinese learning as capacity; Western learning for action.” 
But actually they are different…Tagore’s proposition is that there is 
only one truth that contains two sides, with the East inclined to the 
passive side and the West inclined to the active side. In other words, 
Tagore’s philosophy is monism, while the old view of China was 
dualism… 
 
I think that whatever Eastern civilization may come to be, it is worth 
studying. Why? Because its existence is a fact...After studying facts, 
we try to describe them in systematic ways to devise theories to 
interpret them. Such descriptions and interpretations constitute 
science. The East tends to ignore facts and talk vainly about theories, 
which is incompatible with the spirit of science. Now China is 
propagandizing those Western principles of democracy and 
Bolshevism, but very few people are addressing the problem of how to 
adapt China to them. Is this any different from our dull imperial 
examinations? We must study facts and devise theories to regulate 
them, which embodies exactly the spirit of the modern West!24 
 
There are two reasons for a faithful presentation of the 1920 conversation 
between the Indian and Chinese thinkers. Firstly, the content is full of 
philosophical depth. Secondly, references to this “Conversation” are surprisingly 
scarce. Even when mentioned occasionally in some articles, it serves as 
background for other arguments rather than constituting the issue in 
question.25 For example, Stephen Hay in his monograph has a brief analysis of 
the conversation, but his conclusion is misleading. He says that Feng “left the 
interview unmoved by Tagore’s appeal,”26 and then merges in Feng’s criticism 
of the Eastern inclination towards empty words, thereby proving his general 
observation that “those [students] specializing in academic philosophy proved as 
                                                   
24 Ibid., pp.7-8. 
25 There is an article entitled “Taigeer de Zhongguo qingjie: cong Feng Youlan yu Taigeer de 
tanhua shuoqi” 泰戈爾的中國情結―從馮友蘭與泰戈爾的談話説起 (Tagore's “China Affection”: 
A Conversation between Tagore and Feng Youlan) by Qian Gengsen 錢耕森, in Study of 
Sino-Western Culture, No.5 (June, 2004), pp.112-119. The title of the article is similar to the 
current chapter, but it does not deal with the issues of intellectual history. 
26 Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and 
India, p.236. 
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skeptical of his ideas as were their elders in this field.”27 Stephen Hay denied 
any depth to this conversation. Nonetheless, the citations above indicate that 
Feng Youlan showed no rejection of or contempt for Tagore. On the contrary, as 
he stated: “The right or wrong of Mr. Tagore’s opinion is another matter. What 
we should know is that such is the view of Eastern and Western civilizations 
held by the leading figure of the East.”28 It can be confirmed that Tagore’s 
notion of civilization, his approval of the analogy between Laozi and his own 
thought, and his monist philosophy had at least stimulated the formulation of 
Feng’s idea.  
Stephen Hay’s treatment is typical of scholarly conventions on “Tagore and 
China”: the issue is often approached from the perspective of disputations 
around Tagore in China with little attention paid to discursive complexity and 
intellectual context.29 As Tagore and Feng’s conversation was conducted at an 
earlier date, it bore no direct relation to the 1924 event. Furthermore, the 
philosophy-oriented content was also far from the ideological rivalries 
characterizing contemporary China. Therefore, “Conversation” failed to appeal 
to the Chinese public or to enhance their understanding of Tagore, whose 
complexity was seriously underestimated.  
As mentioned in the introduction, Tagore was responsible for the biased 
image of himself in China as an “ultra-conservative,” which here is understood 
as someone who adheres to tradition. Nevertheless, while it is true that Tagore’s 
speeches were narrowly focused on so-called Eastern civilization, his Chinese 
critics also filtered his message and found fault with the traditionalist-sounding 
parts. In any event, Chinese debates became ideology-ridden, against which this 
chapter proposes a new perspective to explore Tagore’s interaction with Chinese 
intellectuals, starting from his conversation with Feng Youlan. The choice of 
this starting point is justifiable. The fact that Feng was not an active polemicist 
in the several rounds of cultural debate in China from the 1910s to the 1930s, 
and that he is not a usual focus of studies on “Tagore and China” lend this study 
a somewhat objective position vis-à-vis the cultural ambience around the time of 
Tagore’s visit to China, and from the mainstream research paradigm developed 
                                                   
27 Ibid., p.234. 
28 Feng Youlan, “Yu Indu Taiguer tanhua: dongxiwenming zhi bijiaoguan,” in Sansongtang 
quanji, Vol.11, p.7.  
29 In “Tagore and China,” Amartya Sen criticizes this conventional approach and expects 
discussions of more sophistication; see note 4. Concerning the process of formulation of 
Tagore’s civilizational discourse, see Chapter 2. 
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thereafter. The space of discourse thus created will be different from the current 
framework of research in terms of both historical complexity and intellectual 
depth.  
 
6 .3  Network of  Thought Derived from the Conversation 
 
There is one point worth mentioning before delving into analysis of the 
conversation between Tagore and Feng Youlan. The only way for later 
generations to learn of this intellectual intercourse is through Feng’s own record 
in Chinese. Therefore, it is difficult to determine to what degree the content is 
shaped by Feng’s subjective thinking. Structurally speaking, Feng started the 
account with his own motives and ended it with his philosophical reflections; 
throughout the conversation he also tended to interpret Tagore’s remarks in 
traditional Chinese terms. It is precisely because of Feng’s involvement of 
Tagore in the formulation of his philosophical system that “Conversation” 
brilliantly sketches an episode in modern Chinese intellectual history, with 
Tagore’s interaction with contemporary Chinese and foreign thinkers serving to 
contextualize that episode within a broader current of thought. 
Remotely echoing the beginning of “Conversation,” in his late years Feng 
recalled in Autobiography of the Sansong Chamber (referred to as 
Autobiography hereafter) that the three years spent at Peking University 
brought him into the real world of knowledge, which was far beyond the realm of 
learning required by the imperial examination system: 
 
There is a contradiction between these two worlds, which derives from 
the contradiction between two cultures. This contradiction is visible 
throughout the early modern and modern history of China. Some 
people at that time did not recognize this contradiction to be between 
ancient and modern, old and new; instead, they considered it to be a 
contradiction between East and West, China and foreign countries. 
Eastern and Western cultures are different because their underlying 
philosophies are different.30 
 
Feng stated that in 1919 he received an official scholarship to study abroad 
                                                   
30 Feng Youlan, Sansongtang zixu, in Sansongtang quanji, Vol.1, p.171. 
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and was planning to enter Columbia University in New York: “I brought with 
me this problem—namely the reality of China—to America.” 31  This 
autobiographical account is very important. Although Feng was neither directly 
involved in the “debate on East-West cultures” around the time of the May 
Fourth Movement in 1919, nor did he participate in the “debate on science 
versus philosophy of life” in 1923, the contemporary cultural atmosphere of 
China had not only stimulated his own thinking but also shaped his later 
intellectual activities. This is why Feng went to visit Tagore when the latter 
visited the U.S. in 1920. Furthermore, the distinctions between “ancient and 
modern, old and new” and between “East and West, China and foreign 
countries” mentioned in Autobiography should correspond to the differences of 
“degree” and of “kind” respectively that appear in Feng’s conversation with 
Tagore. As for the comment that “Eastern and Western cultures are different 
because their underlying philosophies are different,” he points out in 
Autobiography that one of the representatives of such a view was Liang 
Shuming, the scholar whose lecture captivated Feng Youlan so much that he 
regretted that the whole text was not available, as described at the beginning of 
“Conversation.”  
In brief, Liang Shuming, in his East-West Cultures and Their Philosophies, 
specifies three different ways of life. “Firstly, going forward to fulfill one’s needs; 
secondly, changing, harmonizing, or tempering one’s needs; and thirdly, turning 
back to restrain one’s needs.”32 In his own view, the civilizations of the West, 
China, and India embodied the three ways of life, which differ from each other 
not in terms of quality, but in priorities given to each phase of cultural 
development. If a people are seeking to feed, shelter themselves, and overcome 
nature, they follow the Western way of life. As such pursuit of satisfaction of 
personal needs inevitably leads to desire, which makes life painful and overly 
calculating, then the Confucian—hence Chinese—attitude of adapting to even 
adverse circumstances becomes necessary to foster a well-balanced life 
temperament. Finally, after both material and emotional needs are met, there is 
the ultimate problem of death and continuity of life. Here, the Buddhist—hence 
Indian—way leads to the realization of the final truth.33 
                                                   
31 Ibid., p.172. 
32 Liang Shuming, Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue, p.68. 
33 Ibid., pp.249-252. 
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Feng Youlan’s interest in Liang Shuming was purely philosophical. As he 
states in Autobiography, “most of the many comments made at that time were 
mere demonstrations of the contradiction [between the two civilizations]; there 
were few extensive interpretations of the contradiction itself.” 34  Liang 
elucidated the spiritual and philosophical foundations of Eastern and Western 
civilizations, which certainly satisfied Feng Youlan intellectually. Feng paid 
lifelong homage to Liang. The latter’s East-West Cultures and Their 
Philosophies was published in 1921, and Feng wrote to him the next year to 
discuss it. They did not agree upon every point, but Feng’s praise of Liang 
remained extraordinary: “Whatever the disagreements between us, there are 
very few people except Sir [i.e. Liang Shuming] in today’s China who have real 
questions in mind and dare to answer them themselves. The publication of your 
book has added luster to Chinese academia.”35 That same year, Feng wrote an 
English review of Liang’s book, which ends with the following commendation: 
“Whether Buddhist or Confucian thought are exactly as he interprets, I think 
there is no one who will not feel moved by his creativity and rigorous 
argumentation. Mr. Liang has real insight, which justifies the existence of such 
a philosophical work.” 36  Even if Feng’s philosophical and political stances 
underwent a sea change after 1949, in his later work, A New History of Chinese 
Philosophy, he still evaluated Liang’s ideas in highly positive terms.37  
Apparently, for Liang, the difference between Eastern and Western 
civilizations was one of “kind” rather than of “degree.” He regarded the three 
ways that he had specified as representing fundamentally different views of life. 
Feng was also inclined to such interpretation in the 1920s, which is evidenced 
by his own accounts in “To Liang Shuming” and Autobiography. However, the 
most vivid substantiation of this view can be discerned in his conversation with 
Tagore. In the beginning, Feng said that traditional Chinese civilization failed 
to meet modern needs, and that in recent years Chinese intellectuals had been 
trying to totally reform tradition “to adapt the country to the modern world.” 
                                                   
34 Feng Youlan, Sansongtang zixu, in Sansongtang quanji, Vol.1, p.172. 
35 Feng Youlan, “Zhi Liang Shuming” 致梁漱溟 (To Liang Shuming), in Sansongtang quanji, 
Vol.14, p.591. 
36 Feng Youlan, “Ping Liang Shuming zhu Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue” 評梁漱溟著《東西文化
及其哲學》(Comment on Liang Shuming’s East-West Cultures and Their Philosophies) in 
Sansongtang quanji, Vol.11, p.57. 
37 Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexueshi xinbian 中國哲學史新編 (A New History of Chinese 
Philosophy), VII, in Sansongtang quanji, Vol.10, pp.543-552. 
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Tagore agreed that “adaptation” was urgently needed, but his proviso was that, 
concerning Eastern civilization, “what to preserve and what to abolish must be 
decided by our own judgment and through our own research.” This verbal 
exchange constitutes a momentous event in modern intellectual history: Feng’s 
focus was on tradition versus modernity, which was shifted to the East versus 
the West by Tagore, who went on to emphasize that “perhaps there is something 
wrong with our civilization, but how can we know that without serious study?”38 
Feng’s reference to Laozi also prompted Tagore’s comment that truth consists of 
active and passive sides, “both of which are indispensable.” This analysis makes 
it clear that both paragraphs of Feng’s self-reflection at the end of 
“Conversation” bear direct relation to Tagore’s remarks: Feng recognized the 
difference between the monism believed by Tagore and the old Chinese slogan, 
“Chinese learning as capacity; Western learning for action.” Besides, Feng’s 
conclusion that Eastern civilization should be studied echoed Tagore’s 
proposition. In any case, Tagore inspired or at least confirmed Feng’s own ideas; 
between the two men there was a resonance that Stephen Hay failed to perceive. 
As time progressed, Feng came to adopt a more abstract view to encompass the 
antitheses between tradition and modernity, the East and the West:  
 
In the late 1930s I also discussed similar questions [about Eastern 
and Western civilizations]…such discussion concerns a philosophical 
issue, that is, the relationship between the general and particular. A 
certain social type is general, but a country or nation is particular…It 
is possible as well as necessary to learn the general. In contrast, to 
learn the particular is impossible and unnecessary.39 
 
Nonetheless, around the time Tagore visited China in 1924, Feng Youlan 
was still obsessed with the question of whether Eastern and Western 
civilizations differ in “degree” or in “kind.” There is one point worth particular 
attention. What Feng compared with Tagore’s monism was the old theory of late 
nineteenth-century China (“Chinese learning as capacity; Western learning for 
action”) rather than the new theories that were formulated around the May 
                                                   
38 Feng Youlan, “Yu Indu Taiguer tanhua: dongxiwenming zhi bijiaoguan,” in Complete 
Works of the Sansong Chambe, Vol.11, p.4. 
39 Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexueshi xinbian, VII, in Sansongtang quanji, Vol.10, p.582. 
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Fourth Movement. In the 1910s and 1920s China experienced a fierce, 
large-scale debate on Eastern versus Western civilizations. The two main 
groups—the pro-Western side led by Chen Duxiu and the traditionalist or 
harmonizer side led by Du Yaquan 杜亞泉 (1873-1933)—criticized and even 
slandered each other in their respective magazines. However, Feng Youlan 
completely ignored these disputes in “Conversation.” One probable explanation 
is that he believed they were lacking in philosophical depth, just as he stresses 
in Autobiography that “most of the many comments made at that time were 
mere demonstrations of the contradiction.” This accounts for Feng’s high regard 
for Liang Shuming’s work, although he also indicated that Liang was often too 
subjective in drawing conclusions. Unfortunately, Tagore’s visit to China as a 
cultural event was part of that “contradiction,” which resulted in relevant 
studies on “Tagore and China” being restricted to the dispute that arose in 1924. 
A serious consequence was that not much historical complexity or intellectual 
insight has been attempted in research in this area ever since. 
Tagore’s advocacy of Eastern spiritual civilization in China contains the 
following statement: 
 
This age to which we belong, does it not still represent night in the 
human world, a world asleep, whilst individual races are shut up 
within their own limits, calling themselves nations[?]...This age, that 
still persists, must be described as the darkest age in human 
civilization. But I do not despair...Science also is truth. It has its own 
place, in the healing of the sick, and in the giving of more food, more 
leisure for life. But when it helps the strong to crush the 
weaker...their own weapons will be turned against them...Let the 
morning of this new age dawn in the East, from which the great 
streams of idealism have sprung in the past, making the fields of life 
fertile with their influence...40 
 
This statement encapsulates many critical points of Tagore’s civilizational 
discourse, including the dichotomies between nationalism and universalism, 
scientism and idealism, and so forth. Nevertheless, the most thought-provoking 
                                                   
40 Rabindranath Tagore, “Talks in China,” in Mohit K. Ray, ed., The English Writings of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Volume IV: Essays, pp.748-750. 
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aspect of his statement is that it upsets the conventional cognition of tradition 
and modernity. While Tagore firmly believed in the spiritual glory of the 
traditional East, he regarded the materialistic achievement of the West as less 
modern than brutal and dark; he predicted that true modernity would only come 
with revival of the ideals of the East.41 On this point, a similarity between 
Tagore’s and Liang Shuming’s philosophies is discernible, although their 
conclusions were quite different. From the previous discussion we know that 
Liang was by no means a simplistic cultural harmonizer. On the contrary, his 
theory is closer to cultural evolutionism, with the so-called “evolution” here a 
counterargument to the Western paradigm. By regarding the material 
achievements of the modern West as the first step to satisfying the needs of 
human life, Liang credited spiritual superiority to Eastern civilization. To him 
the problem of China and India was not stagnancy but precociousness; they 
prioritized spiritual pursuit over material desire, thus failing to improve their 
cultures in terms of technological progress. 42  Moreover, Liang in his book 
mentions Tagore several times. In his view, Tagore’s philosophy was different 
from the other-worldly and often passive thought that characterized Indian 
tradition, so it was inappropriate to consider him as representative of Indian 
culture.43 As Tagore preached the philosophy of love, which encouraged people 
to take part in human affairs without selfish calculation, Liang states that 
“although there is no seeming relationship between Tagore and Chinese 
philosophy, I would like to argue that he belongs to China, to the Confucian way 
of life.”44 While we do not have to agree with Liang’s argument, his observation 
is provocative. 
Judging from the analyses above, when we shift the focus of studies away 
from Tagore’s 1924 visit, a stimulating intellectual world behind the barrage of 
disputes can be unveiled. In the next section this network of thought will be 
expanded to encompass sources not exclusively Chinese to explore Tagore’s 
relevance to the intellectual history of the modern world.  
 
 
                                                   
41 Tagore made the same points in his speeches in Japan in 1916. See Chapter 3 for a 
detailed analysis.  
42 Liang Shuming, Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue, pp.287-288. 
43 Ibid., p.84. 
44 Ibid., p.234. 
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6.4  A Comparison of  Tagore with Chinese and Western Thinkers  
 
Naturally, Liang Shuming’s daring classification of world civilization drew 
many criticisms. As shown in the previous section, although an admirer of Liang, 
Feng Youlan did not completely agree with his view. Zhang Dongsun also 
pointed out that “the so-called East-West Cultures and Their Philosophies is 
merely a ‘discourse of Eastern and Western cultures from a philosophical 
viewpoint,’ which is different from the discourse of ethnical psychology.”45 
Zhang differentiated between culture and philosophy. While culture contains 
everything about the attitudes and modes of living of a people or nation, 
philosophy is the brainchild of a few thinkers; the two should not be mixed.  
Of all critical responses to Liang’s book, Hu Shi’s “Reading East-West 
Cultures and Their Philosophies by Mr. Liang Shuming” is the most influential. 
Hu’s comment is satirical, and rebuts Liang’s overarching philosophical 
induction with historical observations.46 There is another well-known essay by 
Hu Shi comparing Eastern and Western civilizations that starts with the 
following statement: 
 
The most groundless and vicious fallacy in vogue nowadays is the one 
that dismisses Western civilization as materialistic, and venerates 
Eastern civilization as spiritual…In recent years, the great war that 
ravaged Europe arouses a sense of disgust at the scientific culture of 
the modern world; that is why we hear oftentimes the eulogy of 
Eastern spiritual civilization from Western scholars.47 
 
This article was written in 1926, after the publication of Liang’s book and 
Tagore’s visit to China. Arguably, those who upheld the superiority of Eastern 
spirituality were targets of Hu’s criticism, including Liang and Tagore. After 
                                                   
45  Zhang Dongsun, “Du Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue” 讀《東西文化及其哲學》 (Reading 
East-West Cultures and Their Philosophies), in Chen Song 陳 崧 , ed., Wusiqianhou 
dongxiwenhuawenti lunzhanwenxuan 五四前後東西文化問題論戰文選 (Selected Articles on 
the Debate of East-West Cultures during the May Fourth Era) (Beijing: China Social 
Sciences Press, 1989), p.503.  
46 Hu Shi, “Du Liang Shuming xiansheng de Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue” 讀梁漱溟先生的《東
西文化及其哲學》(Reading East-West Cultures and Their Philosophies by Mr. Liang Shuming), 
in Ouyang Zhesheng ed., Hu Shi wenji, Vol.3, pp.182-197. 
47 Hu Shi, “Women duiyu jindai xiyangwenming de taidu” 我們對於近代西洋文明的態度 (Our 
Attitude toward Modern Western Civilization), in ibid., Vol.4, p.3. 
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contrasting Eastern and Western civilizations point by point, Hu concluded that 
“here we find an essential difference between Eastern and Western cultures: the 
former abandons itself by not thinking; the latter seeks truth persistently.”48 
Hu reached his conclusion of an East characterized by inertia versus a West 
characterized by progress by paralleling historical examples that are 
deliberately culled. Hu’s tone was also critical when he claimed that “such a 
civilization [i.e. Eastern civilization] that is dominated by material environment 
and that does not seek to break this environmental bondage is a civilization of 
indolent people, a civilization that is materialistic in the real sense.”49 Of course, 
Hu aimed his poignant remarks at the problems that were plaguing modern 
Chinese society and culture. However, his criticism of Liang’s cultural 
philosophy as “general and imprecise” was also based on subjective 
observations.  
During Tagore’s visit to China in 1924, as a committed liberal, Hu Shi 
defended Tagore from blasphemies that were deemed unsuitable toward a 
foreign guest. But when it came to philosophy, Hu showed no sympathy at all 
with Tagore’s thought. 
 
When I listen to Tagore’s praise of Eastern spiritual civilization, I 
always feel ashamed…What American audiences expect from a 
lecturer from the East is the kind of information given by Tagore; 
that is, criticism of the materialistic West and eulogy of the spiritual 
East…Indeed, Eastern civilization receives much harsher censure 
from me than from any Western critics, and my appreciation of 
modern Western civilization is higher than the self-evaluation of 
Westerners.50 
 
Hu Shi sided with “total Westernization” out of practical considerations: 
 
Those propositions of cultural eclecticism and Sino-centrism are 
nothing but vain talk. For the moment, we have no alternative but to 
try hard to totally accept the new civilization of this new world. Once 
                                                   
48 Ibid., p.7. 
49 Ibid., pp.12-13. 
50 Cited from Zhou Zhiping 周質平, Hu Shi yu Weiliansi 胡適與韋蓮司 (Hu Shi and Edith 
Clifford Williams) (Beijing: Peking UP, 1998), p.57. Translated back to English by myself. 
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it is totally accepted, the inertia of old culture will naturally make it 
an eclectic, harmonized new Sino-centric culture.51 
 
To this claim Feng Youlan retorted: 
 
It is not amazing that Hu Shi proposed “total Westernization.” But 
according to his words quoted here, the reason for his proposition of 
“total Westernization” is kind of special. It seems to me that he 
considered such a proposition to be a little extreme, too, but he also 
thought that only an extreme proposition can bring “Westernization” 
into balance. What the balance looks like he didn’t explain.52 
 
It is this lacuna—“he didn’t explain”—that confines Hu Shi’s comparison of 
Eastern and Western civilizations to historical critique or ideological debate, 
without raising itself to the level of a philosophical system.  
It might be safe to conclude that cultural debates in China in the 1920s 
consisted of at least two spaces of discourse. Some probed the “backwardness” of 
the East from a historical perspective, like Hu Shi, while others attempted to 
compare the essence of Eastern and Western civilizations, like Liang Shuming. 
Li Zehou describes the two major trends ushered in by the May Fourth 
Movement as the “duet of enlightening and saving the country,” and regards Hu 
Shi as the head of those who sought to enlighten China through educational, 
cultural, and scientific works.53 From the analysis above, it is clear that as 
opposition to those who followed the principles of class struggle and the 
proletarian revolution of Marx-Leninism to save China from ruin, there was 
more than one proposition for enlightening the country via intellectual 
endeavors.  
Another group that expressed opinions on these issues during the debate 
was the revivalists of Eastern culture headed by Liang Qichao. Witnessing the 
catastrophe brought by WWI and echoing the view held by some Westerners, 
they believed Chinese civilization could serve to remedy a Western civilization 
                                                   
51 Cited from Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexueshi xinbian, VII, in Sansongtang quanji, Vol.10, 
p.581. 
52 Ibid., pp.581-582. 
53 Li Zehou, “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou,” in Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang 
shilun, pp.37-38.  
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that had become bankrupt. Such an idea was dismissed not only by Hu Shi,54 
however, but also criticized by Liang Shuming.55 Nonetheless, in Liang Qichao’s 
Record of Reflections during the European Trip (published in 1920), there are 
some keen observations, such as the following: 
 
During the past century both the material and spiritual changes of 
Europe derived from the principle of the “development of the 
individual,” which is still being followed on a daily basis. A 
fundamental difference between such a [modern] civilization and the 
civilizations of ancient times, of the Middle Ages, and even of the 
eighteenth century is that the latter were aristocratic and passive, 
while the former is mass-oriented and self-propelled…Modern 
civilization is created by each average person in society through their 
own will. Therefore, although its “quality” may not equal past 
achievements at times, its “quantity” is much greater and the “force” 
much more continuous than before. In a word, everything in modern 
Europe is mass-oriented.56 
 
The reason for singling out this comment is that a critical historical 
juncture is touched upon, that is, the change from the “development of the 
individual” to the “mass-orientation” of European civilization. This observation 
contradicts that of Chen Duxiu. In an article published in 1915, Chen points out 
the differences between Eastern and Western civilizations, stating: “Western 
races are individual-based; Eastern races are family-based.” According to Chen, 
it is such an emphasis on individuals that propelled development in many fields: 
“ethics, morals, politics, laws―all that is desired by a society and pursued by a 
country is to protect and support the freedom, rights, and happiness of its 
individuals.”57 Here Chen Duxiu does not address the way Western societies 
concentrated and reinforced their power. On the other hand, although Liang 
                                                   
54 Hu Shi once commented that “such a theory derived from a pathetic mentality, but caters 
to the megalomania of Eastern nations and fuels the fire of the conservative force of the 
East.” See Hu Shi, “Women duiyu jindai xiyangwenming de taidu,” in Ouyang Zhesheng ed., 
Hu Shi wenji, Vol.4, p.3. 
55 Liang Shuming, Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue, p.16. 
56 Liang Qichao, Ouyou xinyinglu, in Yinbingshi heji, Wenji, No.23, p.16. 
57  Chen Duxiu, “Dongxi minzu genben sixiang zhi chayi” 東 西 民 族 根 本 思 想 之 差 異 
(Fundamental Differences of Thought between Eastern and Western Races), in Ren Jianshu 
et al. eds., Chen Duxiu zhuzuoxuan, Vol.1, p.166.  
 161 
Qichao was sensitive enough to grasp the trend, he gave no clear explanations 
for the phenomenon in the citation above. This mechanism of concentration, that 
is the West-originated system of the nation-state, is what Tagore criticized 
throughout his life. Tagore once said: 
 
Western civilization came into being because the power to rule was 
distributed among a whole people. There was an individual dignity, 
an individual consciousness of importance. Dictatorships put an end 
to such individuality.58 
 
Here Tagore was targeting the fascist government of Benito Mussolini 
(1883-1945). Although the comment is directed at a somewhat extreme form of 
government, criticism of West-originated nationalism represents a recurrent 
theme of Tagore’s lectures and writings. In Tagore’s view, the mechanism of the 
nation-state entails nothing but its own function and development, paying no 
regard to humanity and its ideals.59 It is nationalism that linked the egoism of 
individuals and the collective violence of nations (imperialism is the highest 
form of its development), characterizing what Tagore termed as materialist 
Western civilization. In a conversation with the British writer Herbert G. Wells 
(1866-1946), Tagore expressed concern that individual cultures would be effaced 
or made uniform, while Wells seemed optimistic that world cultures would 
inevitably converge, implying that heterogeneity is something that obstructs the 
convergence. 60  Although the conversation is too short to contain Wells’ 
perspective on world history and civilization, it can be said that what worried 
Tagore was always the egoism and nationalism―standing at the two ends of the 
same spectrum―of modern Western civilization, both of which Tagore perceived 
as lacking in love of and empathy with others.61 
A few examples have been drawn to show that Tagore was not a blind 
                                                   
58  Rabindranath Tagore, “Interview with F. L. Minigerode,” in Mohit K. Ray, ed., The 
English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VIII: Miscellaneous Writing, p.1234. 
59 Cf. Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism. 
60 Rabindranath Tagore, “H. G. Wells and Tagore,” in Mohit K. Ray, ed., The English 
Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VIII: Miscellaneous Writing, pp.1237-1241. 
61 It is well known that Liang Qichao was a strong supporter of nationalism to remedy the 
lack of unification of the Chinese people. Tagore, on the other hand, stressed the specificity of 
each race but insisted on his opposition to nationalism, which derived from modern Western 
history. Obviously, the difference in historical backgrounds between China and India obliged 
intellectuals in respective countries to adopt different views of nationalism. This issue 
deserves more discussion. 
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traditionalist; on the contrary, his criticism of modern Western civilization was 
chiefly based on humanistic rather than ideological grounds. Furthermore, 
Tagore was also rational enough to appreciate the merits of Western culture 
while censuring the parts that disenchanted him. Moreover, in one of his 
dialogues with the French novelist Romain Rolland, Tagore even remarked that 
the gravest problem of Indian religious culture is “an indiscriminate spirit of 
toleration that all forms of religious creeds and crudities have run riot in India, 
making it difficult for us to realize the true foundation of our spiritual faith.” 
Therefore a purge was deemed necessary by Tagore for India to return to its true 
spiritual heritage.62  As to the means for reform, Tagore believed that the 
introduction of scientific rationalism into India could probably be effective. Here 
Tagore showed a view similar to that of Hu Shi. Tagore thought that Indians 
“can never believe in mere intellectual determination for any long period of 
time,” but a temporary emphasis on science could serve to reverse the swing and 
lead to its final harmonization.63 Although this dialogue contained no specifics, 
Tagore put these ideas into practice through his long-term educational work. 
Thus viewed, it is clear that Tagore’s thought is broad enough to defy any 
simplification, which was not only well expressed but also put into action. 
Unfortunately, what is also obvious is that the richness of Tagore’s thought 
was largely manifested in the context of his interaction with Western 
intellectuals. As indicated in the introduction, in China, Tagore overemphasized 
the notion of the “East” and focused his discourse too narrowly, which also 
unwittingly involved him in the cultural debate long raging in China. Decades 
later, when researchers look back to the legacy left by Tagore, they are mainly 
concerned with his 1924 visit, comparing Tagore’s lectures with the views of 
Chinese polemicists, thus disregarding other peripheral but inspiring texts and 
failing to take Tagore’s interaction with the West into consideration. Critically, 
a thorough reexamination of Tagore’s relationship with modern Chinese 
intellectual history requires another study, that is, a comparison of Tagore with 
other foreign thinkers who also visited China in the 1920s such as Bertrand 
Russell and John Dewey, to explore their views of the East-West paradigm and 
their respective advice for a China struggling to modernize. This task has been 
                                                   
62 Rabindranath Tagore, “Romand Rolland and Tagore,” in Mohit K. Ray, ed., The English 
Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VIII: Miscellaneous Writing, p.1223. 
63 Ibid., p.1224. 
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undertaken in Chapter 5. 
 
6 .5  Future Prospects  for  Studies on “Tagore and China” 
 
In a 1922 letter from Feng Youlan to Liang Shuming, there is an 
observation that “although Tagore’s books are loved by general readers, very few 
references to him can been found in philosophical journals and discussions.”64 
Liang Shuming was also perceptive concerning the way Tagore became popular:  
 
His [i.e. Tagore’s] ability lies in his catering to the modern Western 
psyche. Westerners are suffering greatly from [too much] rationality, 
and he is able to save them with intuition…He is good at expressing 
intuition without resorting to rational arguments, so he talks nothing 
about philosophy but merely composes poetry…In this way, he moves 
people easily, improving their intuition and suppressing their 
rationality. Thus people do not bother to criticize the fallacies in his 
philosophy, but admire the nobility of his thought.65 
 
Tagore himself, however, always claimed to be a poet rather than a 
philosopher, not to mention a prophet. It has been shown that, during the 1920 
conversation, Tagore’s remarks left an impression on Feng Youlan. But when 
examining the development of his own philosophical system, Feng assigned no 
special role to Tagore and regarded him as a mere representative of the 
dichotomous view of spiritual versus materialistic civilizations.66Feng seems to 
have forgotten his earlier appreciation for Tagore’s monism; close reading of 
Tagore’s works shows that Feng’s later characterization is unfair. Admittedly, 
the aim of Tagore was not a delicate system of knowledge, but an integration of 
the human body, mind, and soul, and harmony between the spirit and the 
material. Nonetheless, Tagore’s conversation with Albert Einstein confirms the 
coherence of his humanistic thought, which is not less persuasive than the 
arguments of the great modern physicist.67 Therefore, when Hu Shi reduced 
                                                   
64 Feng Youlan, “Zhi Liang Shuming,” in Sansongtang quanji, Vol.14, p.590. 
65 Liang Shuming, Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue, p.234. 
66 Feng Youlan, Sansongtang zixu, in Sansongtang quanji, Vol.1, p.173. 
67 Rabindranath Tagore, “Einstein and Tagore,” in Mohit K. Ray, ed., The English Writings 
of Rabindranath Tagore, Volume VIII: Miscellaneous Writing, pp.1241-1250. 
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Tagore’s thought to “criticism of the materialistic West and eulogy of the 
spiritual East,” he was engaging in oversimplification.  
Hu Shi’s evaluation of Tagore was shared by the majority of Chinese 
people in the 1920s. Indeed, around the time of Tagore’s visit to China, some 
articles appeared in newspapers and magazines introducing his literary idea 
and philosophical thought. However, apart from daily reports of Tagore’s 
itinerary and activities, most of what was written about him was either 
enthusiastic praise or fierce criticism. It is no exaggeration to say that Tagore 
became a battlefield in the cultural debate in China starting from the mid 1910s. 
It is natural for such a controversial event to draw critical attention, but the 
outcome was far-reaching and profound: most studies on Tagore conducted in 
China since then make little reference to other issues than the debates, which 
lead to an astonishing overlap of research. 
As argued repeatedly in previous sections, mere focus on the cultural 
debate deprives Tagore studies in China of both breadth and depth. The only 
methodology that has been employed is to compare Tagore’s lectures in China 
with the remarks of other Chinese thinkers, thus omitting both the temporal 
and spatial dimensions of Tagore’s interaction with intellectuals worldwide. 
This chapter has examined instead the interconnection between the thought of 
Tagore, Feng Youlan, Liang Shuming, and other Chinese opinion leaders in the 
early 20th century. By contrasting this interconnection with Tagore’s interaction 
with contemporary Western thinkers, it is hoped that a new perspective will 
emerge to reveal the depth of intellectual exchange that has been obscured by 
visceral debate. This chapter has also attempted to provide a more vivid image 
of Tagore than that of a repetitive preacher of Eastern civilization. Of course, it 
is undeniable that Tagore was responsible for his own unsavory image in China. 
The Nobel Prize gave him an easy pass to communicate his thought to the whole 
world, but this reputation also molded him into a “spokesperson of the East,” 
who was first and foremost expected to provide a spiritual remedy to the 
Western psyche. It was in this atmosphere that Tagore visited China in 1924. As 
his discourse was based on the cultural experiences of India and intended for 
Western audiences, it ultimately simplified the political, social, historical, and 
cultural complexities of China; therefore, it is almost inevitable that Chinese 
intellectuals reduced the richness of Tagore’s thought to mere cultural 
conservatism. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
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Chinese academia was overwhelmed for a long period with political ideology, 
which produced confusing results: some articles that bear seeming titles of 
Tagore studies are in reality verbal attacks on ideological enemies. Fortunately, 
reform and the opening of China from the 1980s have restored considerable 
freedom and autonomy to academic research.  
A final point worth mentioning is that, even though Tagore’s thought is 
underestimated in China, from the perspective of cultural history, his difficult 
friendship with China constitutes nothing less than an episode of significance. 
The short-term purpose of Tagore’s visit to China to propose an Eastern 
spiritual civilization ended in failure. Nevertheless, Tagore’s effort to define and 
enrich such ideas as the East or Asia a century ago appears as an intellectual 
feat in modern world history, which becomes all the more relevant in this age 
that is witnessing the rise of Asia. Many studies have been conducted in this 
field with frequent contributions from Chinese-speaking scholars. With 
celebrations of the 150th anniversary of Tagore’s birth and the many cultural 
and academic events that have followed, Tagore’s artistic, intellectual, and 
educational legacies are receiving much needed critical reevaluation on a global 
scale.  
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Part IV 
Asia in World Historical Narratives 
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7. On or Near the Axis: Construction of  
East Asia’s Cultural Image in a Comparative Frame 
 
 
7 .1  Theoretical  Sett ing 
 
7 .1 .1  Objective 
Part I of this dissertation focuses on the formulation of Rabindranath 
Tagore’s East-West paradigm, which demonstrates both his resistance to 
ostensible Western superiority and his inheritance of Western imagination. 
Parts II and III contextualize Tagore in modern intellectual histories of Japan 
and China, revealing how Tagore’s Asian project was received in the East per se. 
This final part takes a broader view of how China, Japan, and India—three of 
the main Asian actors—have been characterized in modern world historical 
narratives. Chapter 7 starts with an analysis of the contrasting images of China 
and Japan in a theoretical framework of world history, that is, the “axial age 
theory.” Currently prevalent in academia, however, the theory presumes the 
supremacy of a Western mode of modernity, which leads to very different 
characterizations (and even evaluations) of China and Japan in the framework. 
Following the highly theoretical exploration, Chapter 8 examines different kinds 
of world historical narratives during the modern era. As will be demonstrated, 
West-centricity poses as a paradigm to attach to or rebel against in those 
narratives. 
With increased interaction between the East and West since the end of the 
19th century, how to define and delineate “East Asia” on the cultural, political, 
and economic map of the world has become an imperative issue of mutual 
recognition and self-identity. This chapter focuses on the paradigm of “axial age 
civilizations” to examine an image of China that has been constructed on a 
theoretical level since the first half of the 20th century. This image is illustrative 
in two senses: first, it originated in a specific intellectual milieu and with 
concomitant motives; second, this cultural image of China appears biased when 
compared with that of Japan constructed within the same frame.  The first 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the content and politics of the axial age 
theory to explicate this bias; the second purpose is to modify the model and 
adapt it to East Asia as a counterpart to an overarching West. 
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The term “axial age” was coined by Karl Jaspers in The Origin and Purpose 
of History published in 1949, which expounds that mutually independent 
spiritual breakthroughs occurred from 800 BCE to 200 BCE in China, India, 
Greece, Israel, and Persia. Such breakthroughs not only left an indelible impact 
on each civilization, but also, as some scholars argue, shaped each culture’s 
approach towards modernity.1 Simple as it seems, this statement is historically 
conditioned and theoretically premised. Before articulating the theory and its 
characterization of China and Japan, the notion of “East Asia” must be explored 
as its complexity defies any simplistic attempt to parallel great traditions or to 
generalize transnational cultures. 
 
7 .1 .2  East  Asia as a  Research Paradigm 
In the field of East Asian cultural interaction studies, the assumption is 
held that study of historical cultural exchange among East Asian members 
should not be confined to “regional studies” that became institutionalized in 
Western academia, especially in the second half of the 20th century. Rather, the 
new discipline emphasizes construction of a historically verifiable, 
geographically facilitated community that has been propelled by a momentum 
towards a common cultural manifestation with critical local differences. This 
construction of regional history provides a solid ground for the project of a new 
world history that is to be understood in the spirit of cultural dialogue and in 
the context of globalization. More importantly, as a paradigm for the study of 
regional history, the notion of East Asia assumes a special role in the task of 
de-Westernization, which is gradually gaining prevalence in contemporary 
academic circles. On the one hand, East Asian countries have developed sui 
generis traditions that are not necessarily compatible with Western historical 
experiences and the theories derived therefrom. On the other hand, from a more 
practical view, although the modern history of East Asia has been strongly 
shaped by Western impact, most of its domain was not subject to the colonial 
rule of Western powers, and the tenacity and flexibility of some of East Asia’s 
                                                   
1 Jaspers attributed the axial age breakthroughs occurring in many parts of the world to 
some central figures: in China, Confucius, Laozi, and all other philosophical schools; in India, 
interpreters of the Upanishads and Buddha; in Iran, Zoroaster; in Palestine, the prophets; in 
Greece, Homer, and the great philosophers, and the great tragedians. All of these figures 
emerged almost simultaneously in each region without knowledge of each other’s existence. 
See Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p.2. Jaspers’ list seems to be longer than 
what is widely acknowledged. 
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traditional thinking and behavioral modes are still visible today. This 
phenomenon facilitates the possibility of reinvigoration and the potential to 
transform long-dominant Western values. 
However, there must be critical awareness that “East Asia” is a rather 
artificial notion. Whatever geographical or cultural bonds East Asian countries 
might share historically, it has been argued that the slogan of East Asia became 
coextensive with anti-Western rhetoric in China, Korea, and especially in Japan 
in the early 20th century, as Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦 comments: 
 
“East Asia” is by no means a self-evident geographical concept, but one 
which is endowed with strong historicity. It was constructed in the 
1920s by imperial Japan as a cultural-geographical idea.2 
 
In other words, the notion of East Asia, being an idea of space assuming 
some shared legacies among its members, also came to embody a strong sense of 
“modernity,” which is a concept of time. It is this temporal dimension that 
complicates the question of legitimacy of East Asia as a entity, for history 
demonstrates that its two main actors, China and Japan, have had very 
different experiences in the pursuit of modernity despite the cultural bond 
between the two countries. Given the limited space, only China and Japan will 
be discussed in this chapter, with Korea and Vietnam being excluded.3 But later 
argument will justify that the idea of East Asia—conventionally called the 
Sinocentric world—becomes both prominent and problematic because of Japan’s 
continual emulation of and challenge to the Chinese axis. In view of the 
contrasting experiences of modernization between China and Japan, any 
assumption about East Asia is in need of fundamental examination, or it will 
merely include regional countries without synthesizing their context-specific 
dynamics in history. Nevertheless, any attempt at synthesis might also risk 
oversimplification when the focus is modernity, for this idea is extraneous to 
East Asian cultures but tends to constitute a teleological process in 
contemporary narratives.  
                                                   
2 Koyasu Nobukuni, “Ajia” wa dō katararetekita ka: kindai Nihon no orientarizumu 「アジ
ア」はどう語られてきたか―近代日本のオリエンタリズム  (How “Asia” has been Narrated: 
Orientalism in Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2003), pp.177-178. 
3 While India is not conventionally included in the discussions on East Asia, the importance 
of Indian civilization in the making of an “East Asian cultural circle” will be touched upon in 
the last section.  
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Critically, the spatial dimension of East Asia becomes prominent when its 
temporal dimension—expressed in terms of responses to Western modernity—is 
taken into consideration. Such intertwining of spatiality and temporality, 
however, is embedded and almost naturalized in much of the discourse on East 
Asia. For instance, in East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, the authors 
begin their narrative with the following statement:  
 
Our story divides naturally into two major phases: the evolution of 
traditional East Asian civilization in relative isolation over three 
thousand years, and the upheavals and transformation of that 
civilization in recent times partly in response to contact with the 
modern Western world.4   
 
To paraphrase this statement figuratively, while East Asia and the West 
can be generally considered as two separate spheres of culture and life, the 
boundaries of the former, an area remarkable for its illustrious tradition, 
became necessary when threatened by the latter, which has embodied the 
momentum of world history since the modern era. These seemingly 
unbridgeable dichotomies between tradition and modernity, and East and West, 
find clear expression in the axial age theory. This is not particularly surprising 
as both of the ideas—East Asia in the modern sense and the axial age—received 
conceptual forms roughly at the same time and were guided by similar 
considerations. Therefore, while this theory provides a comparative frame in 
which different civilizations can be characterized in terms of common criteria 
and evaluated in relation to each other, it shares some ideological assumptions 
with most discourses produced from the early 20th century, which have equated 
the idea of East Asia or the East with past glory vis-à-vis an evolving West. 
 
7 .1 .3  China on the Axis  versus  Japan near the Axis  
As mentioned above, “axial age” appeared as a theoretical term in 1949 in 
Karl Jaspers’ work. However, the importance of this historical period had 
already been recognized by Max Weber (1864-1920) in his comparative study of 
world religions (this lineage will be detailed later). Yu Ying-shih also points out 
                                                   
4 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, Revised Edition, p.3. 
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that the Chinese scholar and poet, Wen Yiduo 聞一多 (1899-1946), had noted in 
a 1943 article the almost simultaneous awakening of literary creativity in China, 
India, Israel, and Greece.5 
Whatever the origin of the notion, the theory of axial age civilizations has 
been discussed extensively and has undergone critical development in recent 
decades. Since China constitutes one of the axes, and has long been an enormous 
“other” for neighboring East Asian countries even during the turbulent 20th 
century, this chapter will show the distinct features of Chinese civilization 
characterized by this model. Significantly, what will become manifest in the 
coming analysis is that different interpretations of the Chinese axis tend to 
unwittingly at times reinforce the premises of the axial age theory. Such 
arguments, in brief, hail West European modernity and pay merely passing 
attention to the traditional achievements of non-Western civilizations. This 
ideology is used to depict Japan as a brilliant latecomer on the stage of world 
history, in sharp contrast to the stereotype of a traditionally-bound China. 
Despite Japan’s history of aggression in the modern era, there is no 
denying that it was an active and receptive member in the historical Sinocentric 
system. Japanese cultural assimilation, however, was eclectic; it is not typically 
labeled as Confucian or Buddhist, two of the pillars of Chinese civilization. 
Instead, the combination of an eclectic spirit with indigenous elements often 
earns Japan an epithet of “unique.” Therefore, in view of the heterogeneity 
between Chinese and Japanese cultures, an inevitable question emerges as to 
                                                   
5 Yu Ying-shih, “Zhouxin tupo he liyue chuantong” 軸心突破和禮樂傳統 (Axial Breakthrough 
and the Tradition of Ritual and Music), in Twenty-First Century, No.58 (Apr, 2000), pp.18. 
This article has a complex history. It was first written in 1999 in English as “Between the 
Heavenly and the Human: An Essay on Origins of the Chinese Mind in Classical Antiquity.” 
This paper was later condensed and incorporated into a 2003 collection, Confucian 
Spirituality, and the title was shortened to “Between the Heavenly and the Human.” The 
second section of the 1999 article was translated into Chinese and included in the Hong Kong 
based journal Twenty-First Century (April, 2000), which was reproduced in a 2007 volume 
published in Taiwan. The English essay was translated in its entirety into Chinese around 
2010, and this new Chinese version was revised and published in Taiwan in 2012 as “Tianren 
zhiji: Zhongguo gudaisixiang de qiyuan shitan” 天人之際―中國古代思想的起源試探 (Between 
the Heavenly and the Human: An Exploration of the Origins of Ancient Chinese Thought), in 
Chen Jo-shui 陳弱水  ed., Zhongguoshi xinlun: sixiangshi fence 中國史新論―思想史分冊 
(New Interpretations of Chinese History: The Intellectual History Volume) (Taipei: Linking 
Publishing, 2012), pp.11-93. Eventually, a monograph on this topic has come out in 2014. For 
the purpose of this chapter, the 2000 Hong Kong source is used since other articles contained 
in the same forum are also referenced. For the condensed version of Yu’s English article, see 
Tu Wei-ming and Mary Evelyn Tucker eds., Confucian Spirituality, Volume One (New York : 
The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2003), pp.62-80. The Chinese version reproduced in 
2007 is included in Zhishiren yu Zhongguo wenhua de jiazhi 知識人與中國文化的價值 
(Intellectuals and the Value of Chinese Culture) (Taipei: China Times Press, 2007), pp.69-95. 
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how their different paths towards modernity developed in their own historical 
contexts despite the geographical proximity, and how much each country’s 
tradition weighed in its approach towards modernity.  
One of the most interesting and unconventional efforts to probe into 
Japan’s uniqueness was made by the late Israeli sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt, 
who depicts Japanese civilization in terms of the axial age breakthrough: 
 
The distinctiveness of Japan lies in its being the only non-Axial 
civilization that maintained—throughout its history, up to the modern 
time—a history of its own, without becoming in some way 
marginalized by the Axial civilizations, China and Korea, 
Confucianism and Buddhism, with which it was in continuous 
contact.6 
 
On the other hand, Japanese civilization also “did exhibit some of the 
structural characteristics…that can be found in Axial Age civilization.”7 While 
Eisenstadt’s theory will be elaborated later, here it is sufficient to point out that 
the distinctness of Japanese culture lies in its quick success in modernizing, a 
success that, in Eisenstadt’s view, can only be achieved in those societies 
deriving directly from the axial civilizations. That is to say, Eisenstadt held that 
the two epochal changes are structurally and ideologically bound together, and 
that Japan forms an extraordinary case for its independence from this bond. 
Methodologically speaking, Eisenstadt studied Japan’s traditions to 
explain its successful modernization, and this problematique obliged him to 
conduct research in a comparative frame: the success of Japan to transform 
tradition into modernity versus the lack of success of many other axial and 
non-axial civilizations to “complete” the transformation. 8  In the following 
sections the general idea of the axial age theory will be explored, as well as its 
application to China—one of the few axial civilizations—and Japan—the most 
renowned non-axial civilization of prominence in the modern world. By 
approaching the Chinese and Japanese cases thematically, two types of 
                                                   
6 S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View (Chicago and London: The U 
of Chicago P, 1996), p.14. Here Korean culture is simplified to being subordinate to Chinese 
civilization. 
7 S. N. Eisenstadt, Power, Structure, and Meaning: Essays in Sociological Theory and 
Analysis (Chicago and London: The U of Chicago P, 1995), p.27. 
8 S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View, p.15. 
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unevenness—ideological and structural—inherent in the axial age theory will 
become apparent, which prevent it from becoming an effective paradigm for the 
comparative study of civilizations, especially in terms of a synthetic description 
of non-Western cultural spheres such as East Asia. 
 
7 .2  The Axial  Age Breakthrough and the Chinese Case 
 
7 .2 .1  Basic  Characterist ics  of  the Axial  Age 
Karl Jaspers’ and Benjamin Schwartz’s (1916-1999) views are 
representative of the essence of the axial age theory: while the former proposed 
the theory, the latter contributed to its dissemination in the United States.9 
Furthermore, Schwartz’s specialty, Chinese intellectual history, balances 
Jaspers’ proposition, which was formulated in the tradition of Western 
philosophy. 
To begin with, although the axial age civilizations followed mutually 
independent paths towards spiritual breakthroughs during the period from 800 
BCE to 200 BCE, there was indeed a common ground: 
 
What is new about this age…is that man becomes conscious of Being 
as a whole, of himself and his limitations…By consciously recognizing 
his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences 
absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of 
transcendence.10 
 
This process receives Schwartz’s critical elaboration in what is now 
considered a classic statement of the axial age:  
 
If there is nevertheless some common underlying impulse in all these 
“axial” movements, it might be called the strain toward 
transcendence…a kind of standing back and looking beyond – a kind of 
                                                   
9 The Spring, 1975 issue of Daedalus: The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and 
Science (Vol.104, No.2) is dedicated to a forum of “Wisdom, Revelation, and Doubt – 
Perspectives on the First Millennium B.C.” Schwartz is known to be the organizer of this 
discussion. As noted by Yu Ying-shih, this issue brought discussion of the axial age to public 
attention in American academia. See Yu Ying-shih, “Zhouxin tupo he liyue chuantong,” in 
Twenty-First Century (Apr, 2000), pp.17. 
10 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p.2. 
 176 
critical, reflective questioning of the actual and a new vision of what 
lies beyond.11 
 
In Jasper’s own terms, with crystallization of human rationality, the axial 
age bid farewell to the “mythical age.”12 However, Schwartz was more reserved 
about usage of the term for fear that “more definite concepts such as 
‘individualism’ or ‘freedom’ or ‘rationality’ might involve the hasty 
universalization of specifically Western concepts of transcendence.”13 
As mentioned in the introduction, coinage of the “axial age” by Jaspers does 
not mean that he was the first person to perceive the significance of this 
historical period. Indeed, from his examination and criticism of many different 
explanations of the cause of these simultaneous breakthroughs in remotely 
separated areas, it is evident that this issue had been thoroughly discussed 
prior to Jaspers’ own research; he simply readdressed the problem with his own 
explication. Finding no obvious evidence of mutual influences among China, 
India, and West Asia in ancient times, Jaspers seemed satisfied merely with 
discovery of the mysterious simultaneity as long as it continued inspiring 
research.14 Schwartz expressed a similar opinion more forcefully:  
 
The interest of these observations does not lie primarily in the very 
rough “contemporaneity” of these developments or in speculations 
about mutual influence....What one rather senses are areas of common 
concern and dissatisfaction with prevailing states of affairs. Yet the 
search for new meanings in all these civilizations continues to be 
refracted through preexistent cultural orientations.15 
 
Jaspers himself was not unaware of the heritage passed down from the 
previous era to the axial age. However, for him the epochal breakthroughs were 
so profound and radical that anything surviving the transformation seemed to 
show more selectivity than continuity:  
                                                   
11 Benjamin Schwartz, “The Age of Transcendence,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 (Spring, 
1975), pp.1-7.  
12 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, pp.2-3. 
13 Benjamin Schwartz, “The Age of Transcendence,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 (Spring, 
1975), p.3. Schwartz’s view of the pre-axial Chinese cosmology is described in 2.2. 
14 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p.18. 
15 Benjamin Schwartz, “The Age of Transcendence,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 (Spring, 
1975), p.3. 
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The thousands of years of old ancient civilizations are everywhere 
brought to an end by the Axial Period…The ancient cultures only 
persist in those elements which enter into the Axial Period and 
become part of the beginning.16 
 
Indeed, older traditions earned continued admiration but mainly as 
constitutive elements of the new spirit; for satisfying the needs of the latter, the 
meaning of the former was subject to transmutation. Most significantly, from a 
long-range perspective, the axial age does not exert one-way influence but 
extends its impact to both ends of the time line. Spiritual awakening towards 
the transcendental order and self-reflectivity eventually forms a so-called sense 
of history, by whose standards every development before or after this axial age 
is measured.17 Thus Jaspers asserts that “from it world history receives the 
only structure and unity that has endured—at least until our own time.”18 For 
all later generations, “return to this beginning is the ever-recurrent event in 
China, India and the West.”19 This primacy of the axial age does not, of course, 
preclude greatness or the novelty of later achievements. However, as Schwartz 
concludes: “The age of which we speak established a range of thought that was 
to shape all future developments without predetermining them.”20 
The basic concepts of the axial age theory have been outlined by comparing 
Jaspers’ and Schwartz’s views. This broad description naturally engenders 
different degrees of elaboration in accordance with different perspectives and 
concerns, which can be further specified as follows: 
 
1. Context-specific relationship between preceding cultures and the axial 
age civilizations. 
2. Rise and gradual solidification of the stratum of intellectuals who were 
the carriers of the transcendental view, sometimes in various versions. 
3. Crystallization of transcendent views and their institutionalization. 
4. Influence of axial age civilization on modernity. 
                                                   
16 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, pp.6-7. 
17 Ibid., p.20. 
18 Ibid., p.8. 
19 Ibid., p.7. 
20  Benjamin Schwartz, “Transcendence in Ancient China,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 
(Spring, 1975), p.68. 
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While these considerations are not absent from Jaspers’ work, they must be 
developed with the help of specialists in various fields. Specifically, the first two 
questions address the background of the axial age breakthrough, which mainly 
belong to historical studies. The next two questions focus on the effect of the 
breakthrough and are of particular sociological importance. As the argument 
unfolds, it will become clear that these two approaches—historical and 
sociological—seem not yet to have reached a mutual accommodation, and this 
proves to be the core problem of the current frame of axial age theory. 
 
7 .2 .2  The Axial  Age Breakthrough in China:  A Historical  View 
To answer the first two questions raised above, this section focuses on the 
arguments of two prominent scholars of Chinese intellectual history—Benjamin 
Schwartz and Yu Ying-shih—to examine their characterization of the axial age 
breakthrough in China. Their arguments are taken as exemplary because both 
offer relatively balanced accounts of the different schools of thought rather than 
focus exclusively on Confucianism. 
As previously mentioned, Jaspers regarded the axial age not only as a 
yardstick to measure past achievements but also as a percolator through which 
only the parts essential to its spiritual reformulation are kept. Such treatment 
might be a bit too definitive in distinguishing the axial age from preceding 
traditions, especially in the case of China, whose breakthrough is commonly 
known as the most conservative among major civilizations. 
According to Schwartz, the cultural image of ancient China is a rather 
“un-mythic” one. What is demonstrated in the classic writings is “the image of 
an all-embracing, socio-political and cultural order in which men relate to each 
other in terms of a structured system of roles—familial and political.”21 In this 
system, spirits and deities still occupy certain places but are all subject to an 
arrangement in which the human and cosmic orders are in constant 
communication. To maintain a harmonious relationship between the two orders, 
proper performance of ritual by leaders is of critical importance. On the other 
hand, if they stray far from the Dao 道, all features of a disordered society will 
                                                   
21  Benjamin Schwartz, “Transcendence in Ancient China,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 
(Spring, 1975), p.58. 
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become manifest. 22  Ontologically, this Dao is not merely an idealistic 
imagination but, at least for Confucius and other past sages, used to be perfectly 
embodied in the human world. That is to say, when Confucius raised some 
fundamental questions for the world, a political and moral paradigm had 
already been in existence. He did not need to undergo “a process of dialectic 
ratiocination in the manner of Plato.”23 
On the eve of the axial age, since the socio-cosmic order had been 
prescribed and the paradigm lay already in the not too distant past, the 
contribution Confucius made to the breakthrough, according to Schwartz, is “a 
new focus on the subjective or inner side of the moral-spiritual life” that seeks to 
achieve “the inner moral perfection called jen [i.e. ren 仁 ].” 24  This inner 
morality, if well cultivated and outwardly expressed, should be in accord with 
the normative cultural and social order that embodies the harmonious 
relationship between human beings, and between humans and heaven, although 
such an ideal order was hardly ever achieved in history, which accounts for the 
tragedy of Confucius. He was never held in high regard by the government, and 
was thus denied the chance of implementing the Dao for society. 
In sharp contrast to Confucianism, Daoism takes the prescribed 
socio-political order not as part of the Dao, but as an artificial human construct. 
Such an approach represents “a classical ‘primitivist’ critique of all ‘higher 
civilization’,” thus also representing “the most radical expression of 
transcendence in China” until the arrival of Buddhism.25 Mohism, in Schwartz’s 
view, aims to achieve good order not by resorting to inner perfection, but by 
strenuously searching for the active moral will of the gods. Therefore, the 
Mohist idea constitutes a reaction “against the tendency to associate the 
transcendent with the notion of an immanent cosmic and social order.”26 
                                                   
22 Ibid., p.59. 
23 Ibid., p.61. 
24 Ibid., p.63. Chang Hao 張灝  questions Schwartz’s dating and characterization of the 
Chinese axial age by arguing that the seeds of breakthrough emerged later than Schwartz 
had assumed, and that some mythic factors—especially in relation to correlative 
cosmology—were still prevalent after the breakthrough. Chang’s basic recognition, however, 
of the Confucian spirit does not diverge from that of Schwartz: a turning inward for achieving 
transcendence. See Chang Hao, “Some Reflections on the Problems of the Axial-Age 
Breakthrough in Relation to Classical Confucianism,” in Paul A. Cohen, Merle Goldman eds., 
Ideas across Cultures: Essays on Chinese Thought in Honor of Benjamin I. Schwartz 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1990), pp.17-31. 
25  Benjamin Schwartz, “Transcendence in Ancient China,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 
(Spring, 1975), p.66. 
26 Ibid., p.67. 
 180 
Among other schools, Legalism demonstrates an anti-inward-looking and 
anti-transcendental tendency in its absolute emphasis on technical questions for 
constructing an effective socio-political order. The formation of such a tendency 
is only natural for the emerging warring states in their competition for 
resources and administrative efficiency. In this light, both Confucian and Daoist 
transcendentalisms may be viewed as “reactionary” in relation to this actuality 
of the time: 
 
It would be wrong to think of the transcendental factor as simply a 
reaction against a static and unreflective traditionalism. It may, on 
the contrary, have been in part a reaction against the rationalizing, 
“progressive” tendencies of higher civilization.27 
 
In contrast to Schwartz’s portrait of the ideological orientation of the 
Chinese axial age breakthrough, Yu Ying-shih’s account gives more historical 
specifics necessary for an understanding of the cultural dynamics of ancient 
China. 
Differing slightly from Schwartz’s view of an “un-mythic” world, Yu 
specifies that what prevailed in the pre-axial Chinese tradition was 
“Wu-shamanism.” The hereditary Wu 巫 not only acted as powerful mediators 
between human beings and ancestral spirits or natural deities, but also 
monopolized the interpretation of “the Way of Heaven.” What the awakened 
philosophers and their emerging schools commonly struggled against was this 
monopoly, and their efforts brought about two fundamental transformations: 
the replacement of the Dao for gods, and emphasis on the human mind’s 
perceptivity rather than on the Wu’s divination and ritual performance. 
Subsequent to the axial age breakthrough, “study of the mind” (心學) rose to 
such prominence that it became the Chinese counterpart to Western theology.28  
Historically, Yu attributes the cause of such a breakthrough to the 
“disintegration of the order of ritual and music (禮壞樂崩).” Since “ritual and 
music” formed the entire repertoire of official knowledge in ancient China, this 
“disintegration” directly gave rise to the “flourishing of and competition among 
                                                   
27 Ibid., p.68. 
28  Yu Ying-shih, Renwen yu minzhu 人文與民主  (Humanities and Democracy) (Taipei: 
China Times Press, 2010), p.154. 
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hundreds of (private) schools (百家爭鳴),” with each major school elaborating its 
own critical relationship with the tradition of ritual and music.29 This view is 
reminiscent of Jasper’s description of the phenomenal rise of new disciplines in 
the axial age: 
 
Spiritual conflicts arose, accompanied by attempts to convince others 
through the communication of thoughts, reasons and experience…In 
this age were born the fundamental categories within which we still 
think today.30 
 
Furthermore, the rise of intellectuals as a social class did not fail to draw 
Jaspers’ attention: 
 
For the first time philosophers appeared. Human beings dared to rely 
on themselves as individuals…Man proved capable of contrasting 
himself inwardly with the entire universe.31 
 
In Schwartz’s words, those self-reflective individuals constitute the 
“creative minorities.” They are “no longer ‘cultural specialists’ who simply 
expound the established ‘rules’ of their cultures. Even when they continue to 
accept the ‘rules,’ they often see them in an entirely new light.”32 The creative 
minorities are exactly those self-appointed carriers of the Dao in ancient China 
of which Yu argues.33 
Yu’s view of Confucian and Daoist contributions to the Chinese axial age 
breakthrough is similar to that of Schwartz’s but is explicated in more concrete 
terms. Specifically, he attributes the term “inward transcendence” (內向超越) to 
the Chinese type of breakthrough.34  For Confucianism, Yu argues that by 
                                                   
29  Yu Ying-shih, Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun: gudai pian 中國知識階層史論―古代篇 
(Historical Analysis of the Chinese Intellectual Class: The Ancient Period) (Taipei: Linking 
Publishing, 1980), p.30. 
30 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p.2. 
31 Ibid., p.3. 
32 Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP, 1985), p.3. 
33 Yu Ying-shih, Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun: gudai pian, pp.38-57. 
34 Yu Ying-shih, “Zhouxin tupo he liyue chuantong,” in Twenty-First Century, No.58 (Apr, 
2000), p.19. For a more thorough discussion, see Yu Ying-shih’s “Cong jiazhi xitong kan 
Zhongguo wenhua de xiandai yiyi” 從價値系統看中國文化的現代意義 (The Modern Meaning 
of Chinese Culture: Viewing from the Value System), in Zhishiren yu Zhongguo wenhua de 
jiazhi, pp.9-68. The issue of Chinese “inward transcendence” versus Western “outward 
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reinterpreting the archaic tradition of ritual and music, Confucius infused ren 
into the spiritual core of the prescribed ritual behaviors, although it must be 
added that such prioritization does not lessen the social significance of ritual.35 
For Daoism, Yu also focuses on its primitivist character. In the Daoist classics 
Laozi and Zhuangzi 莊子, a clear path for returning to the original Dao from 
modern degeneration is presented: first, forget ritual and music; next, forget ren 
and yi 義 (righteousness). Yu argues that it is because the Dao in the Daoist 
characterization is transcendental and beyond any prescription that one must 
forget conventional knowledge to approach it. However, such forgetting is by no 
means a negation but—borrowing a famous metaphor from Zhuangzi—the 
disposing of tools after the goal is reached.36 As argued by Schwartz as well, 
neither Laozi nor Zhuangzi were revolutionaries. “They take for granted the 
society in which they live, and would simply minimize its effects on the life of 
the individual.”37 
While Schwartz recognized a kind of dissociation between Mohist 
transcendence and the immanent cosmic and social order presumed by the 
Confucians, Yu perceives that Mozi’s criticism of the tradition of ritual and 
music is based on such an assumption: there existed in high antiquity a pure 
and primitive lifestyle that was becoming contaminated by the growing 
formality and luxury of later generations. Therefore, the ultimate reference of 
the socio-political order in Mozi’s thought is still an archaic tradition which, of 
course, is defined by a set of criteria different from the Confucian one.38 
 
7 .2 .3  China in the Axial  Age:  A Crit ical  Review 
In the foregoing analysis of the Chinese axial age breakthrough, focus was 
on the two historically-oriented questions raised in 7.2.1, with the two 
sociologically-oriented questions being left to the next section. This is done to 
show that two contrasting types of reasoning are usually followed in narrating 
                                                                                                                                             
transcendence” also receives responses and elaborations from, for example, Tang Yijie 湯一介, 
whose discussions on the immanence (内在性) and transcendence (超越性) of both Confucian 
and Daoist philosophies are inspired by Yu’s article. See Tang Yijie, Xin zhouxin shidai yu 
Zhongguo wenhua de jiangou 新軸心時代與中國文化的建構  (New Axial Age and the 
Construction of Chinese Culture) (Nanchang: Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2007), p.2. 
35 Ibid., pp.22-23. 
36 Ibid., pp.26-27.  
37  Benjamin Schwartz, “Transcendence in Ancient China,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 
(Spring, 1975), p.66. 
38 Yu Ying-shih, “Zhouxin tupo he liyue chuantong,” in Twenty-First Century, No.58 (Apr, 
2000), pp.24-25.  
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the axial age theory. 
As explained earlier, Schwartz’s and Yu’s arguments are referred to 
because they place the breakthrough in a broad intellectual spectrum. 
Methodologically speaking, as the axial age is claimed to have had great impact 
on later history, analysis of the source of such influence should be as in-depth 
and extensive as possible. However, since the axial age theory is presumed to 
account for the paths from tradition to modernity unique to those major 
civilizations, its ideological and institutional aspects receive most attention, 
which in China was almost exclusively Confucianism. Accordingly, it is only 
natural for most authors to neglect other philosophical schools when treating 
the issue of breakthrough in China. For instance, in 2000, the February and 
April issues of the Hong Kong-based journal Twenty-First Century held a forum 
on “Axial Civilizations and the 21st Century.”39 Most of the articles provide 
critical reflections on the axial age theory and on its implications for the 21st 
century. When it comes to China, discussions inevitably concentrate on 
Confucianism and the imperial order deriving from its institutionalization. But 
it should be noted that, while this approach makes the arguments more focused, 
they suffer from being incomprehensive.  
Following this vein of argument, the next section will delve into a 
particularly ideological—rather than historical—characterization of the axial 
age breakthrough and its connection with modernity, in which the whole issue is 
“repackaged” to fit into a comparative framework that is more selective in terms 
of historical details and employs universal criteria to generalize particular 
events. By juxtaposing the two versions of the axial age theory, two purposes 
will be fulfilled in the last section: first, to point out the logic and assumptions of 
the axial age theory as well as its inherent limitations; second, to refine the 
argument and adapt it to the concept of East Asia. 
 
7 .3  Reformulation of  the Axial  Age Theory and Japanese Civi l ization 
 
7 .3 .1  Japan as a  Unique Civi l ization 
In contrast to the historical details presented in describing the axial age 
breakthrough in China, this section is theory-oriented with a view to drawing 
Japan into the framework of comparative civilizations. As previously mentioned, 
                                                   
39 Many articles contained in the forum will be referred to later in this chapter. 
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Japan is included in this model because of its modern achievements. In other 
words, one cannot dwell on its tradition for the distinctness of this tradition is 
mainly illumined by its modernity.  This is a very different case from China, 
whose illustrious tradition seems to justify it being a research topic in itself. 
This view is supported by the following statement, cited again from East Asia: 
Tradition and Transformation: 
 
Japan, though sharing much culturally with China, Vietnam, and 
Korea, came to contrast sharply with them in social and political 
structure. Significantly, many of the differences between Japan and 
the other members of East Asian civilization turn out to be points of 
resemblance between Japan and the West…So also is Japan's more 
rapid modernization during the past century, which has produced 
closer parallels to the contemporary Occident than are to be found in 
China or anywhere else in Asia.40 
 
This quote justifies an elaboration on an earlier argument, that is, the 
intertwining of spatiality and temporality that pervades much of the discourse 
on East Asia. Spatially speaking, it is obvious from the statement that East Asia 
and the West constitute two major reference systems for Japan, whose cultural 
hybridity and geographical separation earn it the ambiguous status of mediator 
between East and West. Temporally speaking, in the case of Japan, the division 
between a traditional East Asia and a modern West becomes particularly 
explicit, as the differences between Japan and other East Asian countries seem 
to account for Japan’s rapid modernization. However, the uniqueness of the 
Japanese version of modernity often suggests a spiritual source in East Asian 
traditions, as evidenced by many publications on the possible relationship 
between Confucianism and capitalism.41 
To sum up, the discontinuities between East Asia and the West, and 
between East Asia’s tradition and modernity, becomes most conspicuous 
through the refraction of Japan’s historical experience. The singularity of these 
experiences is very ambitiously  raised to a theoretical level by some 
                                                   
40 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, Revised Edition, p.324. 
41 For example, Tu Wei-ming ed., Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard UP, 1996). 
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sociologists, including Eisenstadt and Johann Arnason, who argue that Japan 
constitutes “a civilization sui generis, unparalleled in other parts of the 
world.”42 The following discussion will focus on Eisenstadt’s characterization of 
Japanese civilization. Before that, however, some effort must be made to trace 
the development of Eisenstadt’s thought and place him within the intellectual 
history that concerns the axial age theory. 
 
7 .3 .2  Development of  Eisenstadt ’s  Theory of  Comparative 
Civi l izations 
In the development of the axial age theory, some main contributors are 
worth mentioning: Jaspers, originator of the term in 1949; Schwartz, organizer 
of the first large-scale discussion on the theory and its application to different 
civilizations in the 1970s; Eisenstadt, the most fervent theorizer who summoned 
two other international forums on the theory in the 1980s and 2000s.43 
In hindsight, it can be said that the core issues of the two forums organized 
by Eisenstadt to a great extent reflect his own theoretical interests. They are the 
last two questions raised at the end of 7.2.1 respectively, namely, the 
crystallization of transcendent views and their institutionalization, and the 
influence of axial age civilization on modernity. 
Eisenstadt’s own theoretical concern is very aptly expressed in the title of a 
1973 publication, that is, Tradition, Change, and Modernity. Eisenstadt argued 
that although “modernity” poses to various societies a set of distinct problems 
requiring specific methods of response, in each society such responses to 
“modernity” may be similar to those already developed in previous historical 
periods.44 That is to say, there are similarities and continuities in a society’s 
reactions to changes in history, including the change termed “modernization.” 
This line of argument foreshadows Eisenstadt’s later idea of “multiple 
modernities.” As different patterns of reaction to historical change create many 
distinct paths towards “modernity,” those paths cannot be considered as 
belonging to a uniform program. More importantly, such recognition of the 
                                                   
42 Sugimoto Yoshio, An Introduction to Japanese Society, the Third Edition, pp.26-27. 
43 For a summary and evaluation in Chinese, see Yu Kwok Leung 余國樑, “Zhouxin wenmin 
taolun shuping” 軸心文明討論述評 (Description and Evaluation of the Discussions on Axial 
Civilizations), in Twenty-First Century, No.57 (February, 2000), pp.33-41. As Yu’s article 
predates the second forum convened by Eisenstadt, later critical development is introduced 
in this section. 
44 S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, and Modernity (New York: A Wiley-Interscience 
Publication, 1973), pp.v-vii. 
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unique inner logic of each culture enabled Eisenstadt to trace the “multiple 
modernities” to their respective traditions, thus demanding a comparative 
framework for analyzing the dynamics of civilizations.45 
Nevertheless, the view of “change” from “tradition” to “modernity” requires 
a progressive theorization, which is formulated around Eisenstadt’s continual 
elaboration of the axial age theory. As a sociologist, Eisenstadt generalized the 
axial age breakthroughs as follows: 
 
1. Emergence of tension between the transcendental and mundane orders. 
2. Attempt of a few intellectual elites to model the world upon a 
transcendental vision. 
3. Successful institutionalization of the vision and an ensuing reordering 
of society. 
4. Change in the dynamic of history. 46 
 
While a common historical cause of these breakthroughs is too 
controversial to be pinpointed conclusively,47 what interested Eisenstadt was 
not the background but the unfolding and institutionalization of such cultural 
breakthroughs. A small group of intellectual elites were inspired to assume 
reflective attitudes towards human life and the cosmos. They felt compelled to 
bridge the gap between the two worlds by way of reconstructing human behavior, 
which now pursued some higher moral or metaphysical order, and then to 
maintain that formula. It was the different interpretations of the gap and the 
ensuing divergent programs of reconstruction, combined with specific social 
conditions that facilitated or obstructed such development, which resulted in the 
unique crystallization of each axial age civilization and “ushered in a new type 
                                                   
45 Ibid., p.6. 
46 See S. N. Eisenstadt, “Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthroughs: Their Characteristics 
and Origins,” in S. N. Eisenstadt ed., The Origin and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations 
(New York: State U of New York P, 1986), especially pp.1-2. This summary is, however, my 
own. 
47 Among many attempts of this kind, Eric Weil’s “What Is a Breakthrough in History?” is 
possibly best known (also in the 1975 Daedalus forum, pp.21-36). However, Weil’s argument 
that breakthroughs follow breakdowns draws many criticisms. In Chinese academia, while 
Yu Ying-shih agrees with his observation in the Chinese case, both Chang Hao and Hsu 
Tso-yun 許倬雲 oppose its general applicability. See Yu Ying-shih, “Zhouxin tupo he liyue 
chuantong,” in Twenty-First Century, No.58 (Apr, 2000), p.21; Chang Hao, “Cong shijie 
wenhuashi kan shuzhou shidai” 從世界文化史看樞軸時代  (Viewing the Axial Age from 
Cultural History of the World), in ibid., p.6; Hsu Tso-yun, Zhongguo gudai wenhua de tezhi 
中 國 古 代 文 化 的 特 質  (Characteristics of Ancient Chinese Culture) (Taipei: Linking 
Publishing, 1988), pp.131-134. 
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of social and civilizational dynamic in the history of mankind.”48 
Eisenstadt, like Yu Ying-shih, pays particular attention to emerging 
intellectual elites. They no longer saw themselves as performers of technical and 
functional activities, but as “autonomous carriers of a distinct cultural and 
social order related to the transcendental vision.” Furthermore, forming a new 
stratum, those intellectuals were closer to both the ruling and social powers, 
and were most active in reinterpreting the world and creating new 
establishments.49 
As argued previously, no change in history is blind to its own tradition. 
Nevertheless, since the change that took place in the axial age was so radical 
that its subsequent institutionalization grew into sources from which every later 
development in history derived, the recent radical change of modernization 
cannot but be similar to it in structure. Following this logic, Eisenstadt claimed 
that only those civilizations that experienced the transcendental breakthrough 
are capable of self-transformation to modernity; other minor civilizations cannot 
trigger the transformation by themselves. However, for some structural reasons 
and historical contingencies, Western Europe as a combination of the Greek and 
Judaic axes is the only one that has completed this self-transformation (North 
American modernity is a variation thereof). 50  Such theorization of world 
civilizations, though ambitious and eloquent, is, nevertheless, made possible 
only by neglecting a myriad of context-specific historical details. As a historian, 
Yu Ying-shih also comments that Eisenstadt’s bold theoretical connection of 
modernity with the axial age does not sound quite convincing.51 
In any case, one of the merits of Eisenstadt’s project is that he places 
modernity in a macro-historical perspective and distinguishes it as a unique 
historical force. Such distinctness of modernity does not prevent it from 
assuming plural forms, which are all variations of but by no means subject to 
the model of Western European modernity: 
 
…Within all of them [i.e. respective traditions] developed distinct 
                                                   
48 S. N. Eisenstadt, “Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthroughs: Their Characteristics and 
Origins,” in S. N. Eisenstadt ed., The Origin and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations, pp.3-4.  
49 Ibid., p.5.  
50 For an epitome of the argument presented here, see S. N. Eisenstadt, “Preface,” in The 
Great Revolutions and the Civilizations of Modernity (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 
pp.vii-viii. 
51 Yu Ying-shih, “Zhouxin tupo he liyue chuantong,” in Twenty-First Century, No.58 (Apr, 
2000), p.18.  
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modern dynamics, distinctive ways of interpretation of modernity, for 
which the original Western project constituted indeed the crucial 
starting point and continual – usually ambivalent – reference point.52 
 
Critically, Eisenstadt’s arguments that modernity is ideologically and 
structurally connected with the axial age civilizations, and that modernity must 
assume plural forms bore the most interesting fruit when Japan was drawn into 
comparison. 
 
7 .3 .3  Japan’s  Non-Axial  Transformation:  A Sociological  View 
Japan by definition is not an axial age civilization: it has never experienced 
any form of drastic tension between the transcendental and mundane orders. 
According to Eisenstadt’s formulation, such experience (or inexperience), 
enabled Japan to minimize ideologization of change and struggle because of a 
characteristic tendency towards rejection of absolutism. This in turn facilitated 
social mobilization and institutional transformation in Japan.53  
To best illustrate how Japan achieved modernity as a non-axial country, 
especially in terms of being relatively free from ideological burdens, a discussion 
on China is necessary to examine how its experience of the axial age 
breakthrough and ensuing institutionalization restricted the unfolding of its 
history. In respect to the transcendental vision developed in China, Eisenstadt 
follows Schwartz’s view that in the Analects, the immanent and transcendental 
worlds, and moral and natural forces are metaphysically connected through the 
mediation of the Dao. 54  Consequently, in Confucian China, where 
transcendental concerns were largely moralized and secularized, the tension 
                                                   
52 S. N. Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities (Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 2003), p.504. 
53  S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View, p.420. Another great 
contemporary sociologist, Robert Bellah, holds a similar structural view of Japanese culture. 
Although Bellah does not use the term “axial” or “non-axial” as emphatically as did 
Eisenstadt, he refers frequently to Eisenstadt’s comparative framework and arguments. See 
Robert Bellah, “Introduction,” in Imagining Japan (Berkeley: U of California P, 2003), 
pp.1-62. The similarity between Eisenstadt’s and Bellah’s views is, perhaps, not surprising, 
as they were both greatly influenced by Max Weber and Weber’s student, Talcott Parsons 
(1902-1979), and were clearly aware of how Jaspers’ view of the axial age derived from 
Weber’s works on comparative religion. This intellectual lineage is touched upon in both 7.1.3 
and 7.4.1. of this dissertation. Bellah had authored and edited other works on the topic of 
axial age civilizations, which I will discuss in other projects.  
54  Benjamin Schwartz, “Transcendence in Ancient China,” in Daedalus, Vol.104, No.2 
(Spring, 1975), p.64; cited in S. N. Eisenstadt, “Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthrough in 
China and India,” in The Origin and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations, p.292. 
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between the transcendental and mundane was principally articulated in 
cultural terms. This particular mode of transcendence—an inward one—led to a 
uniquely this-worldly way of resolving the tension, that is, “through the 
cultivation of the social, political, and cultural orders as the major way of 
maintaining the cosmic harmony.”55 Since such a world-view put heavy stress 
on order and harmony in any relationship, it required “proper conduct and 
attitude, which necessitates a very stringent and reflexive self-discipline.” This 
tendency, however, fostered no institutional breakthroughs in China after the 
empire was established in the 3rd century BCE. Most importantly, the 
inseparability of cultural and political functions in such a system soon equated 
professional intellectuals with political functionaries. It also bound the 
Confucian literati-bureaucrats to the political center as a special social stratum 
with little autonomy. This structure in turn hindered the possibility of economic 
and cultural breakthroughs.56  In the end, although China is a civilization 
capable of radical ideological breakthrough conducive to the momentum of 
modernization, its particular institutionalization of cultural dynamics posed a 
staggering obstacle to its development towards modernity. 
From this viewpoint, the ideological conditioning of Japan towards 
modernity differed greatly from that of China. Lacking the tension 
characteristic of the axial age civilizations, the Japanese were accustomed to a 
primordial and undifferentiated world view and cosmology.  There was no need 
for intellectual elites to bridge that gap by modeling the world order upon 
transcendental precepts. This phenomenon, in turn, minimized disputation 
among elites, thus producing rare differentiation between professionals, and 
between orthodoxies and heterodoxies. Accordingly, historical dynamics in 
Japan acquired an exceptional flexibility to change with minimal ideological 
obstruction. One brilliant example of this flexibility is Japan’s ability to 
transform the transcendental, universalistic orientations of Confucianism and 
Buddhism in an immanentist and particularistic direction.  
In the face of foreign influences Japan always demonstrates “an openness 
to them combined with a tendency to Japanize them with but little effect on the 
basic Japanese ontological premises and conceptions of social order.”57 The 
                                                   
55 S. N. Eisenstadt, “Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthrough in China and India,” in The 
Origin and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations, p.293. 
56 S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View, p.415. 
57 Ibid., p.425. 
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perennial practice of Japanization meant that “Japan always lived with these 
other civilizations but was never one of them. It continuously maintained its 
conscious collective uniqueness and the distinctiveness of its civilizational 
premises.” It was this intensive reflexivity that set Japan apart from other 
non-axial civilizations, bringing it closer to the axial ones.58 
However, given the lack of dichotomy between the transcendental and 
mundane worlds, Japanese consciousness showed a high degree of continuity in 
many remarkable respects. Cosmologically, many sacred and natural elements 
were amalgamated without being absolutized.59 Socially, as Japanese society 
was primarily defined in terms of primordial kinship, trust extended easily from 
family to broader settings; furthermore, since Japanese elites were not 
ideologically orientated, they raised no opposition to the extension of trust 
under the guise of universalistic principles.60 Philosophically, it is argued that 
because there was no conception of discontinuities in cosmic time, none existed 
in mundane time as well. Therefore, the Japanese generally perceived no break 
between different regimes or historical stages. This very notion prompted 
Japanese to assume the mythical continuity of imperial symbolism, which is 
epitomized by reconstruction of the emperor system under the Meiji regime.61 
Since modernity is a Western idea, Japan, like many other civilizations, 
felt an urgent need to search for a place in the new world dominated by the 
West.62 Quite different from most Asian countries, Japan was never colonized. 
That is to say, Japan’s program of modernity was not affected through external 
force, but by the Meiji Restoration.  
Although the translation of Meiji Ishin as “Meiji Restoration” has long been 
controversial, Eisenstadt argues that there are several factors preventing the 
event from being a true “revolution,” including a lack of tension between the 
transcendental and mundane orders, and the lack of ideological breakthroughs 
and overthrow of institutions. On the one hand, the reforms implemented by the 
Meiji government were designed to transform Japanese society to a degree equal 
to those brought about by Western modernity. On the other, it was a movement 
“proclaimed as a renovation of an older archaic system…and not as a revolution 
                                                   
58 S. N. Eisenstadt, The Great Revolutions and the Civilizations of Modernity, pp.94-95. 
59 Ibid., p.96. 
60 S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View, pp.425-426. 
61 Ibid., pp.423-424. 
62 Ibid., pp.428-429. 
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aiming to change the social and political order…according to principles that 
transcended them.” 63  That is to say, the Meiji government strategically 
prevented possible ideological confrontation by retaining or even reinventing old 
political symbols. Under this guise, whole institutions were actually 
reconstructed. Since the primary objective was to gain a solid footing on the 
global stage, the movement strove for maximum adaptability combined with a 
restorationist vision. Consequently, the Meiji Ishin brought about “an almost 
uniquely successful initial modernization based on neo-traditional orientation 
and symbols.”64 
One of the most striking features of the Meiji Restoration is that it was 
effected by a small group of revolutionary, modernizing oligarchs, who were 
born to aristocratic samurai families.65 In contrast to the flexibility of the Meiji 
oligarchs, Chinese intellectual and political elites were more structurally bound: 
 
The identity between the cultural and political orders and the specific 
characteristics of the literati tended to maintain the dominance of a 
stagnant neo-traditionalism that continuously reinforced the 
non-transformative orientations of Chinese culture.66 
 
In the case of Japan, a search for authenticity constituted the main focus of 
modernization. This search was, paradoxically, characterized by a swing 
between the negation of modernity as undermining the Japanese spirit and the 
appropriation of modernity to create an authentic Japanese version.67  The 
extreme case of the latter developed into fascist nationalism with the slogan of 
“overcoming modernity.” Generally speaking, however, what made Japanese 
modernity distinct from that of others was its flexibility in defining 
traditionality and accommodating new ideas. Thus, “there did not develop a 
sharp confrontation between traditionality and modernity;” neither was there a 
rigid dividing line between “authentic” Japanese and Western modes.68 
                                                   
63 Ibid., p.430. 
64  S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Protestant Ethic Thesis in an Analytical and Comparative 
Framework,” in S. N. Eisenstadt ed., The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A 
Comparative View (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968), p.9. 
65 S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 
1966), pp.76-77. 
66 S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, and Modernity, p.274. 
67 S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View, p.432. 
68 Ibid., p.433. 
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Tradition and traditionalism constituted a sort of general orientation, 
often identified with what was authentically Japanese, in the name of 
which many activities and organizations, old and new, were brought 
together and legitimized.69 
 
It is such flexibility, adaptability, and a non-confrontational attitude that 
distinguished Japanese modernity not only from the Western paradigm, but also 
from the resistant mode of other axial or non-axial civilizations. Perhaps Japan 
serves as the best example of Eisenstadt’s theory of “multiple modernities” in 
view of its self-conscious incorporation of tradition into modernity. Again we 
find a contrasting situation with China in its confrontation with Western 
culture: Chinese tended to hold the extreme attitudes of either totally rejecting 
their traditions or totally negating Western values. According to Eisenstadt’s 
argument, this predicament also involved the ideological tension and conflict 
characteristic of most axial age civilizations, which developed into a deadlock in 
China because of its particular historical context and social conditions. 
 
7 .4  East  Asia in  a  Comparative Frame 
 
7 .4 .1  Crit ical  Evaluation of  the Axial  Age Theory 
As the title suggests, in this concluding section I attempt to propose a 
tenable method for constructing a cultural image of East Asia. Towards this end, 
an examination of the theoretical tool with which this construction began is in 
order. The following evaluation of the axial age theory will demonstrate first its 
limitations, both ideological and structural, and then its advantages, which are 
conducive to the idea of a cultural sphere such as East Asia. An analysis of the 
pedigree of the theory should make the argument more convincing. 
According to Jaspers, his recognition and coinage of the “axes” in world 
history were inspired in contradistinction to Hegel’s (1770-1831) claim that 
Jesus Christ stands as the only axis, to and from whom all history unfolds. In 
Jaspers’ view, a real axis of world history must be situated at a point that is 
most fruitful in shaping humanity. This axis, if not immediately evident, must 
be empirically verifiable “to give rise to a common frame of historical 
                                                   
69 Ibid., p.424. 
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self-comprehension for all peoples.”70 
The publication year of Jaspers’ book, 1949, indicates that his views on 
civilization were formulated during, between, or even before the great wars. 
This was a historic period that witnessed the collapse of the Western social 
order and found expression in some renowned precedents for Jaspers’ 
philosophy of history, such as Oswald Spengler’s (1880-1936) The Decline of the 
West and Arnold Toynbee’s (1889-1975) A Study of History. However, when it 
comes to its intellectual lineage, researchers have pointed out that the very idea 
of axial age was produced along a vein deriving from Max Weber, who in 
comparing great religions of the world had already noted independent but 
almost simultaneous cultural breakthroughs. 
Ideologically speaking, Weber’s juxtaposition of civilizations served to 
explain the uniqueness of Western European civilization, which underwent its 
most radical rationalization in the modern era. This rationalization came to 
fruition in capitalism. Although Jaspers revamped Weber’s sociological concern 
into a philosophical query, both of their positions were inevitably West-centric 
despite their relativizing of Western civilization. Their comparative approach 
uses Western modernization as a yardstick against which the accomplishments 
of other civilizations are measured. Therefore, Jaspers’ paralleling of major 
traditions constituted wartime introspection on the one hand, but this approach 
also unwittingly deprived those civilizations of their verve on the other. 
Structurally speaking, two different narratives—historically specific and 
theoretically general—are usually adopted in discourses on the axial age. The 
reason for focusing on Benjamin Schwartz’s and Yu Ying-shih’s views in 
expounding the Chinese axial age is that they refer to different sources to assert 
a historic breakthrough. 71 For a civilization worth the title of an axis, this 
phenomenal change must be empirically verifiable as Jaspers insisted. 
Therefore, claims shall be made from the particularistic to the universalistic to 
prevent oversimplification. However, when modernity becomes a target for 
                                                   
70 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p.1. 
71 Yu Ying-shih’s historical perspective is all the more conspicuous in regards to the axial 
age breakthrough as the primary, but only one of the four, major transformation in Chinese 
intellectual history. This method, as he asserts, takes the development of Chinese thought as 
an organic continuum with twists and turns. In this view, the influence of Western 
knowledge since the 16th century does not form a major “breakthrough” but constitutes a 
separate issue. Although this treatment still suggests a dichotomy between tradition and 
modernity, it is generally free from Western ideology inherent in the current axial age theory. 
Yu Ying-shih, Renwen yu minzhu, pp.145-147. 
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narration, a streamlined version of history becomes imperative to facilitate a 
comparative study. Remarkably, the characterization of Japanese civilization 
showcases a combination of both types of unevenness—ideological and 
structural—inherent in the axial age theory. 
Eisenstadt’s study of Japanese civilization claims that Japan occupies a 
unique position in world history as being the only non-axial civilization to 
maintain its own cultural distinctiveness without being overwhelmed or 
marginalized by any dominant axial civilization, such as China in the 
pre-modern, and the West in the modern era. As a result, Japan is also the only 
civilization that achieved successful modernization without totally following the 
Western European model, a model deeply rooted in a particular version of 
transcendental breakthrough that finds no counterpart in any other axial 
civilization. However, this macro-historical analysis assumes too strong a 
deterministic relationship between tradition and modernity. It also seems too 
theory-oriented. In the case of Japan, the lack of axial age breakthrough 
becomes a determinant in its historical development; any other culture drawn 
into this model also acquires its primary identity in terms of being axial. This 
reasoning, proceeding from the universalistic to the particularistic, is what 
could potentially harm the historical particularity of a culture or society. Indeed, 
one of the reviewers of Eisenstadt’s Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View 
points out that “what claims to be a book on ‘Japanese Civilization’ only deals 
with a very small part of ‘Japan,’ mainly at the middling, institutional, level.” In 
the author’s view, any discussion on Japanese culture that doesn’t mention its 
geography, ecology, rice agriculture, tea ceremony, aesthetics, craftsmanship, 
and so forth, is indeed incomplete.72 
One point deserves particular attention. As the major part of Jaspers’ book 
discusses the present and future world as being dominated by Western 
civilization, he wrote little on Chinese civilization. Most characterizations of the 
Chinese axial age are made by later scholars from various backgrounds. 
However, a common ground for most of those descriptions is, as shown in 3.3, an 
exceedingly stable structure fostered by an institutionalized Confucianism and 
its incompatibility with modernization.73 There is nothing that resembles the 
                                                   
72 Alan Macfarlane, “Review of S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative 
View,” in Cambridge Anthropology (1999). Pages not specified. For an electronic version, see: 
http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/EISENSTA .pdf  
73 Although Jin Guantao 金觀濤 delves from different perspective into this stable structure, 
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Western epic from the classical breakthrough to radical rationalization in the 
modern era. It can be reasonably questioned whether this characterization is 
essentially any different from Hegel’s observation that Asia (particularly China 
and India) is stuck in the historical mire. Judging from the above analysis, it is 
the Western standard assumed here that largely accounts for the relatively low 
degree of articulation of China as one of the “axes.” In contrast, although Japan 
is a “non-axial” civilization, its successful modernization warranted it a special 
place in one of the branches of the axial age theory. In retrospect, the axial age 
discourse is by no means theoretically neutral.  
Moreover, Eisenstadt based his understanding of the breakthrough largely 
on Western experiences, whose definitions of “tension,” “transcendental,” and 
“mundane” are grounded in a historical context specific to Western societies. 
Eisenstadt was not unaware of this problem, and in his last years he proposed 
the idea of “multiple axialities” (corresponding to “multiple modernities”), which 
seeks to demystify a seemingly uniform world-wide axial age movement and to 
better illustrate how different axial age components interacted among 
themselves and with non-axial civilizations in the shaping of world histories.74 
However, the model is useful only when its deterministic perspective is enlarged 
to encompass more historical, geographical, and cultural concerns. 
 
7 .4 .2  East  Asia around the Chinese Axis?  
Despite the criticism of over-manipulation of the interpretive framework, 
another respect of the axial age theory, namely, its general observations on 
world history, are enlightening. What is more, if properly managed, the 
spatial-temporal structure inherent in such observations can serve to remedy 
the biased image of East Asia prevalent in much of the contemporary discourse. 
Jaspers credited the axial age with prime historical significance because 
the sense of history of human beings emerged at this time. Since then the world 
has divided into either pre-axial/primitive or axial/historical domains, and 
                                                                                                                                             
and claims that it was the unique breakthrough of China—which constitutes the only 
counterpart to the Western, salvational style of breakthrough — that gave rise to this 
structure, its incompatibility with the Western mode of modernization is still apparent. The 
pattern he draws from the Chinese experience provides a totally non-Western lesson and 
indication for the 21st-century world. See his “Zhanwang disange qiannian” 展望第三個千年 
(A Prospect of the Third Millennia), in Twenty-First Century, No.57 (Feb, 2000), pp.20-29.  
74  S. N. Eisenstadt, “Axial Civilizations and the Axial Age Reconsidered,” in Arnason, 
Johann P. et al. eds., Axial Civilizations and World History (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 
p.531. 
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Japan is a renowned “convert” in the Sinocentric world.75 In the same spirit, 
Eisenstadt also argues that world history can be understood in terms of 
continuous interaction between the axial and non-axial civilizations: 
 
It is the expansion of these civilizations and their encounters with one 
another and with the great non-Axial civilizations—with, for instance, 
the Mongols—that have occupied the center stage of history as it was 
depicted by the historians of these civilizations. These histories 
depicted the ways in which the Axial civilizations succeeded in 
creating institutional frameworks which dominated over those of the 
non-Axial ones. These histories also pushed many of the non-Axial 
civilizations into the margins of history—as people without history or, 
to be more accurate, people with, from the point of view of the 
historiographies of the Axial civilizations, only local histories.76 
 
Both Jaspers’ and Eisenstadt’s statements suggest that the axial age is 
paradigmatic in two ways. Temporally, there is an “age” that concludes all past 
events and prefaces future ones; spatially, there are “axes” around which 
cultures constellate and tend to show more or less similar historical 
characteristics. Cultures not drawn into these orbits remain unhistorical or 
gradually fall into extinction. Conceptually speaking, the axial age is a 
proposition full of comparative spirit: each of the axes assumes particularity in 
juxtaposition to each other, yet they are worth comparing because of a common 
historic turn. This observation, despite its ideological trait, encourages us to 
argue an East Asia that, more than being geographically bound, evinces cultural 
and historical symbioses whose basic structures were shaped by some 
phenomenal spiritual breakthroughs. 
It has been shown that East Asia is by no means a self-evident idea but one 
manipulated in the face of Western imperialism, especially at the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century. However, as argued earlier, much 
of the discourse on East Asia presumes a dichotomy: a traditional East Asia 
versus a modern West. Here both East Asia and the West are spatial concepts of 
strong temporal connotations. Lying between the two spheres, Japan is 
                                                   
75 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, pp.6-8. 
76 S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View, p.414. 
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regarded both Eastern and Western (perhaps neither Eastern nor Western), and 
both the uniqueness of its traditions and the achievement of its modernization 
draw considerable attention.  
In my judgment, such a dichotomous view does justice to neither East Asia 
nor the West. Both have great traditions. Regarding the momentum of 
modernization, if there is one historically and culturally coherent East Asia to 
be claimed, it requires some “potential rules” in the reactions of each of its 
members to the challenge of modernity. In this sense, the problem of 
modernization of China constitutes a perennial challenge to the norm of 
Western modernity. What is more, the distinctness of Japanese experience adds 
to the diversity of a rich, complex, and structurally organic East Asia rather 
than constitutes an outlier.  
While Western Europe seems to be a well-demarcated cultural community 
whose civilization is considered to be the combination of two axes, Greek and 
Judaic, what really matters is not the figurative idea of “axis” but 
distinguishable cultural fountainheads. In this sense, for the notion of East Asia 
to be culturally legitimate, more studies must be devoted to finding a cultural 
dynamic manifest throughout its history, and to discovering great traditions 
that have shaped this history of East Asia in a decisive but not predestined 
manner; Chinese and Indian cultures with many of their variations are strong 
candidates. Last but not least, the idea of “axis” presumes “periphery.” In the 
case of China, Japan acted as both a usurper and a challenger of the axial 
paradigm, thereby filling the Sinocentric world with intellectual tension. 
Historically speaking, it was also the modern ambition of imperial Japan that 
raised East Asia to unprecedented heights. As the view of “all under heaven” 
continued to pervade traditional China, it was Japan’s sense of self-identity that 
most benefited our understanding of this geo-cultural region. Significantly, 
regardless of its ideological history, “region” in this sense is more historically 
coherent than geographically contingent and is expected to be a useful factor for 
categorizing world history. Not denying the axial status of China, its 
relationship with Japan deserves more study to question the given 
preconceptions of modernity and East Asia. 
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8. Arguing the East in the Modern World 
 
 
8 .1  World History as a  Modern Western Genre 
 
As the title suggests, this concluding chapter deals with two ideas, that is, 
the East and the modern world, and how the former acquired its identity in the 
latter. By the qualifier “modern,” what is assumed here is a theoretical stance 
that considers both the East and the world as more than cartographical 
designations; temporality is also addressed. Indeed, the most heated issue in the 
so-called East-West debate is how the West, which occupies a mere corner of 
Eurasia, has become so technologically and institutionally advanced that other 
parts of the world have come under its dominance in recent centuries. A 
derivative inquiry is, in the process of the West overwhelming the world, how 
the East, represented by the immense landmass of Eurasia beyond the western 
tip, came to be a perennial inferior antithesis to the West.1 While the two 
questions cannot possibly be answered here—arguably no historical accounts 
are sufficiently detailed and omniscient to give definite answers as the 
questions are nothing less than history itself—this chapter delves into some 
systematic interpretations of the East-West dichotomy, which, despite each 
constituting a grand narrative that claims grasp of the essence of the division, 
reflect how the dichotomy has been understood differently according to diverse 
historical experiences and geographical conditions. 
This treatment of the East-West division, friction, as well as interaction, is 
subsumed under the genre of “world history” here. In What is Global History?, a 
perceptive booklet introducing this discipline, Pamela Kyle Crossley makes the 
following statement:  
                                                   
1  K. M. Panikkar grasped the history in terms of Europe’s assuming sea powers and 
expanding its commercial economy to the non-European world. The imposition of European 
political authority over Asia derived from the preceding two factors. See “Introduction,” in 
Asia and Western Dominance: A Survery of the Vasco Da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 
1498-1945 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1959), pp.13-17. Edward Said characterized 
Europe’s ideological domination over Asia as having proceeded in the academic guise of 
Orientalism, which is a long Western tradition but culminated in the modern era. Critically, 
while Said recognized the Islamic world as the centralpiece of European Orientalism, 
Panikkar claimed his work to be the first “study of the relations of Europe with non-Islamic 
Asia [—particularly India, China, and Japan—] as a whole” (p.17). The different emphases, 
however, complement each other in narrating the story of subjugation of the East to the West. 
See Chapter 1 for more in-depth introduction to Said’s argument. 
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[M]any great religious traditions and most cultures preserve an 
original story about the beginnings of the universe or the creation of 
mankind…This tendency to be inclusive for purposes of understanding 
the deep factors behind change and development is, perhaps, universal. 
Though it does not in method resemble much of what global or world 
historians do today, it accounts in part for the continuing fascination 
with the ideal of a universal history.2 
 
The tendency to make overarching narratives might be universal, yet 
Crossley is also aware that what is practiced by “global or world historians” 
currently constitutes a rather specialized field. As will be demonstrated, the 
apparent East-West difference has bewildered—and also stimulated—historians 
and thinkers to formulate grand narratives on how human history evolves or 
simply moves itself. A further claim can be made that “world history” is a 
modern Western genre; all similar narratives that are of Eastern origins are 
inspired by the West. Before analyzing some representative works of this genre, 
both Western and Eastern, a brief review of its formulation will help establish 
the fundamental arguments. For convenience’s sake, a rough distinction 
between world history of a narrative kind and that of a theoretical kind is 
employed.  
In terms of narrative, H. G. Wells is widely regarded as the author who 
made world history a popular genre. “The Outline of History was first written in 
1918-1919,” as Wells recollects in a 1931 introduction written for a revised 
edition: “There were many reasons to move a writer to attempt a World History 
in 1918. It was the last, the weariest, most disillusioned year of the Great 
War....Everyone was ‘thinking internationally,’ or at least trying to do so. But 
there was a widespread realization that everywhere the essentials of the huge 
problems that had been thrust so suddenly and tragically upon the democracies 
                                                   
2 Pamela Kyle Crossley, What is Global History? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p.5. 
Crossley distinguishes “world history” from “global history” as viewed by historians: 
“Scholars of global-level history have struggled to follow the outlines of ‘world’ and ‘global’ 
genres. Outstanding among this group has been Bruce Mazlish, who as early as 1993 
associated inclusive but perhaps haphazard historical compendia as ‘world’ histories, while 
those focusing on large but coherent patterns appeared to him to be ‘global.’” (p.107). Such a 
distinction, however, matters little in this chapter that deals with conceptual categories.  
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of the world were insufficiently understood.”3 It was the devastation of WWI 
that motivated Wells to embark on the enterprise of world history; the deeper he 
delved into the causes of events, the more he felt obliged to turn his eyes away 
from “a general review of European unity,” for that “was only the latter act of a 
much greater drama.”4 This statement gives us a clear idea that the “world” for 
Wells was essentially, and inevitably, the background of and preparation for 
modern Western experiences. 
Among many subsequent world historians, William H. McNeill, whose A 
World History was first published in 1967, is worth particular attention. In the 
preface to the 1979 edition, McNeill describes the rationale for writing on world 
history:  
 
Civilizations are usually massive societies, weaving the lives of 
millions of persons into a loose yet coherent life style across hundreds 
or even thousands of miles and for periods of time that are very long 
when measured by the span of an individual human life. Being both 
massive and long-lived, civilizations must perforce also be few…These 
facts allow an overview of the history of mankind as a whole.5 
 
McNeill goes on to explain the organizing idea of his book, which, simply 
put, is an impact-reaction model: 
 
[I]n any given age the world balance among cultures was liable to 
disturbance emanating from one or more centers where men succeeded 
in creating an unusually attractive or powerful civilization…In 
successive ages the major centers of such disturbance to the world 
altered. It therefore becomes possible to survey the epochs of world 
history by studying first the center or centers of primary disturbance, 
and then considering how the other peoples of the earth reacted to or 
against what they know or experienced (often at second or third hand) 
of the innovations that had occurred in the main centers of cultural 
                                                   
3 H. G. Wells, The New and Revised Outline of History: Being a Plain History of Life and 
Mankind (Garden City: Garden City Publishing Company, 1931), pp.1-2. 
4 Ibid., p.3. 
5 William H. McNeill, A World History (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979), p.v. 
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creativity.6 
 
This lucid account also recapitulates the guiding spirit of McNeill’s 1963 
magnum opus, The Rise of the West. Interestingly, in a 1989 review article, “The 
Rise of the West after Twenty-five Years,” he turns critical of his previous view, 
reflecting on the fact that during the decade that he wrote the book, from 1954 
to 1963, the United States rose to the apex of its global influence: “It follows that 
my vision of the world’s past can be dismissed as being no more than a 
rationalization of American hegemony, retrojecting the situation of post-World 
War II decades upon the whole of the world’s past by claiming that analogous 
patterns of cultural dominance and diffusion had existed always.”7  
Wells and McNeill are quoted as two examples to indicate how world 
historical narratives have been closely connected with Western consciousness. 
From the decline of European power in the late 1910s to America’s rise to an 
unprecedented height in the early 1960s, it can be said that the tendency to 
“look at the non-Western world” was eventually spun into another West-centric 
narrative structure. Furthermore, McNeill’s systematic view of world history 
brings us closer to a more theoretical kind of this genre, which is generally 
equivalent to the category of philosophy of history and provides more 
sophisticated, though sometimes quite artificial, treatment of the East-West 
dichotomy in widely diverse theoretical frameworks.8  
In Chapter 7 Karl Jaspers’ proposition of the axial age civilizations has 
been discussed in detail. This theory is significant for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, the model has been continuously elaborated upon and revised since its 
                                                   
6 Ibid., p.6. 
7 William H. McNeill, “The Rise of the West after Twenty-five Years,” in The Rise of the 
West: A History of The Human Community (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991), p.xvi. 
8 In an article that introduces Marshall G. S. Hodgson’s Islamist view of world historical 
studies, Edmund Burke III begins his discussion by summarizing major Western trends of 
writing world history. The one that was most in vogue in the late 20th century was the 
Marxist economic view, represented by such prominent figures as Immanuel Wallerstein and 
Eric Hobsbawm. However, as Burke points out, William McNeill might have done more than 
any other individuals in reshaping the genre of world history. “The Rise of the West has 
provided students with a comprehensive account of the history of the world within the 
tradition of civilizational studies. McNeill’s innovation was to unhook the study of 
civilizations from the Procrustean bed of metaphysics—whether it be the pessimism of 
Spengler or the cyclicalism of Toynbee.” However, Burke continues, “Borrowing the concept 
of cultural diffusion from anthropology, McNeill’s world history is one in which what goes 
round comes round—but where inexplicably the West is the principal beneficiary.” See 
Edmund Burke III’s “Introduction: Marshall G. S. Hodgson and World History,” in Marshall 
G. S. Hodgson, Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), p.ix-x. 
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emergence in 1949; secondly, the year of publication of Jaspers’ The Origin and 
Goal of History indicates that his world history paradigm was conceived 
primarily during the inter-war period, when the slogan of “decline of the West” 
was in vogue. Indeed, in the introduction to the book, Jaspers, as a relative 
newcomer to this genre, reviews theories of world history proposed by his 
Western predecessors. While Hegel held that all human events lead “finally to 
the concept of a single meaningful pattern, in which all diversities have their 
appointed place,” for Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), “[w]orld history was the 
history of the West.” Hans Ferdinand Helmolt (1865–1929) took a more 
egalitarian view towards all races and cultures, whereas both Oswald Spengler 
and Arnold Toynbee approached the epic of world history through analogies of 
organic cycles.9 From Hegel’s and Ranke’s optimism about the West’s being the 
summit of human history to Spengler’s and Toynbee’s formulations of the West’s 
decline, nearly all world historical narratives follow the undulation of the 
hegemony of Western Europe. Jaspers was no exception. He viewed the history 
of humankind as being shaped by five main actors—Greece, Israel, Persia, India, 
and China—that experienced spiritual breakthroughs from 800 to 200 BCE 
independently. All peripheral societies and cultures were merged into these 
civilizations or otherwise threatened with extinction. However, a major portion 
of this book is dedicated to explaining the unique experience of Western 
modernization. As history reveals, Jaspers argued, modernization took place 
automatically only in a West that combines the essences of both Greek and 
Judaic cultures; Persian civilization does not exist, and China and India still 
live solely on spiritual resources passed down from the past. In spite of the 
strong philosophical bias, Jaspers’ formulation is similar to McNeill’s visions of 
both Western and world histories, which might imply a common perspective or 
even mindset. As indicated, McNeill’s books further reflect the change in the 
center of Western hegemony from Europe to America. 
So far I have tried to demonstrate how the genre of world history, whether 
of a narrative kind or of a theoretical one, is inevitably West-centric in the sense 
that all relevant works are motivated by the historical experiences of the 
(modern) West. Nevertheless, whether geographically, linguistically, or 
ideologically, the West must assume an East that helps establish its own 
identity, and the East is forced to either argue its unique identity without being 
                                                   
9 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, p.xiv. 
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relegated to a lesser developed phase of human civilization, or rid itself of 
traditional burdens to embrace whatever has made the West advanced. Of 
course, most “Eastern projects” lie between the two extremes, and it is the 
purpose of this final chapter—after going through so many specific cases in the 
previous chapters—to examine how the East defined itself and was defined by 
the West. Again, the main focus here is on the early 20th century, a time when 
Western imperialism rose to its zenith and Eastern countries sought to fight 
back in intensively intellectual and ideological terms. 
 
8 .2  The East  as Characterized by Westerners 
 
According to Jaspers, the breakthroughs occurring during the axial age 
changed peoples’ consciousness of life. The changes were so radical that they not 
only brought to an end the thought of the previous thousands of years, but also 
determined the modes of thinking of later ages. This is evidenced by the esteem 
assigned to such axial figures as Socrates, Old Testament prophets, Zoroaster, 
the Buddha, Confucius, and Laozi. It is the great convergence of various kinds of 
thought that made a uniform structure of world history possible: 
 
Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial 
Period, by what was thought and created during that period. In each 
new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired 
anew by it. Ever since then it has been the case that recollections and 
reawakenings of the potentialities of the Axial Period— 
renaissances—afford a spiritual impetus. Return to this beginning is 
the ever-recurrent even in China, India, and the West.10 
 
The synchronicity of spiritual breakthroughs and their longstanding 
influences are a great mystery of history that Jaspers did not intend to solve but 
to reveal. Jaspers narrowed the five axial age civilizations to three areas:  
China, India, and the West. His argument crystallized into an East-West 
dichotomy, after which he turned to the theme of the West’s modernization. 
Critically, Jaspers did not approve of the thesis of immobility of Chinese and 
Indian societies prevalent in Europe from the 18th century; he observed the 
                                                   
10 Ibid., p.7. The italics are Jaspers’. 
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great dynamism of Chinese and Indian histories in their accomplishment of the 
axial age breakthroughs and their ensuing remarkable cultural developments. 
But Jaspers was also forced to concede a seemingly indisputable historical 
phenomenon: “In comparison with China and India, there seem to be far more 
dramatic fresh starts in the West…The dissimilarity to Europe is not a radical 
one. The great analogy remains: the creative epoch of the Axial Period followed 
by revolutions and renaissances; until A.D. 1500, when Europe takes its 
unprecedented step, whereas China and India, at precisely the same moment, 
enter into cultural decline.”11 
The details of Jaspers’ explication of the uniqueness of Western civilization 
go beyond the scope of this chapter; here suffice it to place his view into the 
genealogy of Western discourse on world history. As put by Jaspers, Hegel 
“brought together China, India, and the West as stages in the dialectical 
sequence of the development of the spirit.” 12  Glancing through Hegel’s 
introduction to his lengthy lectures of philosophy of world history, the following 
formula might be closest to Jaspers’ paraphrase: 
 
For if we cast our eyes around the world, we can discern three main 
principles in the older continents: the Far Eastern (i.e. Mongolian, 
Chinese, or Indian) principle, which is also the first to appear in 
history; the Mohammedan world, in which the principle of the abstract 
spirit, of monotheism, is already present, although it is coupled with 
unrestrained arbitrariness; and the Christian, Western European 
world, in which the highest principle of all, the spirit’s recognition of 
itself and its own profundity, is realised.13 
 
Hegel’s definition of “history” follows his own complicated view of the 
“spirit.” Although Jaspers’ approach is quite different from Hegel’s metaphysical 
speculation, he inherited the latter’s classification of world historical stages into 
the Far East and the West; the Islamic world is rarely touched upon for it is not 
an axial age civilization by definition. In any case, despite trivial differences, 
China and India often appear together in both Hegel’s and Jaspers’ works. In 
                                                   
11 Ibid., pp.54-55. 
12 Ibid., p.10. 
13 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, H. B. Nisbet tr., Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History – Introduction: Reason in History (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), pp.128-129. 
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Hegel’s case, they are regarded as unmistakable symbols for how civilizations 
can achieve high levels of development without progressing to consummation: 
“there are nations in which many arts have attained a high degree of perfection, 
as in China and India. But although the Chinese invented gunpowder, they did 
not know how to use it, while the Indians produced superb gems of poetry 
without any corresponding advances in art, freedom, and law.” 14 Jaspers seems 
to have been more sympathetic to the non-Western world, but the difference 
between East and West is so profound that it led to the latter’s dominance over 
the former: 
 
The differentiation into a multiplicity of languages and peoples is 
perhaps no less in India and China. But there this differentiation does 
not become, in the course of struggle, the foundation for a 
three-dimensional contrast between the various forms taken by social 
and cultural reality [;] it does not become the historical structure of a 
world in which the particular configurations develop an energy and 
consistency that threaten to burst asunder the whole mass.15 
 
Together with previous quotes, we can see that, for Jaspers, the West 
distinguishes itself from the East because of a totally different type of struggle 
and fusion that make up its history. The historical momentum of the West 
surfaced as structural superiority after 1500.  
A closer precedent to Jaspers’ formulation of world history is Max Weber. 
While his sociological concerns have little in common with Hegel’s and Jaspers’ 
philosophical interests, in terms of a comparative framework that addresses the 
essence of independent spiritual breakthroughs and the institutionalization of 
world views derived therefrom, Weber’s works no doubt herald the method that 
Jaspers was to adopt later.16 That much of Weber’s research was comparative is 
widely acknowledged; in The Religion of China, “Weber continued from his 
theme in the Protestant Ethic by trying to contrast the distinguishing features 
of traditional Chinese society, Confucianism and Taoism, with…the spirit of 
capitalism…Weber thus located the decisive differentiating element in the 
                                                   
14 Ibid., p.102. 
15 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, pp.57-58. 
16 See Talcott Parsons, “Introduction,” in Max Weber, Ephraim Fischoff tr., The Sociology of 
Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), pp.xxix-lxxvii.  
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passive and traditionalist character in Confucian and Taoist values, explaining 
why capitalism developed in the West but not in China.”17 In another work full 
of comparative spirit, The Religion of India, Weber makes a vivid analogy 
between Asia and Europe in the concluding chapter: 
 
For Asia as a whole China played somewhat the role of France in the 
modern Occident. All cosmopolitan “polish” stems from China, to Tibet 
to Japan and outlying Indian territories. Against this India has a 
significance comparable to that of antique Hellenism. There are few 
conceptions transcending practical interests in Asia whose source 
would not finally have to be sought there.18 
 
What is crucial here is that in Weber’s account, both India and China are 
invariably measured against a European yardstick and, in spite of the perceived 
cultural heterogeneity, the two countries can be lumped together and marked as 
“Asia,” whose reference is always a Europe that self-triggered a process of 
religious secularization and social rationalization that led to the emergence of 
capitalism in the modern era.  
The summary made above is admittedly simplistic in that it omits the 
quintessence of Hegel’s, Jaspers’, and Weber’s arguments, while other 
significant authors are not treated. Nevertheless, by tracing the outline of 
representative discourses, it is clear that the East-West dichotomy was often 
addressed in terms of the tradition-modernity difference. The following sections 
will examine how this view of duality was digested and revamped spatially and 
temporarily in some of the countries of the East.  
 
8 .3  The East  as Characterized by Easterners:  Japan 
 
It might appear disproportionate to assign an entire section to Japan, given 
its relatively small geographical size and historical influence. However, it is in 
Japan that such issues as Asia, modernity, and world history have received the 
                                                   
17 C. K. Yang, “Introduction,” in Max Weber, Hans H. Gerth tr., The Religion of China: 
Confucianism and Taoism (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp.xviii-xix. 
18 Max Weber, Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale trs., The Religion of India: The Sociology 
of Hinduism and Buddhism (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p.329. 
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most elaboration outside Western academia.19 By comparing the views of world 
history held by the West and Japan respectively, the knowledge-power structure 
of the genre becomes conspicuous.  
In July, 1942, that is, in the thick of the Asia-Pacific War, Kōyama Iwao 高
山岩男 (1905-1993) wrote in the preface to The Philosophy of World History:  
 
The previous European War [i.e. WWI], despite its scale of a world war, 
was in nature a war restricted to the modern era…The world order 
that the Paris Peace Conference secured represented nothing more 
than the principles of the modern world; it was a mere continuation of 
such principles. After twenty years of false peace, another European 
War broke out, which was symptomatic of the modern principles. 
Hence, the current war [i.e. the Asia-Pacific War] is a farewell to the 
modern era. Judging from the Greater East Asia War that the 
Japanese empire started, the fact is crystally clear.20 
 
For the contemporary reader, the logic of this statement does not seem to be 
coherent. Nevertheless, many keywords that activated modern Japanese 
academia are included therein. The purpose of this section is to illuminate the 
meaning of the claim by restoring it back to the historical context.  
The leading figure in Japan’s embarkation on massive absorption of 
Western civilization was Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉  (1835-1901), who is 
widely considered as the greatest enlightenment scholar in modern Japan. In 
An Outline of Civilizational Discourse published in 1875, he portrayed a 
hierarchy of civilization in which Western European countries and the United 
States occupied the top tier. According to Fukuzawa, for a country to be civilized, 
the whole nation must be institutionalized first, within which the creativity of 
its people is allowed full development without obstruction. By this criterion, old 
empires such as China, Japan, and Turkey were merely semi-civilized as their 
peoples were largely bound by custom, and Africa and Australia were not 
civilized at all. For Japan to become a civilized country, Fukuzawa claimed, it 
                                                   
19 In Western discourse as well, and especially in the axial age theory, Japan is presented as 
an enigmatic case for scholars to revise their frameworks to better account for the East-West 
dichotomy, which is challenged by Japan’s extraordinarily successful modernization. This 
issue is discussed in Chapter 7. 
20 Kōyama Iwao, Sekaishi no tetsugaku 世界史の哲学 (The Philosophy of World History) 
(Tokyo: Kobushi Shobō, 2001), p.8. 
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was necessary to follow the path created by Western countries rather than to 
adhere to Eastern traditions.21 While in his early middle age Fukuzawa still 
attempted to unite Chinese and Korean revolutionists to form a front against 
Western powers, in an 1885 editorial— published anonymously but generally 
believed to be Fukuzawa’s work—he urged the Japanese to say goodbye to Asia 
and thus concluded with this message: “If one keeps company with bad friends, 
one cannot be exempt from a bad reputation. So we have to reject our bad 
friends in Asia and the East from the bottom of our hearts.”22 
To leave out details here, the path that Japan took from the mid-nineteenth 
century generally followed Fukuzawa’s outline. Fukuzawa died in 1901. At this 
time, nonetheless, the very idea of Asia underwent transformations in Japan. As 
mentioned in the previous chapters, Okakura Tenshin published The Ideal of 
the East in 1903 and popularized the slogan of “Asia is one.” He argued that 
Asian civilization is based on the principle of beauty, from which derived all the 
major religions of the world; such a spiritual civilization is far superior to 
material, European civilization. In the book, although Okakura traces the 
change and development in Chinese and Indian arts in the course of history, he 
directs the flow of the narrative to their perfect fusion and sublimination in 
Japan: “The history of Japanese art becomes thus the history of Asiatic 
ideals—the beach where each successive wave of Eastern thought has left its 
sand-ripple as it beat against the national consciousness.”23 
Compared with Fukuzawa Yukichi, it is obvious that Okakura Tenshin had 
a greater expectation of Asia, which means the civilizational view of the 
Japanese changed with the development of their country. But the common 
ground between them is even more noticeable: while Fukuzawa emphasizes the 
idea of kokutai 国体 (that is, national polity, which Fukuzawa interpreted as 
the English term “nationality”) in An Outline of Civilizational Discourse, 
Okakura’s interest in “national consciousness” proved no less intense.  
The drastic change in Japan’s civilizational view was social psychologically 
grounded: 
                                                   
21 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmeiron no gairyaku 文明論之概略 (An Outline of Civilizational 
Discourse), in Fukuzawa Yukichi senshū 福澤諭吉選集  (Selected Works of Fukuzawa 
Yukichi) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), Vol.4, p.20. 
22  Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Datsu-A ron” 脱亜論  (On Leaving Asia), in Fukuzawa Yukichi 
senshū, Vol.7, p.224. 
23 Okakura Kakuzō, The Ideals of the East, in Okakura Kakuzo: Collected English Writings, 
Vol.1, p.16. 
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[T]he Japanese adopted the struggle to overcome their inferiority in 
the hope of sustaining the political and cultural autonomy of their 
nation. Once the Japanese were convinced that modernization did not 
lead to this goal, their images of themselves and their past went 
through a revision; their past became not something to be overcome 
but rather a source of inspiration. This romantic yearning for a “lost” 
cultural tradition became manifest in the discursive trend of 
“returning to Asia.”24 
 
This phenomenon is generally called “reviving Asia” (興亜), which is an 
antithesis to Fukuzawa’s earlier proposal of “leaving Asia” (脱亜). Despite their 
seeming difference, both projects were rooted in the same historical trend, as 
one of the definitions of “Asianism” (アジア主義 ) clarifies: “It had been 
continuously reformulated in modern Japan, regarding ‘Asia’ as a unity in 
contradistinction to ‘the West;’ or it was Japan’s worldview by which the country 
tried to define its own place in Asia. Particularly, in the face of Western impact, 
Japan moved more quickly than other Asian countries toward Westernization/ 
modernization; two different self-identities—that of ‘leaving Asia’ and of 
‘reviving Asia’—emerged. Asianism is the aggregate title of the ideas and 
movements of ‘reviving Asia’.”25 Critically, neither “reviving Asia” nor “leaving 
Asia” could have taken root without the premise of “modernization” or 
“Westernization;” aligning itself with the East or West became for Japan more a 
geopolitical decision than an issue of national survival, which is different from 
the case of China and, to a certain degree, India.  
As history proceeded, successive victories in the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the First World War 
gradually established Japan as an international power. The devastation of 
Europe after the Great War was an effective antidote to Japan’s fascination with 
Westernization, and the power vacuum in inter-war East Asia facilitated 
Japan’s regional and even global deployment. It was precisely at this time that 
                                                   
24 Yumiko Iida, “Fleeing the West, Making Asia Home: Transpositions of Otherness in 
Japanese Pan-Asianism, 1905-1930,” in Alternatives, No.22 (1997), p.409. 
25  Koyasu Nobukuni ed., Nihon shisōshi jiten 日本思想史辞典  (Dictionary of Japanese 
Intellectual History) (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2009), p.7. This entry is written by Nakamura 
Shunsaku 中村春作.  
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the genre of civilizational discourse resurged in Japanese academia, but it began 
to show a strong Japan-centric Asianism: “[the very idea that] Japan is the 
product of harmonious fusion of Eastern and Western civilizations and is thus 
obliged to establish a new civilizational paradigm in Asia is nothing less than 
‘Asianism,’ which has already found its roots in East-West civilizational 
discourse.”26  Such an East-West civilizational discourse was, from the very 
beginning, too vague to indicate anything other than Japan’s self-image or 
imagination: “it proposed deliberately different views from those derived from 
Western experiences on the one hand, and manifested superiority over India and 
China, which had long been subdued by Western civilization on the other.”27 
Ōkuma Shigenobu’s 大隈重信 (1838-1922) Harmonious Fusion of Eastern and 
Western Civilizations is a classic case in point, in the preface to which he makes 
a strong appeal to the Japanese:  
 
The East has its characteristics, and the West has its characteristics. 
Which is better is not easy to judge…As contact between the two 
hemispheres becomes more frequent, unification or fusion of Eastern 
and Western civilizations is something that is inevitable. Particularly 
for us who live in one part of the East, this unification or fusion is our 
mission. Is there anyone who dares to go against this trend? We have 
to carefully consider how this fusion can be carried out in the future.28 
 
In this book, published posthumously in 1922, Ōkuma generally equated 
Eastern tradition with China, but a more common view at the time was that 
China and India were the two pillars of the East or Asia, while Japan—being an 
Asian country occupying a special corner—assumed responsibility for bridging 
the two hemispheres and bringing world civilization to a higher degree of 
accomplishment.29  
                                                   
26 Ishikawa Yoshihiro 石川禎浩, “Tōzai bunmeiron to Nicchū no rondan” 東西文明論と日中の
論壇 (East-West Civilizational Discourse and Its Forums in Japan and China), in Furuya 
Tetsuo 古屋哲夫 ed., Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki 近代日本のアジア認識 (Modern Japan’s 
Views of Asia) (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1996), p.427. 
27 Ibid. 
28  Ōkuma Shigenobu, Tōzai bunmei no chōwa 東西文明之調和  (Harmonious Fusion of 
Eastern and Western Civilizations) (Tokyo: Waseda UP, 1990), pp.1-2. 
29 Kita Reikichi described Japan as “born to be the heart of the world,” which was “the 
greatest privilege as well as the greatest duty.” See “Wagakuni no daishimei” わが国の大使命 
(The Grand Mission of Our Country), in Hikari wa Tōhō yori, pp.149-171. 
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Between publication of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s An Outline of Civilizational 
Discourse (1875) and Ōkuma Shigenobu’s Harmonious Fusion of Eastern and 
Western Civilizations (1922), a transformation occurred: the desperate appeal 
for Western civilization seen in the former seemed quite strange by the time of 
the latter. Japan in the Taishō era had become a “civilized” country thanks to 
the efforts made during the Meiji era; the East-West dichotomy for Japan in the 
early 20th century was no longer a matter of choice but of harmonization, 
whether in a cultural or political sense.30 Given Japan’s resolve to stand alone 
and even to fuse world civilizations, Nitobe Inazō 新渡戸稲造 (1862-1933), the 
Japanese thinker and educator and the self-appointed “bridge across the 
Pacific,” made the following claim when lecturing on the “National 
Characteristics of the Japanese People” in America in 1932:  
 
My humble opinion is that in love of novelty and the appreciation of 
the beautiful we are like the Hellenes, though we do not aspire to the 
level of their intellect; neither do we pretend to rival the Hindoo and 
ancient Chinese in theorizing. We stick to realities….That is why we 
maintain our unity and independence as a nation….How short was the 
glory that was Athens!...India and China with their great gifts will no 
doubt contribute much to the progress of mankind, but as to being 
efficient political entities, they give no earnest [sic.] of their future.31 
 
At the height of WWII, two (in)famous symposia were convened in Japan in 
1942, namely, “Surpassing Modernity” (近代の超克) and “A World Historical 
Stance and Japan” (世界史的立場と日本 ). How the attendees of these two 
conferences endorsed the fascist ideology of imperial Japan has been extensively 
                                                   
30 Koizumi Takashi 小泉仰, “Futatsu no hikakubunmeiron: Bunmeiron no gairyaku to Tōzai 
bunmei no chōwa,” 二つの比較文明論―『文明論之概略』と『東西文明之調和』 (Two Examples 
of Comparative Civilizational Discourse: An Outline of Civilizational Discourse and the 
Harmonious Fusion of Eastern and Western Civilizations), in Mineshima Hideo 峰島旭雄 et 
al., Ōkuma Shigenobu Tōzai bunmei no chōwa o yomu 大隈重信『東西文明の調和』を読む 
(Reading Ōkuma Shigenobu’s Harmonious Fusion of Eastern and Western Civilizations) 
(Tokyo: Hokuju Shuppan, 1990), pp.35-36. 
31 Nitobe Inazō, “Lectures on Japan: An Outline of the Development of the Japanese People 
and Their Culture,” in Nitobe Inazō zenshū, dai jūgokan 新渡戸稲造全集・第十五巻 
(Complete Works of Nitobe Inazō, Volume 15) (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1970), p.294. Nitobe 
named twelve national characteristics of the Japanese people: patriotism, national unity, 
loyalty, national continuity, self-abnegation, the sense of duty and of responsibility, sense of 
honor, a cheerful view of life’s pathos, sentimentality, love of and contact with nature, talent 
for detail, and realistic psychology. 
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discussed. Here only one observation is to be made: in early twentieth-century 
Japan, as a temporal notion, “modernity” posed as an abstract spatial 
obstruction, which was to be revised or even surpassed for a “genuine” world 
history to unfold.32 Here, the logic of Kōyama Iwao’s statement (cited at the 
beginning of this section) that was contemporaneous with the two conferences 
becomes clear. He used the term “the principles of the modern world” to signify 
the practice of realist diplomacy that was West-originated, nation-state-centric, 
and embodied in the treaty system. As a matter of fact, Japan had been eager to 
participate in the system but was denied “proper” interests by the Western 
powers, which stimulated the country into challenging it. For Kōyama and many 
Japanese intellectuals at the time, the Great East Asia War was a war in which 
the suppressed nations gathered under that banner of Japan to rebel against 
Western hegemony; it represented an effort to overturn “modern principles” 
with a view to “the establishment of new world orders.”33 This logic, ideological 
and fantastic as it seems today, assumed the reason of a philosophy of world 
history.  
Apparently, in pre-WWII Japan what was prevalent was world history of a 
theoretical kind, which aimed at a non-West-centric historical philosophy. In the 
early-twentieth-century West, there were also efforts to surpass West-centricity 
in world historical writing; although the genre could never exempt itself from 
subjective biases, some Western authors such as Wells had sensed the 
restrictions of Eurocentrism. In constrast, while Japan proposed a philosophy of 
world history to support its political claim of the “Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere,” it was a mere variation of ultra-nationalism. Ironically, 
had it not been that Japan achieved modernization ahead of all other 
non-Western countries, such a fascist view world history could not have 
happened. Here we see again the entwinement between world history as a genre 
and modernization as a Western value. 
 
8 .4  The East  as Characterized by Easterners:  China and India 
 
As is widely known, Asianism in Japan finally developed into the 
                                                   
32 The minutes of the first symposium have been translated into English. See Richard F. 
Calichman tr. ed., Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan (New York: 
Columbia UP, 2008).  
33 See note 20. 
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expansionist project of the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (大東亜共
栄圏) which ended in debacle after Japan’s ruinous defeat in 1945. “The prewar 
Japanese experience suggests that ‘Asian’ identity as such can only be imagined 
aesthetically as a utopia; attempts to translate it into political projects 
inevitably result in a violent erasure of the historical experiences of peoples 
within Asia.”34 In other words, to claim a unified Asia is to erase historical 
differences. Violence might be an instinctive way to level those myriad 
differences, but Japan proved the infeasibility of that course. Indeed, Asia is too 
large and complicated for any proper generalization; the only possible way for 
the existence of an “Asia” is by way of contrast to a “West.” Despite the 
tenuousness of the idea of “Asia,” it held sway in the genres of civilizational 
discourse and world history. Further, it was elaborated on by at least two 
generations of pre-WWII Japanese scholars, who achieved this theoretical depth, 
paradoxically, through Japan’s successful imitation of the West. Such conditions 
existed in neither China nor India in the early 20th century, whose Asian 
discourse, if any, was rather sporadic and incoherent, despite the fact they were 
two veritable ancient “Eastern” civilizations. In this section, I will explore 
Chinese and Indian discourse to demonstrate how the idea of Asia has been 
closely connected with the experience or interpretation of modernization. 
Liang Qichao, one of the leading enlightenment scholars in modern China, 
once claimed that “from the French Revolution derived nineteenth-century 
Europe; from the Sino-Japanese War derived twentieth-century Asia.” 35 
Apparently, for intellectuals in late imperial China, “Asia” was both modern and 
political and thus devoid of either historical or discursive contexts. In the 
meager literature of Asian discourse in early twentieth-century China, the two 
authors who are most frequently referred to are Li Dazhao 李大釗 and Sun 
Yat-sen. Li wrote in 1917 that “if the Japanese really want to carry out the ideal 
of great Asianism, they must first of all acknowledge that China is the 
cornerstone of Asia…If they uphold the banner of great Asianism to pursue their 
imperialist goals and grab hegemony of the Far East…they will eventually 
incite the jealousy of the white people and bring disaster to all Asian races.”36 
                                                   
34 Yumiko Iida, “Fleeing the West, Making Asia Home: Transpositions of Otherness in 
Japanese Pan-Asianism, 1905-1930,” in Alternatives, No.22 (1997), p.411. 
35 Liang Qichao, Zhongguo sishinianlai dashiji 中國四十年來大事記 (Great Events of China 
in the Recent Forty Years), in Yinbingshi heji, Zhuanji 專集 (Special Collections), No.3, p.59. 
36 Li Dazhao, “Da Yaxiya zhuyi” 大亞細亞主義 (Great Asianism), in Li Dazhao quanji, Vol.2, 
 214 
With acceleration of Japan’s militarization, Li’s criticism became even more 
censorious in 1919: “we must realize that ‘great Asianism’ is just a euphemism 
for annexation of China…then we must realize that ‘great Asianism’ is a 
pseudonym for ‘great Japanism’.”37 Li Dazhao’s comments are revealing in two 
respects: firstly, Asianism in early twentieth-century China was not a “project” 
but was characterized by double resistance simultaneously against Western and 
Japanese imperialism; secondly, “Asia” assumes no specific place in the 
civilizational discourse of Chinese intellectuals, as they simply took for granted 
an equivalence of China with Asia. Such self-centricity is more nuanced but 
clearly expressed in Sun Yat-sen’s elaboration of great Asianism: 
 
What kind of problem is it for the “Great Asianism” we are speaking of? 
In brief, it is a cultural problem, a problem of comparison and conflict 
between Eastern and Western cultures…. Eastern culture follows the 
“kingly way,” while Western culture follows the “hegemonic 
way”…Since you Japanese have acquired the hegemonic culture of 
Europe and America, and are endowed with the nature of Asian kingly 
culture, it is left to your decision whether to become the pawn of the 
Western hegemonic way or to become the guardian of the Eastern 
kingly way.38  
 
Sun Yat-sen seemed to hold no grudge against Japan’s being in the leading 
role in modern Asia, but he shifted (tactfully, perhaps) the topic of great 
Asianism to an East-West dichotomy and designated the East as benevolent and 
the West as invasive. Furthermore, the East-West division here bears very little 
relevance to geography, but is culturally and morally defined. This shows the 
real concern of the Chinese intellectual world in the early 20th century, which 
was characterized by numerous disputes between pro-Westernization advocates 
and traditionalists. In 1915, Chen Duxiu opened the East-West debate in China 
by claiming that: 
 
Modern civilizations are strictly divided into the Eastern and Western 
                                                                                                                                             
p.107. 
37 Li Dazhao, “Da Yaxiya zhuyi yu xin Yaxiya zhuyi,” in Li Dazhao quanji, Vol.2, p.269. 
38 Sun Yat-sen, “Dui Shenhu shangyiehuiyisuo deng tuanti de yanshuo,” in Sun Zhongshan 
quanji, Vol.11, pp.407-409. 
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parts. The two representatives of Eastern civilizations are India and 
China. While there are some differences between the two, they are 
largely the same in the sense that they do not transcend the phase of 
ancient civilization. Although they live in the modern world, they are 
actually remnants of the past. The title of modern civilization is 
exclusive to the Europeans, which is nothing less than Western 
civilization…39 
 
Chen Duxiu’s stance was a radical one; he appealed to abolition of 
dictatorship politically and eradication of traditional social regulations ethically, 
acclaiming the Western values of individual independence, freedom, and 
equality.40 The most engaged polemic antagonist of Chen Duxiu was Du Yaquan, 
a strong supporter of traditional Chinese culture, who held a typical view of 
cultural harmonization: 
 
My opinion is that the difference between Western civilization and our 
traditional civilization is one of nature, rather than one of 
degree…Western civilization is as strong as wine, and our civilization 
is as light as water; Western civilization is as juicy as meat, and our 
civilization is as coarse as vegetables. Those who are addicted to wine 
and meat must be cured by water and vegetables.41 
 
The devastation of WWI prompted Du Yaquan to further claim that the 
Western inclination for materialism and action could be offset by the Eastern 
inclination for self-sufficiency and reasoning.42 It is clear that the civilizational 
discourse produced in inter-war China bears resemblance to that of 
contemporary Japan. Both Japanese and Chinese intellectuals rode on the tide 
of the “decline of the West” and assigned themselves the mission of rescuing a 
                                                   
39 Chen Duxiu, “Falanxiren yu jindaiwenming” 法蘭西人與近代文明 (French and Modern 
Civilization), in Chen Duxiu zhuzuoxuan, Vol.1, p.136. 
40 Chen Duxiu, “Wuren zuihou zhi juewu” 吾人最後之覺悟 (Our Last Awakening), in Chen 
Duxiu zhuzuoxuan, Vol.1, pp.175-179. 
41 Du Yaquan, “Jingde wenmin yu dongde wenming” 靜的文明與動的文明 (Static Civilization 
and Dynamic Civilization), in Xu Jilin 許紀霖 and Tian Jianyie 田建業 eds. Du Yaquan 
wencun 杜亞泉文存  (Collected Works of Du Yaquan) (Shanghai: Shanghai Education 
Publishing House, 2003), p.338. 
42  Du Yaquan, “Zhanhou dongxi wenming zhi tiahe” 戰後東西文明之調和  (Harmonious 
Fusion of Eastern and Western Civilizations after the War), in Du Yaquan wencun, 
pp.346-347. 
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bankrupt Western civilization. There is a critical difference, however. In China, 
there was no historical momentum to sustain such a project, which became a 
mere fantasy, while the project was implemented in earnest in Japan but to 
devastating effect. Chang Naide 常乃悳 (1898-1947) astutely pointed out that 
the concept of an East-West dichotomy prevalent in early twentieth-century 
China was actually learned from Japan, which first had to create a seeming 
antagonism between East and West before it could attempt to realize the dream 
of harmonizing the two.43 While Li Dazhao firmly believed in the fundamental 
East-West division and highly appraised the view of harmonization proposed by 
Kita Reikichi, he lamented that such a view should have been formulated by the 
Chinese rather than by the Japanese.44  
Liang Shuming’s Eastern and Western Civilizations and Their Philosophies 
is widely regarded as the greatest Chinese work of its kind. The three ways of 
life Liang observed—Western, Chinese, and Indian—represent three different 
attitudes towards fulfillment of human desires: active, moderate, and passive. 
These three ways place emphases on material, ethical, and spiritual matters 
respectively and thus embody three successive phases of human civilization. The 
Western attitude, Liang argued, was no doubt the most appropriate for 
satisfying basic human needs, whereas the Chinese and Indian civilizations 
were simply too engaged in ethical and spiritual issues from early ages to cope 
properly with material problems and lagged behind the modern era.45 Despite 
its philosophical depth and theoretical novelty, in terms of deep structure, 
Liang’s civilizational discourse is no different from Chen Duxiu’s view that 
China and India were two representatives of Eastern civilization that lived 
largely on traditional legacies. Both China and India in their discourse assume a 
character that is more temporal than spatial; both countries were faced with the 
challenge of modernization, albeit different proposals for that modernization 
were formulated. Significantly, Liang Shuming’s and Ōkuma Shigenobu’s works 
were published around the same time and given similar titles. While the former 
endeavored to find places for Chinese and Indian civilizations in a 
modernity-centric world history, the latter was optimistic about Japan’s vantage 
                                                   
43 Chang Naide, “Dongfang wenming yu xifang wenming” 東方文明與西方文明  (Eastern 
Civilization and Western Civilization), in Chen Song ed., Wusiqianhou dongxiwenhuawenti 
lunzhanwenxuan, p.282. 
44  Li Dazhao, “Dongxiwenming genben zhi yidian” 東西文明根本之異點  (Fundamental 
Differences between Eastern and Western Civilizations), in Li Dazhao quanji, Vol.2, p.223. 
45 Liang Shuming, Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue, pp.287-288. 
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in harmonizing the East with the West.  
One point should be clear from the analysis above: Asianism and East-West 
civilizational discourse constitute two different discursive fields. The former 
embodies a geopolitical imagination or even ambition facilitated by successful 
modernization, but the latter is basically an ideological effort to position one’s 
own civilization in the world. The identification of the two in Japan was 
historically triggered; such conditions were absent in China. The same can also 
be said of early twentieth-century India. 
As a colony of the British Empire for centuries, India’s version of the 
East-West dichotomy was naturally deeply rooted in the Indo-British 
relationship. Nevertheless, when it comes to the idea of Asia, one author 
reminds us:  
 
If one accepts that identities are…constructions that are shaped in 
and through larger discourses, then one must emphasize the absence 
of such an Asian discourse in the public domain of contemporary India. 
In this turbulent domain encompassing any number of identitarian 
debates around caste, community, religion, gender, region, language, 
and nation, the belongingness to a larger imagined community called 
Asia does not exist.46 
 
What is discussed here is “contemporary India.” But the “identitarian 
debates” that are currently raging are in fact historical inheritances, which were 
characterized in the early 20th century by Rabindranath Tagore as what made a 
“syncretic civilization” of India: “In an essay…published in 1902, Tagore argued 
that India’s aim through the ages has been ‘to establish unity amidst diversity’, 
without eliminating the uniqueness of each [i.e. either] element. In 1912, Tagore 
elaborated this notion further and postulated that while India’s endeavor has 
been to bring about unity through cultural assimilation, Western civilization 
has been characterized by self-aggrandizement and suppression of diversity by 
means of state power.” 47  Such is the formulation of Tagore’s East-West 
civilizational discourse, which posits the East as tolerant and inclined to 
                                                   
46 Rustom Bharucha, Another Asia: Rabindranath Tagore & Okakura Tenshin, p.xvi. 
47 Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Talking Back: The Idea of civilization in the Indian Nationalist 
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harmonize diversity, and the West as exclusive and threatening to efface 
differences. This view is inevitably India-centric in its equating India with the 
East, just as Chinese discourse is naturally China-centric, as is evidenced by 
Sun Yat-sen’s endowing the Eastern “kingly way” with Confucian virtues. 
Nonetheless, “modernity” plays a particularly significant role in Tagore’s view of 
world civilizations. He sincerely admired the lofty idealism expressed in 
classical Western humanism; the scientific way to truth is also one of the 
greatest contributions the West has ever made to the world. But the rise of the 
nation-state in the modern era has confined humanity within national, or at 
best Western, borders, with imperialism being considered applicable to those 
“uncivilized” non-nations, which means most parts of the earth’s surface. For 
Tagore, science was noble in terms of its objective spirit, yet its abuse by modern 
Europeans in refining massively destructive weapons and stimulating material 
desires was culpable.48 As the first Nobel Prize winner from Asia whose rise on 
the international stage overlapped the period of the “decline of the West,” 
Tagore felt obliged to preach “Eastern spiritual culture” to remedy “Western 
materialistic culture.” To prove the vigor of the East—a spatial idea that Tagore 
identified with past achievements as virtually all of his contemporaries 
did—Japan weighed very much in Tagore’s civilizational discourse in view of its 
successful transformation into a modernized country. However, to warn against 
the overwhelming Westernization and militarization he perceived in Japan on a 
1916 trip, Tagore attempted to revise the definition of modernity:  
 
I must warn them that modernising is a mere affectation of modernism, 
just as an affectation of poesy is poetising. It is nothing but mimicry, 
only affectation is louder than the original, and it is too literal. One 
must bear in mind that those who have the true modern spirit need not 
modernise, just as those who are truly brave are not braggarts.49 
 
This new definition of modernity was further clarified in a 1924 speech in 
China: “impertinence of material things is extremely old. The revelation of spirit 
in man is modern: I am on its side, for I am modern.”50 By detaching modernity 
                                                   
48 Detailed discussions can be found throughout this dissertation. 
49 Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism, p.93. 
50 Rabindranath Tagore, “Talks in China,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., The English Writings of 
Rabindranath Tagore, Volume IV: Essays, p.779. 
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from material achievements, Tagore was trying to picture for the East a great 
future that would be premised on inexhaustible spiritual resources.  
As mentioned, Japan was where the notion of Asia took on the most 
profound significance among Eastern countries. Historically speaking, the 
burgeoning idea of Japanese Asianism, which later crystallized in The Ideal of 
the East, was brought to the Tagore family in Kolkata by the author Okakura 
Kakuzō himself in 1901. Tagore was greatly moved by the ideal of an Asian 
unity as claimed by Okakura, whose The Ideal of the East starts with the 
following statement: 
 
Asia is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty 
civilisations, the Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the 
Indian with its individualism of the Vedas. But not even the snowy 
barriers can interrupt for one moment that broad expanse of love for 
the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-inheritance 
of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions 
of the world, and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of 
the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, 
and to search out the means, not the end, of life.51 
 
This statement can be viewed as the prototype of Tagore’s Asian discourse. 
Interestingly, as one of the rare Indian thinkers who took the idea of Asia 
seriously, Tagore found audiences for his Asian ideal only after receiving 
accolades from the West, in a paradox similar to the fact that Japan’s proposal 
of Asianism was based on its Westernization. But even such an idealist as 
Tagore was keenly aware of the emptiness of “Asia” as a signifier: “we have not 
yet been able to develop a universal mind, a great background of Oriental 
cultures. Our cultures are too scattered.” 52  Indeed, when Tagore sought 
comrades in China for an Asian unity, what he offered was nothing more than a 
philosophy of the weak: “We in India are a defeated race; we have no power, 
political, military or commercial; we do not know how to help or to injure you 
materially. But, fortunately we can meet you as your guests, your brothers and 
                                                   
51 Okakura Kakuzō, The Ideals of the East, in Okakura Kakuzo: Collected English Writings, 
Vol.1, p.13. 
52 Rabindranath Tagore, “On Oriental Culture and Japan’s Mission,” in Mohit K. Ray ed., 
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your friends; let that happen.”53 Such an offer irritated many Chinese at the 
time: “Unfortunately, as an Easterner born in China, I find clear explanations of 
Eastern culture neither in Chinese books nor in Tagore’s essays and lectures.”54 
If Tagore took a humanistic or spiritual approach to Asia, Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s view was secular and historical. In Glimpses of World History, he 
reminded his first reader, his teenage daughter Indira Gandhi (1917-1984), that 
Asia is the cradle of all major religions of the world. In the chapter “The Old 
Civilizations and Our Inheritance,” Nehru emphasized:  
 
But nowhere else, apart from India and China, has there been a real 
continuity of civilization…It is true that both of them have fallen 
greatly from their old estate, and that the ancient cultures are covered 
up with a heap of dust, and sometimes filth, which the long ages have 
accumulated. But still they endure and the old Indian civilization is 
the basis of Indian life even today.55 
 
In a work that claims influence from H. G. Well’s The Outline of History,56 
Nehru did nothing more than characterize China and India as two great, 
enduring ancient civilizations.  This seems to have become their common 
identity in the modern world, a world that centers on Western politics and 
economics. As for Japan, Nehru “demonstrated that being Asian did not make 
him [i.e. Japan] any less morally indignant about oppression and the denial of 
human rights among Asians. Here was an Asian culture that had not only 
escaped being victimized by the west, but had actually, in some ways, surpassed 
the west as a military power and victimizer of others.”57 But what was Nehru’s 
concept of Asia?  
 
[T]he whole spirit and outlook of Asia are peaceful, and the emergence 
of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world 
peace….We, therefore, support the United Nations structure which is 
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painfully emerging from its infancy. But in order to have One World, 
we must also, in Asia, think of the countries of Asia co-operating 
together for that larger ideal.58 
 
Here Nehru was addressing an Asian conference convened in 1947 in Delhi. 
No Japanese delegates seem to have been present as Nehru makes no mention of 
any. The speech is political and complimentary, but it is obvious that, despite 
decades of effort, an Asian identity had not come to anything substantial two 
years after the end of WWII, when the world was seeking desperately for a new 
order, for which “Asia” could provide nothing but a “peaceful spirit.”  
From the observations made above, it might not be hasty to conclude that 
from the East-West dichotomy, which was in effect a tradition-modernity 
dialectic, to the idea of Asia, which was geopolitically devised to cope with a 
modern West-centric world order, claiming or arguing the East (or Asia) is 
basically a modern intellectual endeavor. The East, in spite of its historicity, has 
been thrust into a process of redefinition since the mid-nineteenth century to 
account for the apparent imbalance in power structure of the modern world. The 
East-West division has presented perplexing questions to world historians, who 
are required to explain how world history developed into, and how it will evolve 
from, this geographical as well as ideological dichotomy. Indeed, many of the 
polemicists of East-West civilizations do not regard themselves as historians; 
their definitions of world history, if any, are not subject to any single perspective 
or framework. Nevertheless, since the East has been pitted against the West, 
the latter’s rise and fall in history will continue to shape our world view for some 
time to come. As Itō Shuntarō 伊東俊太郎, a Japanese scholar on comparative 
civilizations, claimed around 1974: 
 
Now is a great turning point in history....The two great wars of this 
century [i.e. the 20th century] witnessed the Western Europe-centric 
world make boisterous noises and then come to silence, with 
“modernity” that was closely connected with this Western 
Europe-centrism also coming to an end….Indeed, in the past four 
hundred years it was the Western European world that initiated 
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so-called “modernity,” but that their world historical narratives were 
rather biased is also an indisputable fact. The end of the “Western 
European” period signifies the coming of the period of “human beings,” 
and the distortions visible in Western Europe-centric world history 
shall be put right.59 
 
It is interesting that Itō separates American from Western European 
civilization in his seventeen main categories.60 The diversity of human cultures 
seems to be better addressed in this way, but American hegemony did not seem 
to bother him in the mid-1970s (at this early date, McNeill might not have 
questioned his own America-centric stance, either). Perhaps some political 
reasons account for Itō’s interpretation as Japan during the Cold War was under 
the aegis of America. This possibility cannot be excluded since, as demonstrated 
above, definition of civilizations has always been a matter no less political than 
intellectual. In any case, complementary to the efforts of claiming Eastern or 
even global civilizations, de-Westernization is an ongoing project. 
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Conclusion:  
Asia in Cultural Interaction Studies 
 
 
General  ref lect ions 
 
At this final stage, I would like to reconsider the meaning, purpose, scope, 
and methodology of cultural interaction studies since this dissertation has been 
written to meet the requirements for a doctoral degree in this newly created 
field. To be more specific, what is new is not the practice of doing research on the 
relationships between different cultures, but the conscious focus on those 
relationships, with a view to wider contexts of human affairs that are not 
delimited by borderlines, either intellectual or territorial.  
In other words, in cultural interaction studies, what is needed is new 
perspectives and interpretations, since, psychologically, “context” is in itself a 
notion contingent upon cultural and political definitions. Technically, the 
materials that furnish this new discipline are mainly gathered on a national 
scale. It is modern national apparatuses that are sponsoring institutes for 
cross-border, trans-disciplinary, and multi-lingual studies, although this 
academic impetus has grown out of the awareness that the nation as a category 
is no longer sufficient for this globalizing world. In this sense, cultural 
interaction studies are nothing less than a product of the contemporary age. 
Nations are competing not in glorifying their own traditions, but in discovering 
larger stages for their intellectual syntheses, and thus are seeking the power to 
speak for regions, continents, and even the world.  
What is manifest here remains, for better or worse, the relation between 
power and knowledge, a relation that a considerable portion of 
twentieth-century academic history had endeavored to confirm. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the efforts that have been made in recent decades, when it comes to 
East Asia—the region that my own institute focuses on—now we know more 
about the legacies shared by its constituents, notably China, Japan, Korea, and 
Vietnam. It is generally agreed that certain China-originated traditions, such as 
political and economic institutions, material cultures, written script and even 
literary genres, were rather influential in peripheral countries. Thought was 
much trickier, however. While Confucianism claims to be the ethic foundation of 
 224 
East Asia overall, nationalization or localization of Confucian values has never 
ceased in these countries throughout their histories. In the modern era, 
de-Sinicization has even become an express intellectual theme, especially in 
Japan.  
Arguably, “the East” or “Asia,” though not originating in Japan, was 
employed by the newly modernized country to address both its identification 
with and aloofness from this non-Western sphere. Japan sought to define an 
Asia of inherent unity in order to dominate it, with a view to vying with Western 
powers. India became indispensable in this picture as a spiritual source of Asian 
civilization parallel to that of China. As it happened, it was the Indian poet 
Rabindranath Tagore, globally acclaimed as the first non-European Nobel 
laureate, who travelled and lectured extensively, and raised Asia to a new 
height of articulation, thus revealing how flexible but problematic was the 
notion of Asia. 
 
Summary of  dissertation 
 
This dissertation explores how Asia was understood by early 
twentieth-century intellectuals in different parts of the world. Besides the 
political and economic disadvantages suffered by most Asian countries at the 
time, ideologically, the idea of Asia was involved in two heated debates: that 
between East and West and that between tradition and modernity.  
This project delves into these dichotomies by using Rabindranath Tagore as 
the central figure. Three interrelated approaches are adopted, namely, 
empirical, historical, and theoretical. Both primary and secondary materials are 
significant in the research. The former are used for a critically nuanced study of 
Tagore’s civilizational discourse, whereas the latter are drawn upon to indicate 
how attitudes towards Tagore have fluctuated in different countries in the past 
century. Through these documents I review Tagore’s relationship with modern 
intellectual history in various contexts, particularly China and Japan, which is 
followed by theoretical analyses of world history. 
By analyzing Tagore’s grand narrative of East-West civilizations, his 
exchange of ideas with intellectuals worldwide, and different conventions of 
studies on him since the 1910s, I hope to have achieved three purposes: 
First, clarifying the current state of Tagore studies—chiefly in India, 
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Britain, America, Japan, and China—which are strongly although not 
exclusively influenced by an Orientalist perspective, and endowing Tagore’s 
East-West paradigm with more historical and geographical nuances.  
Second, contextualizing the East-West civilizational discourse prevalent in 
China and Japan in the early 20th century in a global environment, and 
examining how thinkers of different backgrounds such as Tagore, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Okakura Tenshin, Ōkuma Shigenobu, Liang Qichao, 
Liang Shuming, Feng Youlan, John Dewey, and Bertrand Russell evaluated 
Japan, China, and even Asia as a whole in the modern world. 
Third, exploring the one-Asia slogan proposed in the early 20th century, 
which, for historical reasons, did not include the Arab world or follow the 
post-war classification of “East Asia” or “South Asia.” Furthermore, I have also 
related the idea of Asia discussed above to world historical narratives, with the 
axial age theory as the main framework. 
 
Future prospects   
 
Rabindranath Tagore’s instrumental role in theorizing the idea of Asia is 
explored in this dissertation. His grand narrative of East-West civilizations 
follows simplistic assumptions and was frequently criticized; however, with the 
rise of Asia in recent decades, Tagore’s ideal of Asia has been receiving frequent 
reviews and is critically examined in post-colonial studies.  
Although not as world-famous as Tagore, other intellectuals or schools of 
thinkers in various Asian countries also contributed to the pan-Asian discourse. 
Therefore, in the near future, I expect to explore the various contexts in which 
the specific notion of Asia took shape, and connect them to general intellectual 
trends in the modern world. Similar works do exist, but my own view is that one 
must understand different contexts and traditions in order to better expand on 
the bonds between cultures. This is my conviction, as well as my overarching 
paradigm.  
From a spatial viewpoint, what Tagore appealed to in his proposal for an 
Asian unity was Asia to the east of the Arab world, which he called “eastern 
Asia” under the influence of Buddhism. This domain of “eastern Asia” roughly 
corresponds to “the East” in both the Chinese and Japanese languages 
(Dongfang and Tōyō, respectively), with China and India being its two pillars 
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and Japan remaining ambivalent in this classification. Temporally, the idea of 
Asia or the East did not emerge contemporaneously in China, Japan, and India. 
Their historical experiences have shaped their respective approaches to 
self-definition. Furthermore, their different roles in the post-war world order 
have also influenced their Asian outlooks. Thus, both space and time are crucial 
parameters in tracing the notion of Asia, or at least the eastern part of Asia, in 
the modern world. 
This future project will have two focuses: to delve into the “Asian projects” 
of China, Japan, and India from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, and 
to compare such views of Asia with mainstream world historical narratives and 
philosophies prevalent in the West, with differentiations within the West being 
carefully noted. In such a project, Tagore, as one of the prominent figures who 
reinforced the dichotomized view of the East versus the West, can be 
contextualized in the formulation of a modern worldview that is a product of the 
collaborative efforts of intellectuals from both hemispheres. Temporally, 
although “Asian discourse” is a recent notion, the responses of different Asian 
countries to the “other” are the outgrowths of centuries or even millennia of 
experiences. Understanding of these traditions is the cornerstone of solid 
cultural interaction studies. 
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